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ABSTRACT 
 In the wake of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the United States designated the 
Jihad al-Bina’ organization in 2007 and its postwar recovery project Wa’ad in 2009 for 
its relationship with, and activities supporting, Lebanese Hezbollah. Because of this 
designation, Jihad al-Bina’ and Wa’ad became subject to sanctions which, in theory, 
should have undermined their ability to support Hezbollah’s strategic objectives by 
denying Jihad al-Bina’ access to necessary resources and funding to execute projects. 
This thesis examines Jihad al-Bina’s projects from 1988–2018 to determine how    
Jihad al-Bina’ contributed to Hezbollah’s strategic objectives. It also examines how U.S. 
sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 and its Wa’ad project in 2009 affected their 
ability to carry out that work. In detailing Jihad al-Bina’s activities and projects during 
this time period, this thesis compares the number, nature and scale of projects executed 
by Jihad al-Bina’ prior to and following U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 
and 2009, respectively. This thesis found that these 2007 and 2009 sanctions were 
ineffective in the near- and long-term. The sanctions failed to deny Jihad al-Bina’ 
resources necessary to conduct immediate postwar reconstruction and recovery. 
Moreover, Jihad al-Bina’ expanded the size and scope of projects, and grew in size and 
legitimacy in the postwar era between 2009 and the present. 
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The construction and developmental wing of Lebanese Hezbollah, Jihad al-Bina’ 
or Construction Jihad, has been instrumental to Hezbollah’s growing popularity and 
political power in Lebanon. Just as Hezbollah grew from the seeds sewn by the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, 
Jihad al-Bina’ was purposefully seeded within Shiite Lebanon by its Iranian progenitors 
for the purpose of bolstering the Islamic revolution in Iran and strengthening its patronage 
network in Lebanon. Jihad al-Bina’ was modeled after Jehad-e Sazandegi, its Iranian 
parent organization.   
Jihad al-Bina’ is a crucial part of Hezbollah’s multi-faceted power consolidation 
strategy by playing a key role in Hezbollah’s social outreach and development in Lebanon. 
Hezbollah is most recognized for its military prowess and Iranian patronage; however, like 
its military wing, its less prominent construction and social services branch challenges the 
competency and capability of the state. The synergistic effects of Hezbollah’s various 
activities and sub-organizations helped transform the organization from a non-state client 
group to a politically powerful and legitimate apparatus within the Lebanese state.1   
Since its establishment in 1988, Jihad al-Bina’ bolstered and brokered Hezbollah’s 
influence first among Lebanon’s Shia communities in Southern Lebanon, the Bekaa valley, 
and the Shiite suburbs of Beirut. With Iranian training, assistance, and funding, Jihad al-
Bina’ and other Hezbollah-affiliated non-governmental organizations (NGO) provided 
severely needed social and utility services, critical housing, medical facilities, and 
infrastructure construction and repairs following damage sustained throughout the civil 
war, in multiple conflicts with Israel, and most recently following attacks by Sunni 
extremists. By focusing its efforts in Shia territories and neighborhoods, Jihad al-Bina’ 
ensured and promoted a loyal political constituency, and established itself as the 
predominant provider of public goods in lieu of a weakened and seemingly incompetent 
                                                 
1 Eric Lob, “Jihad al-Bina’: State-Building and Development in Iran and Lebanon’s Shi’i Territories,” 
Third World Quarterly, May 3, 2018, 1–2. 
2 
state. Effectively, these actions boosted Lebanese Shia support for Hezbollah at the 
expense of Lebanon’s alternative Shia political party, Amal, and the state.2   
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the wake of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the United States designated Jihad 
al-Bina’ in 2007 for its relationship with and activities supporting Lebanese Hezbollah—a 
designated terrorist group. Because of this designation, Jihad al-Bina’ became subject to 
secondary sanctions which, in theory, should undermine its ability to support Hezbollah’s 
strategic objectives by denying the organization access to necessary resources and funding 
to execute projects. This thesis will examine and characterize Jihad al-Bina’s actions from 
2000 to 2018 to determine how Jihad al-Bina’ contributed to Hezbollah’s strategic 
objectives, and how U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina in 2007 affected its ability to 
carry out its work. In detailing Jihad al-Bina’s activities and projects during this time 
period, this thesis will attempt to characterize and qualify the scope and scale of collective 
projects executed by Jihad al-Bina’ prior to and following the 2007 U.S. sanctions. This 
analysis will determine if and how the sanctions obstructed the organization from achieving 
its objectives. It will also attempt to characterize if and how Hezbollah maneuvered to 
mitigate the effects of these sanctions, and evaluate to what degree Hezbollah succeeded 
in this regard.   
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States has enduring interests in Lebanon and the Middle East. Because 
of Lebanon’s weak government and military, and its precarious location on the borders of 
Israel and Syria, it has been the battleground of multiple conflicts involving the United 
States’ friends and enemies. It is also a battleground of political influence between regional 
adversaries; namely, the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia against Iran and Syria. 
Lebanon is the arena in which the external battle for regional influence in the Middle East 
between Iran and its adversaries—primarily, the United States—began. And Iran is 
winning. 
                                                 
2 Lob, “Jihad al-Bina’: State-Building and Development in Iran and Lebanon’s Shi’i Territories,” 2–3. 
3 
The United States’ strategy in the Middle East for decades includes curtailing the 
spread of Iranian influence in the region. U.S. National Defense Strategies from 2008 and 
2018, as well as the National Military Strategy from 2015 all purport that Iran’s 
sponsorship of terrorist organizations and proxy wars in the Middle East destabilize the 
region and constitute challenges of strategic importance.3   
Since the 1979 revolution, Iran seeks to promote its security goals: establish, secure, 
and strengthen an ideal and self-sufficient Islamic state by way of perpetual revolution at 
home and abroad. The primary theater where the revolution takes place is the Middle East. 
The United States is the primary threat to achieving Iran’s security goals. Iran achieves its 
security goals by undermining U.S. interests in the region. Iran carries out its regional 
policies via the IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF), primarily through its like-minded proxy 
groups. Iran supports and sometimes is directly integrated with Houthi rebels in Yemen, 
various Hashd al-Shaabi groups in Iraq, Shia minorities in Kuwait and Bahrain, and Shia 
militias in Syria. However, Iran pragmatically also works with other non-Shia groups—
Sunnis and Christians—as long as their interests and goals align. 
The United States sees Iran as “the most significant challenge to Middle East 
stability.”4  The United States government considers countering Iran’s policy of exporting 
the revolution via its network of proxies and state-sponsored terrorist groups a top priority.5  
The archetype for Iran’s successful revolution exportation policy in the region is the 
diffusion and ascension of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Shortly after Israeli forces invaded 
Beirut in 1982, the IRGC capitalized on standing relations and networks between Iranian 
and Lebanese activists, clergy, and militants to form the basis of what evolved into the 
                                                 
3 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” 2018, 2; Robert M. Gates, “2008 U.S. 
National Defense Strategy” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 2008), 
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2008_NDS.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-124535-363, 4; Joint 
Chiefs Of Staff Washington Dc, “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015: The 
United States Military’s Contribution to National Security:” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical 
Information Center, June 1, 2015), https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA619156, 2. 
4 Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.” 
5 Mattis, 2, 9. 
4 
Lebanese Shiite resistance organization, Hezbollah.6  From its inception, Hezbollah 
followed the lead from its Iranian leadership and adopted a stark anti-American, anti-
Western stance.7  Hezbollah leaped to the forefront of American consciousness following 
the killing of hundreds in the 1983 U.S. and French barracks suicide bombings in Lebanon, 
the 1984 U.S. embassy bombing in Beirut, and a slew of highly publicized kidnappings, 
torture, and murder of Americans. 
This seemingly backwards and barbaric organization that emerged from the 
violence in the 1980s evolved into the most capable military and political force in modern 
day Lebanon. In many ways, Hezbollah’s military force is more powerful than the regular 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Estimates regarding the strength of Hezbollah’s fighting 
force are broad and inconsistent. The Dubai-based Gulf Research Center estimated 
Hezbollah’s full-time fighters were approximately 1,000 with another 6,000—10,000 
volunteers.8  Iranian Fars News Agency states that Hezbollah has 65,000 fighters,9 while 
Israeli Haaretz news service estimates Hezbollah’s current strength at 45,000 of which 
21,000 are full-time fighters. It also estimates Hezbollah’s rocket stockpile to have 
increased from the 2006 war at 12,000-14,000 rockets to approximately 120,000 rockets at 
the present time.10  Speaking to Hezbollah’s capabilities as a formidable adversary, Israeli 
Brigadier General Gui Zur described Hezbollah as “by far the greatest guerilla group in the 
world.”11   
Hezbollah also forms the backbone of one of the major political blocs in Lebanese 
politics. Hezbollah first made the decision to participate in Lebanese elections in 1992 in 
which it won 8 of 128 parliamentary seats, 27 of which are designated for Shia candidates. 
                                                 
6 Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 112–113. 
7 “The Hizballah Program - An Open Letter,” August 21, 2006, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060821215729/http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm. 
8 Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 140. 
9 “No One Can Fight a 65,000 Combatant-Strong Hezbollah,” January 15, 2013, 
http://www.farsnews.com/news/13911026001114. 
10 “Hezbollah: Not a Terror Group but a Midsized Army,” accessed May 25, 2018, 
https://www.haaretz.com/st/c/prod/eng/2016/07/lebanon2/. 
11 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story, 140. 
5 
From that time, it consolidated political power in the Shia community—the largest 
religious bloc in Lebanon. Throughout and following the Lebanese civil war, Lebanese 
political alliances were divided along pro- and anti-Syrian lines; Hezbollah fell clearly into 
the pro-Syrian camp. Following the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005, the pro-Syrian 
groups coalesced around Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) in the shape 
of the March 8 alliance. During the years that followed, Hezbollah effectively collapsed 
the government in protest to government and international efforts to investigate and 
prosecute the assassination of former prime minister, Rafik al-Hariri, which likely would 
have implicated Syrian government leadership and Hezbollah members. In the subsequent 
government, Hezbollah maneuvered its way into holding key cabinet positions and won 
additional seats in the 2009 elections. New proportional representation electoral laws 
implemented prior to the 2018 elections led to dissipation of the March 8 alliance.12  The 
resultant alliances led to Hezbollah and Hezbollah-friendly representatives from Amal and 
the FPM to gain over a third of the seats in parliament. This represents the largest portion 
of political representation and influence Hezbollah accrued to date.13 
Despite Hezbollah’s rise in prominence, the violence that characterized the 
emergence of Hezbollah in its early years remains a permanent fixture in the way the 
American government perceives the organization today. Hezbollah is by far the most 
prominent face of Iran’s revolution abroad. Since the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, 
the United States strives to contain the spread of Iranian influence across the Middle East. 
The United States unabashedly led a broad company of international support for Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980–1988. More recently, U.S. forces 
clashed with IRGC-led proxies throughout the second Iraq war. 
Given the strategic importance the United States places on stopping the spread of 
Iran’s influence and the growth of Hezbollah, this paper will analyze the effects of U.S. 
efforts in Lebanon in this regard. Since 2005 and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from 
                                                 
12 “New Vote Law Leaves Lebanese Perplexed | News , Lebanon Elections | THE DAILY STAR,” 
accessed May 25, 2018, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Mar-07/440551-new-
vote-law-leaves-lebanese-perplexed.ashx. 
13 “Results of the 2018 Lebanese General Elections,” accessed May 25, 2018, 
http://www.interior.gov.lb/AdsDetails.aspx?ida=281. 
6 
Lebanon, the United States invested more than $1.4 billion in the LAF.14  This was in part 
to maintain some parity with Hezbollah’s increasing capability. However, these 
investments did little to curb Hezbollah’s growth as Hezbollah does not rely on the 
Lebanese government for funding. In fact, since its withdrawal from Lebanon following 
the Marine barracks and embassy bombings, the United States’ half-hearted policies in 
Lebanon have done little to contain the military or political growth of Hezbollah. 
Moreover, the United States did little to support the Lebanese government or rival 
political groups at the level necessary to counter Hezbollah’s growing influence throughout 
Lebanon. Hezbollah’s growing popularity in the Shia-dominant areas of Southern 
Lebanon, the Bekaa valley, and the Shia suburbs of Beirut was not a given nor is it a 
mystery—it provided services in the areas neglected by the government. In these areas, 
Hezbollah invested heavily through its social and construction sub-organizations, such as 
Jihad al-Bina’ and other Hezbollah-affiliated NGOs. Specifically, Jihad al-Bina’ provided 
essential services, utilities, vocational training, medical services, financial assistance, and 
rebuilt many of the facilities damaged during Israeli attacks and during the Lebanese civil 
war.15  Effectively, Jihad al-Bina’ ensured the concentration of Lebanon’s Shia 
populations remained in place and provided a Hezbollah-friendly population from which 
the organization could draw recruits and rely upon during elections.16  To counter 
Hezbollah, the United States placed sanctions on Jihad al-Bina’. This paper will examine 
if these sanctions had their desired effect. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Little scholarly literature focusing on the effectiveness of sanctions targeting Jihad 
al-Bina’, Hezbollah, or Hezbollah’s affiliates could be located. However, there is no 
shortage of literature on the Hezbollah organization as a whole. Within that body of 
literature, certain works constitute the baseline pseudo-cannon on Hezbollah and 
                                                 
14 “Cuts to U.S. Aid Will Affect Support to Lebanese Army | Nicholas Blanford,” AW, accessed May 
28, 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/cuts-us-aid-will-affect-support-lebanese-army. 
15 Eric Lob, “An Institutional History of the Iranian Jihad al-Bina’: From Inception to 
Institutionalization (1979-2011)” (Princeton, 2013), 266. 
16 Eric Lob, “An Institutional History of the Iranian Jihad al-Bina,’” 152. 
7 
continually inform further, more detailed research. These authors explain the emergence, 
growth, and development of Hezbollah and form a body of literature focusing on the Iran-
Lebanon nexus and Shiite transnationalism. Naim Qassem and Augustus Norton both detail 
the political history of Lebanon, as well as the social history of Lebanon’s Shia community 
within this political context.17  Both describe Hezbollah’s evolution from a fledgling 
guerilla fighting force to a complex resistance organization with an essential and growing 
military force, a strong political presence, and a successful social development branch.18  
As Eric Lob points out, each of these scholars acknowledged that Hezbollah’s social 
welfare and development services helped gain popular support and attract recruits. 
However, none of them articulate the U.S. policy response to these organizations, nor the 
effects of the U.S. response.19 
Like Qassem and Norton, Judith Harik’s works focus on Hezbollah’s 
transformation. However, she highlights the instrumentalism of Hezbollah’s social services 
and public works in this transformation. Her nuanced works challenge the United States 
and Israel’s position that Hezbollah is unequivocally a terrorist organization, but rather a 
legitimate political and religious force, and most importantly, a resistance movement. She 
highlights that Hezbollah’s military actions are for the most part limited to legitimate 
military targets or are responses in kind.20  Because many states including U.S. allies favor 
Harik’s nuanced characterizations of the Hezbollah organization and designate its separate 
branches independently, her works shed light on complexities related to acquiring a 
consensus on the legitimacy Hezbollah’s actions.   
The literature on Hezbollah’s identity and ideology focuses on the justifications and 
mechanisms the organization utilized to transform from a seemingly uncompromising 
                                                 
17 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story; Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: A Story from Within, Third (London: 
Saqi Books, 2012). 
18 Sami Hermez, review of Review of Hezbollah: A Short History, by Augustus Richard Norton, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 41, no. 1 (2009): 148–49. 
19 Lob, “An Institutional History of the Iranian Jihad al-Bina’: From Inception to Institutionalization 
(1979-2011).” 
20 Robert Brenton Betts, “Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism,” Middle East Policy; 
Washington 12, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 160–62; Judith P. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism 
(London - New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005). 
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dogmatic group to a politically savvy pragmatic one. Hamzeh’s foundational work on 
Hezbollah attempts to reconcile the group’s terrorist past and militant character with its 
emergent political role in Lebanon. He characterizes how the group’s religio-political 
ideology informs and guides its military, political, and social initiatives. Hamzeh believes 
Hezbollah follows a “gradualist-pragmatic” approach en route to its ultimate goal of 
establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon.21  This pragmatism enables the group to work 
within a political and sectarian plurality. Because this pragmatism allows Hezbollah to 
stray from or pause its quest toward a new Islamic state, Hamzeh advocates for domestic 
and international policies that integrate Hezbollah more organization rather than isolate it, 
as sanctions would. Similarly, Joseph Alagha determined that “[Hezbollah] changes as 
circumstances change.”  Alagha argues that Hezbollah altered its power-building strategy 
from a less-effective one centered on military force to its current and ever-adapting political 
strategy which enabled it to maintain its independent military and grow more powerful than 
the government.22  While both authors point to Hezbollah’s social service organizations as 
evidence of their pragmatic metamorphosis, their significant writings related to Jihad al-
Bina’ and the Al-Shahid Foundation predate or ignore U.S. sanctions. 
Harik’s characterization of Hezbollah agrees with, if not informs another thin body 
of literature which attempts to explain the growth of Hezbollah in the face of sanctions. 
These authors articulate how even amongst allies a lack of consensus within the 
international community on what constitutes a terrorist organization is driven by domestic 
political necessity and may render sanctions useless. Peter Margulies writes that the 
European Union’s reticence to designate the entirety of the Hezbollah organization as 
terrorist—instead of just the military wing—allows the organization to channel fungible 
money through its political apparatus to the military wing.23  Some states are hesitant to 
blacklist the entire organization because of the expansiveness of its operations and the 
                                                 
21 Ahmad Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, First (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 
2004), 112. 
22 Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011); 
Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political 
Program (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 
23 Peter Margulies, “Terrorist Sanctions: The Clash in U.S. and EU Approaches,” 2016, 3. 
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avenue it provides foreign governments to work within Lebanon. This provides Hezbollah 
with additional avenues by which it may circumvent U.S. sanctions. However, no detailed 
scholarly work in this regard could be located.  
The literate which focuses on Hezbollah’s social organizations and work is 
Danawi’s foundational work focuses on Hezbollah’s social institutions—Al-Shahid and 
Jihad al-Bina’—and organizational strategies that propelled the organization to 
prominence in Lebanon and the region. Her work brings to light how the efficiency with 
which these organizations operate directly correlates to Hezbollah’s military and political 
successes. These organizations have tied it to the fabric of Lebanese society 
Eric Lob authors the most congruent body of scholarly literature dedicated to Jihad 
al-Bina’ in Lebanon, as well as its Iranian parent organization, Jehad-e Sazandegi. Lob 
focuses on the mechanisms of social movement theory (SMT) that shed light on the 
diffusion of Jehad-e Sazandegi into Shiite Lebanon; these are, mobilizing structures via 
activist networks, political opportunity (political instability and military conflict), and 
culture framing on a common ideology.24  His works detail Jihad al-Bina’s role in 
Hezbollah’s consolidation of power in Lebanese politics through provision of services, 
post-war reconstruction, and by strengthening and combining the religious and political 
identity of Lebanese Shiite citizens.25  However, Lob only mentions in passing U.S. efforts 
to counter Hezbollah’s utilization of Jihad al-Bina’ by emplacing sanctions in 2007 but 
offers no elaboration. 
Most of the literature focusing on Hezbollah and sanctions are policy 
recommendation pieces. Nearly all of these pieces are written prior to sanction 
implementation, and those that follow often advocated for further sanctions without 
reviewing the effectiveness of previous sets of sanctions. Matthew Levitt authors a broad 
and extensive body of literature on terrorist group finances and policy recommendations, 
including advocating a policy of sanctions against various Hezbollah affiliates. In his book 
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Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, he characterizes Hezbollah 
as Iran’s junior partner. It is not only a group that emerged and vies for power in Lebanon; 
Hezbollah also does the bidding of its Iranian senior partner and is committed to 
operational terrorism in the Levant, and a worldwide clandestine campaign of counter-US 
and Israeli propaganda and illicit fundraising.26  More broadly, Dr. Levitt authors a rich 
body of research which exposes funding activities of terrorist organizations, including 
Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s fundraising activities are often illegal and may circumvent state-
level sanctions due to their very nature. These illicit or otherwise difficult-to-track activities 
include Iranian state sponsorship, a global network of foreign expatriate remittances, 
charities and front organizations, criminal enterprises such as drug trafficking, and 
deceptive solicitation and financing.27  Dr. Levitt also details how terrorist organizations 
attempt to evade the negative effects of sanctions by setting up parallel organizations other 
than those sanctioned which perform the same functions under a new name. This forces 
governments into a metaphorical game of whack-a-mole in that each time an organization 
is sanctioned, another pops up in its stead. He also finds that terrorist organizations 
obfuscate their illicit activities by engaging in legitimate, even philanthropic activities to 
reinforce a benign character of the organization.28  However, like many authors that address 
sanctions against Hezbollah, Levitt’s policy papers and sanction writings are limited to 
recommending sanctions to spread the growth of the organization but stop short of 
reviewing the effects of these sanctions later on. The implication from these collective 
works is that, in short, sanctions work.  
Indeed, sanctions may accomplish their limited goals. For example, Lob states that 
Hezbollah’s Jihad al-Bina’ likely did not play a prominent role in post 2006 war 
                                                 
26 Thomas F. Lynch, “Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God,” Prism : A Journal 
of the Center for Complex Operations; Washington 5, no. 1 (2014): 132–35. 
27 Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, “The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing 
Terrorist Finances,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, no. Policy Focus #89 (November 
2008), 57–59. 
28 Matthew Levitt, “Hiding Terrorist Activity,” Blog, Middle East Strategy at Harvard (blog), January 
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reconstruction, “perhaps as a result of U.S. sanctions”29 implemented in 2007. He then 
points out that Hezbollah passed this responsibility to a new affiliated construction 
organization, Wa’ad. The Wa’ad project then became subject to sanctions in 2009 for its 
affiliation with Hezbollah.30  Levitt advocated for both sets of these sanctions and more.31  
However, while much has been written about the Hezbollah organization as a whole, there 
is not a body of literature dedicated to analyzing the effects of U.S. sanctions targeting the 
organization.   
The preceding review started by addressing academic literature explaining the 
emergence of the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon. It then covered authors who focus 
on Hezbollah’s ideology, and its transformation from a militant to political group. Lastly, 
the review covered authors that analyze Hezbollah’s finances and support organizations, 
such as Jihad al-Bina’. While much has been written about Hezbollah’s social and political 
history and Shiite transnationalism, little scholarly research has been conducted on U.S. 
efforts in Lebanon to counter Hezbollah’s Jihad al-Bina’ organization, or other Hezbollah-
affiliated NGOs. Much of the research touching upon this subject relates to terrorist 
financing and advocates policies, such as sanctions, to target and dry up Hezbollah’s global 
finance network. However, most of these papers advocate new policies without reviewing 
the effectiveness of previously-implemented sanctions. Most recently, some scholarly 
research detailed how Jihad al-Bina’ in Lebanon supports Hezbollah’s strategic objectives. 
However, no research could be located which dives into the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions 
on Jihad al-Bina’s ability to support Hezbollah’s strategic objectives. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis seeks to determine if U.S. sanctions which targeted Hezbollah’s Jihad 
al-Bina’ organization were effective. In the years since its foundation in 1988, Jihad al-
Bina’ served as Hezbollah’s official reconstruction and development organization and 
shaped the organization’s evolution from fledgling violent insurgent group to legitimate 
political party in Lebanon. It supported Hezbollah by consolidating a social and political 
base in Lebanon’s Shia territories. Apart from conducting post-war infrastructure and 
housing renovation and reconstruction, Jihad al-Bina’ conducted counseling, finance, and 
assistance services to promote self-sufficiency and income generation. Jihad al-Bina’ 
attracted recruits, compensated the families of Hezbollah fighters killed in battle, and 
secured votes during elections.32   
According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Jihad al-Bina’ is a conduit for 
terrorism financing due to its ties with Hezbollah. Specifically, the organization was 
officially sanctioned for its activities following the 2006 war with Israel. Hezbollah used 
Jihad al-Bina’ to raise funds and bolster Hezbollah’s standing through construction 
projects in southern Lebanon. It sought funding for these projects by employing “deceptive 
means [and] . . . practices, applying in the name of proxies not publicly linked to 
[Hezbollah].”  Jihad al-Bina’ became subject to secondary sanctions on February 20, 
2007.33  This thesis argues that while the specific sanctions implemented likely stifled 
Jihad al-Bina’s activities and consequently its ability to support Hezbollah, they likely did 
not obstruct Hezbollah’s growing popularity among Lebanon’s Shia nor the growth in 
political power of the organization. To test this, I advance the following two hypotheses.   
1. FIRST HYPOTHESIS 
U.S sanctions placed against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 and thereafter did not curb the 
organization’s activities. Jihad al-Bina’ effectively circumvented the effects of sanctions 
                                                 
32 Lob, “Jihad al-Bina’: State-Building and Development in Iran and Lebanon’s Shi’i Territories,” 10. 
33 “Treasury Targets Hizballah Construction Company,” accessed May 8, 2018, 
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with the help of foreign funding, by channeling funding from other non-sanctioned entities, 
and by setting up new organizations with parallel functions. 
2. SECOND HYPOTHESIS 
US sanctions helped to reinforce Hezbollah’s resistance identity and spurred 
Hezbollah’s consolidation of influence and power in Lebanon’s Shia communities. 
Because Jihad al-Bina’ provides critical services to Lebanon’s Shia territories, the U.S. 
narrative of Hezbollah’s terrorist classification did not resonate. Moreover, U.S. sanctions 
likely played into the anti-American, anti-Israeli resistance narrative Hezbollah maintains 
and helped Hezbollah gain sympathy and support away from Amal, which is more closely 
integrated into what is perceived by the Shia community as a weak state apparatus that 
does not have their interests in mind. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will be comprised of a comparative case study of Jihad al-Bina’s 
projects and activities primarily in Lebanon’s Shia territories of southern Lebanon, the 
Bekaa valley, and Beirut’s Shia suburbs before and after U.S. sanctions were emplaced on 
the organization starting in February 2007. The purpose of this study is to characterize and 
qualify the scope and scale of Jihad al-Bina’s collective projects executed between 1988 
through mid-2007 when the group was designated by the U.S. Treasury, against projects 
conducted from mid-2007 to the present. Although sanctions were first implemented mid-
2007, the first case study will take into account data from projects through 2008 because 
some of these projects would have been funded prior to sanction implementation in mid-
2007. Where contradictory data is found, that project’s data will be placed in the 
appropriate case study—pre or post-sanctions. To test the hypotheses listed above, this 
study will determine if and how U.S. sanctions affected Jihad al-Bina’s planned and 
executed projects, operating budget volumes, as well as overall costs of these projects 
where this data is available. 
Research for this thesis will include primary source literature and media reporting 
in Arabic. Secondary sources will include government reports, non-governmental 
organization (NGO) reports, books, journal articles, and scholarly discourses about 
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relevant topics. Primary sources will include news reports from both Western and Middle 
Eastern media, foreign government websites, statements, and propaganda. This case study 
will focus on scholarly publications and books detailing Jihad al-Bina’s activities during 
these time frames. It will also utilize primary sources in English and Arabic published by 
Jihad al-Bina’ and the Lebanese government. Notably, this study will build upon research 
conducted on Jihad al-Bina’ by Eric Lob and Matthew Levitt. Lob’s research includes 
much of, but is not an exhaustive source of available data on Jihad al-Bina’s activities 
since 1988. Moreover, his research is not set up comparatively pre and post-2008. Levitt’s 
works detail Hezbollah’s illicit financial networks and funding operations and inform this 
paper on U.S. government justifications and pretexts for placing sanctions on Jihad al-
Bina’. However, as previously highlighted, Levitt’s works don’t include post-sanction 
analyses on the results of sanctions. In other words, Levitt’s papers don’t shed light on 
whether or to what extent stifling Jihad al-Bina’s activities also stifled Hezbollah’s 
consolidation of power in Lebanon. Research will include works primarily in English or 
Arabic and limited French translated to English. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis will comprise five chapters. The first chapter will contain the 
introduction and literature review. The second chapter will consist of the case study of 
Jihad al-Bina’s activities as described above between 1988 through 2008. Although 
sanctions were first imposed mid-2007, most projects completed through 2008 would have 
been funded prior to sanctions in early 2007. Data to the contrary will be highlighted. The 
third chapter will elucidate Jihad al-Bina’s activities and projects in the post-sanction time 
period. The fourth chapter will provided a comparative analysis of the pre and post sanction 
time periods and present findings. The final chapter will conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of thesis findings to scholarly debates about the effectiveness of U.S. efforts 
to curb the growth of Hezbollah, and to a greater extent, the spread of Iranian influence in 
the Middle East. Lastly, in this chapter I will suggest focus areas for additional research. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the research question, presented the relevant authoritative 
literature on Hezbollah, Hezbollah’s ideology, and its shifting identity. It also covered the 
literature which focuses on Hezbollah’s social service institutions and how those 
organizations helped Hezbollah rise to power and prominence in Lebanon. Lastly, it 
presented the rich but small body of literature that covers Hezbollah’s financing and U.S. 
sanctions. No literature yet exists that assesses the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions against 
Hezbollah. For the purposes of this thesis, the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions will be 
determined by assessing if and how they accomplished their intended results: to stifle Jihad 
al-Bina’s operations, and to counter Hezbollah’s consolidation of power in Lebanon. With 
effectiveness defined, the following question was put forth: were U.S. sanctions against 
Jihad al-Bina’ effective?  The existing body of literature cannot answer this question. To 
answer the research question, two hypotheses were presented. First, U.S sanctions placed 
against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 and thereafter did not curb the organization’s activities; 
second, U.S. sanctions helped to reinforce Hezbollah’s resistance identity and spurred 
Hezbollah’s consolidation of influence and power in Lebanon’s Shia communities. The 
research presented in this thesis find that U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ and its 
Wa’ad projected implemented in 2007 and 2009 were ineffective.  The sanctions failed to 
prevent the organizations from accessing domestic and international funding, nor did 
sanctions prevent Jihad al-Bina' from executing projects.  Moreover, Jihad al-Bina’ 
expanded operations and further integrated with the Lebanese government and 
international organizations in the post-2006 war era.   
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II. JIHAD AL-BINA’ FROM 1988 TO 2007 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section will examine data on early activities of Lebanese Hezbollah’s  
Jihad al-Bina Development Foundation from its inception to the time shortly after the 
United States first imposed sanctions on the organization in 2007. This chapter will show 
how Jihad al-Bina’ activities helped Hezbollah consolidate power and influence through 
mid-2007. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact time period when U.S. sanctions began 
impacting Jihad al-Bina’ operations, this section will present projects through mid-2007, 
after sanctions took effect, because most projects conducted through this time period would 
likely not have been affected by sanctions. To assess the effect sanctions had on the 
organization’s activities, the next chapter will discuss and evaluate data on Jihad al-Bina’s 
activities following the sanctions. At the end of this chapter, I will present an assessment 
of the organization and its overall activities from the data available. 
Data on Jihad al-Bina’s activities is limited. Official data from Hezbollah’s 
Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation was available to researchers until 
2010. The data acquired on Jihad al-Bina’s activities through researchers is most often 
presented in aggregate form covering a span years. It is unclear if Hezbollah’s Consultative 
Center provided annual reports on Jihad al-Bina’ activities to researchers or in aggregate 
form. To accurately capture the pace—acceleration or deceleration—of Jihad al-Bina’s 
activities, this information would ideally be available in annual format. After the Arab 
Spring in 2011, Hezbollah stopped releasing data or even speaking to foreign journalists 
and researchers.34  In general, official data on Jihad al-Bina’s activities after this time 
period is difficult to acquire. The available aggregate data in this chapter will be presented 
in the format presented by original researchers. 
Official data presented in aggregate form will be supplemented by information 
located by scouring hundreds of open source media reports from 1988 to 2008. In the 
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absence of clear and concise annual reports or aggregate data, open source news reports 
are the best publicly available data on Jihad al-Bina’s activities pre and post-US sanctions. 
At times the information provided by news reports supplements aggregate data; at times it 
is the only available information where aggregate reports on Jihad al-Bina’ activity leave 
information gaps for certain time periods. Much of the information located in open source 
reporting comes directly from Jihad al-Bina’ leadership, engineers, or other credible 
representatives.   
Lastly, this study builds on the work of previous scholars whose focused works on 
Jihad al-Bina’ and Hezbollah’s reconstruction and social works are foundational to this 
topic. Dima Danawi’s book, Hizbullah’s Pulse details Jihad al-Bina’s social service 
activities from its inception through the late 1990s. Hana Alamuddin documented the 
destruction that occurred in Lebanon during the 2006 war with Israel, as well as the 
monumental reconstruction and recovery efforts delegated to Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad 
Project from 2007 to early 2010. Ahmed Hamzeh’s work on Hezbollah’s transformation 
includes official data on Jihad al-Bina’s activities from its inception until 2004. Judith 
Harik’s works include information on Jihad al-Bina’s funding and social services in 
Lebanon’s Shiite territories acquired from contemporaneous open source news reports until 
Hezbollah’s entry into politics in 1992. Eric Lob’s work is informed by data and insights 
from these authors and incorporates first-hand research and interviews conducted with 
Lebanese citizens—Hezbollah members, supporters, and non-supporters—to describe the 
transfusion of Iranian construction and development organizations to Lebanon through 
2012. Lob’s works constitute the most current research on Jihad al-Bina. In this chapter, 
the sum of Jihad al-Bina’s collective actions between 1988 and 2008 based on all available 
information will be analyzed. 
B. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 
FORMATION OF HEZBOLLAH 
1. The Islamic Revolution and Iran’s Revolutionary Ideology 
The 1979 Islamic revolution and actions of the resultant government were guided 
by a revolutionary ideology developed and popularized by religious sociologist and 
19 
philosopher Ali Shariati and Khomeini in the 1960s and 1970s. Shariati taught that God 
intended Islam to help the Muslim community (umma) become a classless utopia. This 
could be achieved only under a government system which places primacy on God’s laws 
over man’s and corrupt systems such as capitalism or Marxism. Shariati described the 
transition process as a “liberation struggle,” or jihad that Iranian society must pursue to 
transform from the sad state under the Shah to a state of “social solidarity.”  He advocated 
for armed resistance against the Pahlavi regime. The clergy should be the natural leaders 
to guide the process; however, Shariati claimed that the Shia clergy’s political reticence 
caused religious stagnation in Iran—what he termed “black” Shiism. To establish an 
Islamic utopia in Iran, intellectuals and clerics needed to “rediscover and revitalize the 
original meaning of revolutionary Islam,”35 or “red” Shiism. Shariati hoped his writings 
and teachings would initiate this revitalization.36 
The Shah’s crackdowns in the early 1960s radicalized and aligned many in the 
clerical class with revolutionary ideology—chief among them, Khomeini. The Shah 
enacted a number of social reforms which the clergy opposed—women’s suffrage, for 
example—and land reforms which angered the landowning class, many of whom were 
clergy. Under the premise of abolishing feudalism, the government forced landed elites to 
sell land to the government which it then sold to peasants for below-market value prices. 
Moreover, the reforms caused “rents from an estimated 10,000 villages [which] helped 
finance the clerical establishment [became] eligible for redistribution,” according to Sandra 
Mackey.37  The Shah’s reforms were met with voices of opposition and discontent from 
the typically quietist clerics. In response, the Shah violently squashed protests led by cleric 
activists. The tipping point that radicalized many of the clergy was the government’s 
violent crackdown during a protest at the Fayziyyeh theological school in Qom on March 
22, 1963. Armored police killed clergy members and students, throwing their bodies from 
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the school roof.38  In June, Khomeini gave a speech at the Fayziyyeh School in which he 
accused the Shah of being “fundamentally opposed to Islam . . . and the existence of the 
religious class.”39   
As clashes between the Shah’s forces and clerics grew more intense, Khomeini left 
Iran in 1964 but grew in prominence, solidifying his role as the father of the Islamic 
revolution. From abroad, Khomeini continued elaborating and propagating his 
revolutionary ideology. His revolutionary political thought, what Ostovar calls 
Khomeinism—”radical anti-imperialism, economically conscious Shiite populism, and 
Islamic government under clerical rule”40—resonated with millions of disenfranchised 
Iranians and set him apart from his contemporaries. Like Shariati, Khomeini taught that to 
establish an ideal Islamic society, the state should be rid of Western influence. Further, a 
true Islamic government should be under the guardianship (velayat) of a senior cleric 
(faqih) or a committee of senior clergy. By the time the Pahlavi dynasty crumbled in 1979, 
Khomeini was the clear favorite to lead the emergent Iranian government.  
Following the revolution, Iranian clerics drove the formation of the new 
government and shaped it after the revolutionary model envisioned by Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Two bodies were appointed by Khomeini to manage the post-revolution 
transition period. The first was the Provisional Government led by Prime Minister Mehdi 
Bazargan. Under the Pahlavi government, Bazargan led the pro-democratic Liberation 
Movement of Iran. After the revolution, Bazargan represented a body of non-clerical 
provisional government members appointed by Khomeini which had experience in the 
previous government, but who also supported the Islamic revolution. Though these 
political appointees likely never had the clout to resist the power and influence of the 
Khomeinist clerics involved in forming the new government, they formed the portion of 
the body that may have still valued semblances of secularism. Although previous 
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experience in governance qualified these non-clerical members for appointment to the 
Provisional Government, their association with the Pahlavi government and non-clerical 
status placed them in a position of inferiority to the clerics. The Provisional Government 
was subordinate to the second body—the Revolutionary Council. This body was led by 
Khomeini and consisted of a number of anonymous clerics.41  Moreover, as the 
Khomeinists grew more powerful clerics from the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) pressured 
Bazargan to appoint four IRP clerics to his cabinet. Khomeinist clerics also swept the 
election for the Assembly of Experts which was charged with drafting the new Republic’s 
constitution.42  After a photograph of Bazargan shaking hands with an American diplomat 
in Algeria became public, Iranian outrage and fear of the return of American influence 
drove pro-Khomeini activists to storm the U.S. embassy in Tehran. Bazargan appealed to 
Khomeini to denounce the embassy takeover, but he refused. In protest Bazargan resigned 
and the Provisional Government subsequently dissolved. The clerics then faced little real 
opposition to forming the new constitution and government after Khomeini’s 
“guardianship of the jurist” design.43 
The success of the Islamic revolution in Iran encouraged its leaders to replicate the 
movement abroad. As they saw it, Muslims around the world faced the same oppression 
Iranian’s suffered under the Shah from other imperialist and Western-backed non-
representative governments. Moreover, if Iran did not export the revolution it would be 
threatened by neighboring states and Western imperialism which formed the greatest threat 
to Iran. Iran’s revolutionary leaders advocated for exporting the revolution to the Levant, 
Afghanistan, Eritrea, the Philippines, and Bahrain.44  Many of these leaders were seasoned 
guerilla fighters who gained experience fighting alongside PLO militants against Israel, as 
well as with Lebanese Shia groups during the civil war.   
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Some of the most vocal proponents for revolutionary internationalism and 
intervention were within Khomeini’s inner circle. Ayatollah Hosayn-Ali Montazeri, an 
extremely influential cleric who was at one point Khomeini’s successor preached that 
Muslims must not only support oppressed Muslims in southern Lebanon in word, but in 
deed.45  For his son Mohammad—one of the founding fathers of the IRGC—mustering 
Iranian support for the anti-Israeli resistance in Lebanon was a top priority. Directly 
following the success of the Islamic revolution, Mohammad advocated for sending IRGC 
members to Lebanon to assist Palestinian refugees and guerillas, as well as to burgeon 
Shiite resistance efforts. Though Montazeri senior’s interventionism provided the 
ideological momentum for the IRGC’s actions abroad throughout the 1980s, Iranian 
leaders were initially focused on defending the revolution at home following the Iraq 
invasion on September 22, 1980. 
2. The Iran-Iraq War 
At outset of the war, Iranian leadership was preoccupied with threats to the 
homeland rather than foreign operations. At home, Khomeinists faced violent attacks from 
various opposition groups including leftists, nationalists, liberals, students, and some senior 
clergy.46  To put down opposition violence, Iranian authorities and particularly the IRGC 
jailed, tortured, and executed thousands between 1980 and 1983. Iranian in-fighting during 
the early years of the Iran-Iraq war led to thousands of Iranian deaths. 
During the same time period, Iraqi troops initially invaded and captured oil-rich 
Iranian territories around Khorramanshar and Shatt al-Arab. Regular and IRGC units were 
overwhelmed fighting Iraqi forces along Iran’s western borders. However, by the spring of 
1982 Iranian forces recaptured much of this territory, dealing significant defeats to Iraqi 
forces. Rather than pursue a peace agreement, Iranian leaders felt confident their troops 
could make further gains and decided to conduct a counter-invasion and spread the 
revolution to the people of Iraq. Though Iranian leaders were confident in their righteous 
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cause, they failed to foresee the lopsided support Iraq would receive from the international 
community. Rather than negotiate a peace deal after retaking territory along the Iran-Iraq 
border, the decision to launch a counter-invasion lengthened the war another six years, and 
led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Iranians. 
3. Exporting the Revolution to Lebanon 
The confidence that fueled Iran’s decision to invade Iraq also encouraged its leaders 
to expand the revolution elsewhere. The first and most pressing issue was to defeat Saddam 
because as Iranian leaders often stated, “the road to Jerusalem runs through Karbala.”47  
However, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 provided the justification and pretext 
Iranian’s interventionist leaders needed to send IRGC guardsmen to Lebanon to support 
the cause of Palestine. Iran’s campaign in Lebanon was seen as a second part of a two-part 
Iranian strategy to liberate Jerusalem and to export the revolution. With the approval of 
Khomeini, members of the IRGC 27th Brigade who distinguished themselves in the 
reconquest of Khorramanshar only two weeks prior arrived in Syria on June 11th with 
members of the regular army’s elite 58th ranger division. This special unit was combined 
and sent to Lebanon under the name “Forces of Muhammad the Prophet of God.”48  Their 
experience in guerilla and conventional fighting tactics demonstrated Iran’s initial 
commitment to exporting the revolution abroad and to promoting the cause of oppressed 
Muslims everywhere.   
However, the revolutionary fervor and Pan-Islamist sentiments of Iran’s 
interventionist leaders did not align with Syria’s ambitions in Lebanon. The guardsmen 
were received coldly by the Hafez al-Assad government which was reluctant to allow 
Iranian influence grow in Lebanon. Upon arrival, IRGC fighters were placed in barracks 
that resembled shantytowns and were left without provisions for meals nor hygiene. Syrian 
officials did not allow fighters to do anything more than reconnoitering operations on the 
Lebanese border. When Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez’s younger brother came to visit the 
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guardsmen, he repeatedly drew attention to the Israeli cease-fire which began the day the 
guardsmen arrived in Syria.49  Furthermore, Syrian leaders feared Iranian presence in 
Lebanon would weaken Amal. Amal was a close ally of the Syrian government and 
supported Syria’s intervention into the Lebanese civil war and politics. On June 25th, Iran’s 
top military officials counseled Khomeini that Israel’s attack in Lebanon was meant to 
distract Iran and that with Israel’s victory complete, there was little to gain by keeping 
Iran’s elite troops in Syria and out of the fight with Iraq. Stating that the road to Jerusalem 
passed through Karbala, Khomeini ordered the redeployment of Iranian troops 
immediately. Shortly thereafter, the Iranian embassy in Beirut became surrounded by 
Israeli and Lebanese Forces, or Phalange militia fighters. Fearing infiltration, the Iranian 
military attaché in Damascus, Ahmad Motevasselian traveled to Beirut under diplomatic 
cover with the Iranian charge d’affaires in Beirut to destroy sensitive documents. On their 
way, they were kidnapped by Lebanese Forces and never seen from again.50  It was later 
revealed that they were immediately executed on the orders of Lebanese Forces 
intelligence chief, Elie Hobeika51 who was likely working as an agent for Syrian 
intelligence.52  On Khomeini’s orders, only a few hundred guardsmen with the assistance 
of clerics from the IRGC’s Cultural Unit were sent to the Bekaa valley to set up training 
centers.53 
a. Amal 
During the IRGC’s early years in Lebanon, its work focused on building up 
Palestinian and Lebanese resistance against Israel. IRGC guardsmen and clerics capitalized 
on two main political networks fostered by Iranian activists with Palestinians and Shiites 
in Lebanon that predated the revolution. One of the most important Iranian-Lebanese 
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relationships to the Islamic revolution as well as the Lebanese resistance existed between 
Mustafa Chamran and Musa al-Sadr. During the Lebanese civil war, Mustafa Chamran 
helped establish the Lebanese Resistance Regiments (the Amal militia) to help protect Shia 
interests in southern Lebanon along with the Amal Movement’s primary founder, cleric 
Musa al-Sadr. Chamran and al-Sadr were both active leaders and protest organizers in the 
lead up to the Islamic revolution. Speaking to the duo’s crucial role, Iranian Ambassador 
to Lebanon, Muhammad ‘Ali Sobhani once stated, “Musa Sadr and Chamran were the 
backbone (jism al-asaasi) of the Iranian Revolution and how one cannot speak of the 
Iranian revolution without mentioning these two people.”54  After the revolution, Chamran 
was appointed first Defense Minister of Iran and maintained close ties with Amal’s 
leadership. Chamran was the primary conduit of Iranian funding for Amal, and the linchpin 
that temporarily coupled Amal’s interests with Iran’s until his death in June 1981.55   
The relationships fostered in the second primary Iran-Lebanon network flourished 
into the organization that eventually became Lebanese Hezbollah. This network also has 
roots with the Amal movement, but its leaders who had strong ties with low-level clergy 
in Shia territories in Beirut and the Bekaa valley. These clergy and other Islamists felt that 
Chamran and Amal were not doing enough to support the Palestinian resistance.56  This 
group officially split from Amal sometime after Amal’s Chairman, Nabih Berri agreed to 
be the Shi’i voice on the five-member Committee of National Salvation. The committee’s 
charge was to conduct negotiations with Israel on behalf of all Lebanese communities—
these negotiations would be mediated by an American diplomat.57  Musa Fakhr Rowhani, 
the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon asked Berri to resign, calling the group an “American 
committee.”  Moreover, Amal’s representative in Iran, Sayyid Ibrahim al-Husayn al-
Musawi along with a number of other Islamists condemned Berri’s acquiescence. Despite 
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fierce Iranian and Lebanese Shiite opposition, Berri remained on the committee which 
negotiated a peace plan with Israel in which PLO fighters would be forced to leave 
Lebanon.   
b. Islamic Amal to Hezbollah 
Berri’s participation in the peace negotiations and warming relations with the 
Lebanese government caused a rift in Amal. The Islamists led by Amal deputy secretary 
general Husayn al-Musawi accused Berri of abandoning the Islamic revolution 
championed by Musa al-Sadr and as defined by Iranian leadership and claimed Berri’s 
actions were illegitimate. Some Amal leaders refused to recognize the peace with Israel 
and continued fighting Israelis. The Islamists, led by al-Musawi appealed to the Iranian 
ambassador in Damascus, Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi for arbitration over, effectively, 
continued revolution or the legitimacy of the peace deal. Mohtashemi ruled in favor of al-
Musawi. Berri refused to recognize the decision. Al-Musawi immediately departed Iran for 
his native area in the Bekaa valley and announced the creation of a new organization called 
Islamic Amal and invited all Muslim “brothers” to do join him.58 
Berri’s actions and the subsequent split between Islamic Amal and Amal revealed 
a rift in Lebanon’s Shia community. Berri’s actions caused many Shia to see him as soft 
on Israel and corrupt. Berri’s decision to abandon revolutionary principles and integrate 
into the state committee was extremely unpopular. The committee included Bashir 
Gemayel, a senior leader of the Christian Phalange party and militia which formed the 
backbone of the Lebanese Forces and Southern Lebanese Army, both allied with and 
supplied by Israel. The Lebanese Forces evicted Shiites from their homes in the dahhiya 
during the civil war, and the Southern Lebanese Army was effectively Israel’s proxy army 
in Lebanon which fought against the PLO, Amal, and eventually Hezbollah as well. 
Although most Shiites detested Berri’s association with the committee, the outrage was felt 
most fiercely amongst Shia communities in the Bekaa and southern Beirut. The Shia 
communities of southern Lebanon were desperate to be rid of Palestinian refugees and 
                                                 
58 Chehabi, 217. 
27 
fighters whose actions sparked off the 1982 war with Israel and who bore the brunt of 
Israeli actions. Berri was most concerned about halting the dire circumstances for Shiites 
in southern Lebanon who were most susceptible to Israeli attacks. As Chehabi states, 
“[t]hose in the Bekaa did not share the Southerners’ exasperation with the Palestinians.”59 
The peace deal reached between the Committee of National Salvation and Israel 
led to the expulsion of PLO fighters, the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, and 
accelerated the growth of Islamic Amal. Islamists, revolutionary supporters, and militant 
Shiites in southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs opposed to the deal flocked to the 
Bekaa valley. There IRGC guardsmen instructed them in religion, revolutionary Iranian 
Shiism, and guerilla fighting. Delegates from the different groups formed a nine-man 
committee to establish a new organization dedicated to Israeli resistance and following 
Khomeini’s guardianship of the jurist system. Al-Musawi requested that Iranian leadership 
provide leadership, guidance, and ultimately sponsorship of the organization. Khomeini 
approved the formation of a Council of Lebanon which held its first meeting in 1983. 
Shortly thereafter, the Council of Lebanon evolved into Hezbollah.60 
4. Hezbollah and the Lebanese Civil War 
a. Violent Beginnings 
Hezbollah’s violent actions during the early 1980s of the Lebanese civil war 
characterized the group and its Iranian patrons as uncompromising, anti-Israeli/Western, 
ruthless revolutionaries. After congregating in the Bekaa valley, IRGC-trained Islamic 
Amal fighters returned to Beirut’s southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, spreading 
Khomeini’s posters and ideology wherever they settled. Despite falling out with Amal, 
Hezbollah fighters participated in uncoordinated operations against Israeli fighters with 
Amal and Palestinian fighters. These groups formed what became to be known as the 
“Lebanese National Resistance.”61  Hezbollah suicide bombers attacked the American 
embassy in April 1983, and most notoriously the U.S. and French barracks on October 23, 
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1983, killing more than 300 people. Hezbollah fighters repeatedly attacked Lebanese 
Forces in the Bekaa valley in attempt to drive them out of the region. On November 23, 
1983 they attacked the Shaykh Abdallah Barracks in Baalbek, which became the 
headquarters of the guardsmen in the Bekaa valley. The Lebanese government reacted by 
officially cutting diplomatic ties with Iran. Between 1984 and 1988, dozens of Americans 
and Europeans were kidnapped, tortured, and some killed by militants closely associated 
with Hezbollah.62  Though Iran denied involvement in any of these cases, some abductees 
were transported to and released by Iran, and Iran actively participated in release 
negotiations.63  To Western nations, the ruthlessness with which Hezbollah conducted 
operations in Lebanon was attributed to Iran and its radical revolutionary ideology. 
Ultimately, the violence that Hezbollah directed towards Westerners in Lebanon led to 
American and French withdrawal by mid-1984. 
b. Syria and Iran’s Proxy War for Influence in Lebanon 
After 1985, Hezbollah and Amal—funded by Iran and Syria, respectively—took 
part in a fierce competition for territory, power, and influence over the future of Lebanon. 
Though Syria supported Iran in the war against Iraq, its leadership was wary how the spread 
of Islamic fundamentalism in Lebanon might curb its influence. Syria sponsored the Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party’s (SSNP) attempts to curb Hezbollah growth in the Bekaa valley 
as serious fighting broke out between the two groups in 1986. In 1987, Syrian troops 
directly intervened when Amal fighters were on the verge of defeat against PLO fighters 
in west Beirut, killing 23 Hezbollah fighters in the process. Iran, still bent on establishing 
an Islamic republic in Lebanon invested heavily in laying the groundwork for that purpose. 
In 1986, Lebanese and Iranian clerics drafted a constitution in Tehran in the style of the 
new Islamic republic in Iran’s system in which clerics reigned supreme. Nabih Berri and 
Amal would not support this system and advocated for a majority democracy system. By 
1987, armed clashes between the two groups broke out in Beirut and southern Lebanon. In 
February 1988, clashes erupted into a large-scale intra-Shiite war in Beirut’s southern 
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suburbs and in the south over the abduction of the American U.N. representative William 
Higgins. Amal condemned the kidnapping and rounded up suspected Hezbollah members. 
Amal fighters won in southern Lebanon, but with IRGC assistance, Hezbollah routed Amal 
fighters in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Fearing complete takeover of Beirut’s suburbs 
by Hezbollah, Syria threatened to intervene. Iranian leaders could not afford to lose Syria 
as an ally, especially as Iraqi troops made gains against Iran throughout the year. In the 
end, Iranian leaders compromised and Syrian forces assumed control of the southwestern 
suburbs.64 
Iran’s need to maintain Syria as an ally in and following the Iraq war forced 
Hezbollah to negotiate a peace deal with Amal. In January 1989 a truce between Amal and 
Hezbollah was signed in Damascus. Amal’s hegemony over the south was recognized 
while Hezbollah was permitted to conduct social and political activities, and to continue 
operations against Israeli occupation. To maintain stability and ensure Syria’s influence in 
Lebanon, Syrian troops would occupy the Beirut dahhiya. Fighting still occurred 
occasionally between Hezbollah and Amal fighters until a second peace deal was signed 
on November 5, 1990. Militant clashes between the two groups ceased when Amal 
disarmed along with other Lebanese national and non-national militia groups following the 
Taif agreement signed on October 22, 1989.65  However, Hezbollah managed to maintain 
its arms by rebranding itself as a resistance force against the Israeli occupation in the south, 
rather than a militia. According to Magnus Ranstorp, Hezbollah was not able to maintain 
its arms because of its political astuteness in negotiations; rather, it was because the group 
still had control over a large number of Western hostages which gave it leverage with 
Syrian and Lebanese leaders trying to end the violent, long-drawn civil war and return 
Lebanon to a state of normalcy.66  Though violent clashes between Amal fighters and 
Hezbollah fell to a minimum after 1989, the two organizations still competed for territory, 
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influence, political power, and Shi’i constituents in other ways as will be discussed later in 
the chapter. 
c. Softening the Image 
Iran’s revolutionary ideology and uncompromising foreign policy in Lebanon 
extended its involvement in the Iran-Iraq war and left it isolated diplomatically. 
Throughout the Iraq war, Iran’s revolutionary ideology, threatening rhetoric associated 
with exporting the revolution, and counter-invasion into Iraq alienated the country from 
potential allies and severely needed military equipment. The Islamic revolution was seen 
as a virus that if not contained would infect the entire region. Western and regional powers 
alike invested heavily to bolster up Iraq and increase its chances of defeating Iran. The 
United States pressured its allies to withhold business and resources from Iran during the 
war. The United States understandably ceased equipment and replacement part sales to 
Iran, making obsolete much of Iran’s military equipment acquired prior to the revolution. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) formed in 1981 to counter the revolution’s spread. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait granted up to $50 billion in war loans and grants to Iraq. Egypt 
and Jordan also provided Iraq with military weapons and supplies.67  Though the Soviet 
Union sold military equipment to both nations, it heavily favored Iraq. Between 1984 and 
1987, the Soviet Union sold $11.5 billion in military equipment to Iraq and only $5 million 
to Iran. France also sold and subsidized loans to assist Iraq’s military acquisitions. Iran was 
forced to seek support from those few fringe nations willing to buck Western pressure to 
support Saddam, such as Syria, Libya, Algeria, North Korea, and some Eastern European 
Soviet bloc states, and China.68  Iranian leaders realized that lopsided international support 
for Iraq inflicted unsustainable costs and loss of life upon Iran and ultimately forced the 
nation to accept a peace agreement with Iraq in August 1988. 
Following back-to-back conclusions of the Lebanese civil war and the war with 
Iraq, Iran opted for a softer approach to foreign policy. Exhausted from nearly eight years 
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of war with Iraq, more pragmatic elements with the Iranian regime advocated the end of 
the war. Led by Rafsanjani, the Iranian government accepted UN Security Council 
Resolution 598 bringing the long war to an end. In August of that year, IRGC elements 
withdrew from the Bekaa valley back to Iran. In the years that followed, Iran began 
negotiating and leveraging its influence over Hezbollah for the release of Western hostages 
captured in Lebanon throughout the civil war.69  Lebanese radicals felt betrayed that the 
Islamic republic seemingly abandoned its ambitions of establishing another Islamic 
republic in Lebanon.70  While Iran may have temporarily abandoned its vision of copying 
the Islamic republic in Lebanon, it did not compromise its commitment to leading the 
resistance against Israel and its Western patrons. But to manage the resistance in a post-
civil war context, it needed to take on new forms. 
To help mitigate Iran’s isolation after nearly a decade of revolutionary and 
interventionist foreign policies, Iranian leaders leveraged Jehad-e Sazandegi, or the 
Ministry of Construction Jihad. According to Lob, Jehad-e Sazandegi was instrumental to 
Khomeini and the IRP’s consolidation of power over their post-revolution domestic 
opponents, “namely, leftist, ethnic, and Sunni movements along the country’s rural 
periphery.”71  Jehad-e Sazandegi was formed in parallel to other important revolutionary 
organizations which influenced political and socioeconomic developments across Iran. In 
addition to Jehad-e Sazandegi, these organizations included the IRGC, the Foundation of 
the Oppressed and Disabled, Imam Khomeini’s Relief Committee, and the Housing 
Foundation. One former Jehad-e Sazandegi member attested that from the organization’s 
inception, Khomeini charged it with “a clear, political mission: to win the hearts and minds 
of villagers through rural development and other activities, and to counter similar efforts 
by leftists and ethnic groups that were against Khomeini and his clerical faction.”72  Most 
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literature on the Iranian revolution focuses on how the post-revolutionary government 
consolidated power through violence and coercion. However, Jehad-e Sazandegi 
employed a varied repertoire of non-coercive actions, including patronage, indoctrination, 
cooption, covert action, and logistical support (see Table 1).73  According to Lob,  
“[p]atronage” is the allocation of state resources or rents to reward 
individuals or groups for their political allegiance and support.  
“Indoctrination” constitutes the authoritatively imparting of a political and/ 
or religious ideology to members of society.  “Cooptation” refers to the 
absorption of “new elements into the leadership or policy-determining 
structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or 
existence.”  “Covert action” occurs when agents, their actions, or the 
purposes of their actions are intended to be unknown to the general public. 
“Logistical support” is the provisioning of training, personnel, equipment, 
and facilities in support of military campaigns and operations.74  
Khomeini often told Jehad-e Sazandegi members that “they had a short timeframe to 
complete their work and that they had a lot to accomplish (e.g., building roads, bathhouses, 
mosques, clinics) because [Khomeini] felt tremendous pressure and a sense of urgency to 
amass support in the countryside.”75  
Table 1. Jehad-e Sazandegi’s action repertoire76 
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Quickly after its establishment in June 1979, Jehad-e Sazandegi expanded its 
operations throughout Iran. Between 1980 and 1983, the organization built up to 25,000 
Islamic councils in half the country’s villages which extended Khomeini’s and the IRP’s 
administrative capacities throughout the rural areas.77 Prior to the revolution, 
approximately 8,300 rural villages had access to piped or potable water. Only 8,000 km of 
roads extended to these rural areas, and only 4,500 rural villages received electricity. By 
1989, Jehad-e Sazandegi extended or renovated water pipe networks, organized water 
delivery systems, or set up powered irrigation wells, providing water to approximately 
29,500 rural villages. The organization more than tripled overall road distances to rural 
areas, and brought electricity to an additional 4,500 rural villages. The organization also 
built rural libraries, distributed millions of books to villagers, established Islamic councils 
and religious schools, held lectures and exhibitions across the country, and distributed 
millions of publications, posters, photos, and other propaganda to help enfranchise Iran’s 
rural populations in favor of Khomeini and the IRP.78 The organization held 
demonstrations and rallies in favor of candidates as well as to counter rallies organized by 
leftist, ethnic, and Sunni movements.79 Moreover, the organization played a crucial 
logistical role for Iranian forces fighting against Iraqi invasion.80   
Of the actions that contributed to Khomeini and the IRP’s power consolidation, 
patronage played a crucial role. The IRP relied upon Jehad-e Sazandegi to mobilize voters 
and secure votes during the first post-revolution parliamentary elections in 1980. The 
organization rewarded or withheld goods and services based on the political allegiance of 
individuals and organizations.81  Between 1980 and 1983, it also engaged in covert action 
to denounce and thwart political dissidents, armed insurgents, and weapons and drug 
traffickers supporting Khomeini and the IRP’s rivals.82  Lob asserts that Jehad-e Sazandegi 
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played no small role in the IRP’s domination of the 1980 parliamentary elections and 
ultimate consolidation of power in 1983; not coincidently, the organization became official 
cabinet-level ministry when the new Iranian parliament passed a bill creating the Ministry 
of Construction Jihad on October 31, 1983.83   
After consolidating power, the Islamic Republic turned its attention to improving 
its foreign diplomatic relations to counter its growing isolation following the counter-
invasion of Iraq. To motivate the ministry’s members who were sent overseas and to 
provide a higher-sense of purpose to their mission, the government openly framed their 
actions as part of Iran’s exporting the revolution policies. However, as Lob claims, the 
primary purpose of Jehad-e Sazandegi’s overseas operations was “to mitigate Iran’s 
diplomatic and economic isolation and expand its influence by establishing bilateral 
relations centered on rural and agricultural development.”84 
To this end, the government utilized the new ministry to build and improve 
economic relationships abroad. Though this thesis will focus on the nearly identical 
organization set up in Lebanon by Jehad-e Sazandegi—Hezbollah’s Jihad al-Bina’—the 
majority of the organization’s efforts abroad prior to 1988 were focused in Sunni-majority 
countries of Albania, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tanzania. As Lob’s research 
reveals, the ministry entered into numerous official agreements with representatives of 
these countries to “provide agricultural and rural development, technical support, economic 
assistance, and investment in infrastructure (e.g., power plants) and industry (e.g., 
production and processing units).”85   
Jehad-e Sazandegi’s efforts yielded some economic and diplomatic ties, as well as 
the opportunity for exporting Iran’s revolutionary story. From the mid to late-eighties, 
many of the Sunni-majority governments with whom Jehad-e Sazandegi collaborated 
granted Iran rights to broadcast radio and television documentaries about the Islamic 
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revolution in their countries. They also signed trade agreements favorable to Iran and 
Iranian private ventures, and purchased agricultural and technological goods and services 
from Iran’s state and parastatal companies.86   
C. CREATION OF JIHAD AL-BINA’ 
1. Jehad-e Sazandegi’s Transfusion 
Jehad-e Sazandegi’s greatest successes abroad, however, took place in Lebanon. In 
the late 1980s, Ayatollah Khomeini blessed establishing Jihad al-Bina’ in Lebanon and 
stated that its mission was to “embrace the oppressed” and “lead them to Islam.”87   Rather 
than simply send official Jehad-e Sazandegi Ministry representatives to further Iran’s 
interests in Lebanon, they created a near-identical yet Lebanese organization after the 
Iranian model. Hoping to replicate what Jehad-e Sazandegi did for Khomeini and the IRP 
following the Islamic revolution, Iran established Jihad al-Bina’ to solidify Iran’s influence 
in Lebanon and to strengthen Hezbollah. Moreover, this move reinforced the government’s 
strategic decision to soften the face of Iran’s revolutionary foreign policy.   
The transfusion of Jihad al-Bina’ from Iran into Lebanon reflects a shift in Iran’s 
policy to protect the revolution at home by exporting the revolution abroad. During the 
early 1980s, the Iran’s revolutionary policies abroad were accompanied by hardline 
ideological narratives focusing on “recognizing, attracting, educating, and organizing the 
destitute of the masses . . . in the fight against the arrogance of imperial powers.”88  The 
IRGC helped form Hezbollah by capitalizing on well-established connections within 
Lebanon’s Shia communities, as well as on a common resistance ideology within other 
Lebanese and Palestinian groups fighting against Israeli aggression. The resultant Party of 
God, or Hezbollah, emerged as a blatant, uncompromising militant organization. The 
violent resistance identity of Hezbollah during its formative years reflected the way the 
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IRGC saw international relations—through a lens of conflict.89  However, as the Iran-Iraq 
war dragged on, Iran’s revolutionary policies left it with few diplomatic and economic 
partners abroad. Iran’s need for international support caused it to soften its ideological 
discourse associated with exporting the revolution. 
2. Foundations of Jihad al-Bina’ 
Jehad-e Sazandegi capitalized on pre-existing networks of Lebanese activists with 
experience in social welfare provision to launch its new Lebanese subsidiary. Iran sent 
clergy to Lebanon to work with members of the Association of Muslim Scholars in 
Lebanon, and the Association of Scholars of Jabel Amel which both ran education and 
charitable organizations, schools, cultural centers, clinics, and orphanages throughout the 
Lebanese civil war. These organizations were headed by Lebanese Shia clergy with close 
ties to Iran, including one of Hezbollah’s most influential spiritual leader, Mohammad 
Hussein Fadlallah.90  Additionally, Iran worked with former members of Amal’s Council 
of the South which orchestrated relief efforts following Israeli incursions into southern 
Lebanon after 1978. These efforts included providing social assistance to the needy, 
providing medical care to fighters and civilians, supplying piped water, and rebuilding 
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and homes.91  In collaboration with these local 
organizations, Jehad-e Sazandegi launched the Jihad al-Bina’ developmental foundation 
(JBDA) on September 12, 1988. Between 1988 and 1992, Jehad-e Sazandegi members 
opened, directed, and managed Jihad al-Bina’s headquarters and offices, and helped set up 
training programs for Hezbollah members in welfare program management.92   
Jihad al-Bina’ became the umbrella organization for a number of Hezbollah service 
committees that predate the Jihad al-Bina’ Developmental Foundation (Jihad al-Bina’). 
For example, between 1983 and 1987 Hezbollah’s Health Committee founded one hospital, 
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eight infirmaries (health clinics), two dental clinics, three pharmacies, and three civil 
defense centers in Beirut’s southern suburbs. In the Bekaa Valley, it opened one hospital 
and three infirmaries. In Shia areas of southern Lebanon, the Health Committee opened six 
infirmaries and three civil defense centers.93  Interestingly, the Health Committee built civil 
defense centers, which is outside the purview of what would be expected of a health 
organization. In many ways we see that Hezbollah’s Health Committee is the predecessor 
of Jihad al-Bina’. 
3. Objectives 
As part of its new strategy to deemphasize its armed interventionist policies abroad, 
the Islamic Republic’s Jihad al-Bina’ (Jehād-e Sāzandegī) established its Lebanese 
counterpart, Jihad al-Bina’ on September 12, 1988.94  In this way, the face of Hezbollah’s 
resistance movement in Lebanon shifted from a purely militant one to include humanitarian 
services and social development aspects. Hezbollah’s purpose and mission expanded from 
one of fighting aggression and oppression to include repairing physical and psychological 
damage caused by that aggression. In a brochure published by the Jihad al-Bina 
Development Association in 1998, the organization’s listed objectives included: 
1. To establish many construction and humanitarian projects such as 
hospitals, schools, cultural centers and public clinics in order to raise 
the social level of population in Lebanon. 
2. To dig and install artesian wells; to construct water tanks and towers, 
and to install water networks, irrigation canals, and sanitary sewers. 
3. To construct housing developments to accommodate orphans and war 
casualties. 
4. To help farmers with different development and extension methods to 
properly use land and increase production levels and incomes. 
5. To install electrical networks and generators in rural villages. 
6. To construct many education and training institutions, mainly for 
orphans and poor people. 
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7. To help refugees find shelters during war crises.95 
Between 1988 and 1992, Jehād-e Sāzandegī opened Jihad al-Bina’s headquarters and 
satellite offices and trained local Hezbollah members on how to administer welfare 
programs. In addition to the above listed objectives, Jehād-e Sāzandegī provided training 
to its Lebanese counterpart in areas of service provision, conducting training programs, 
indoctrination, and proselytizing.96   
Jihad al-Bina was founded during the latter years of Lebanon’s civil war by Shiites 
for Shiites and played a crucial role in Hezbollah’s competition for popular Shia support 
with other Lebanese Shiite organizations. From its inception, the organization’s purpose 
was to provide relief and improve the quality of life in the areas known as the “doomed 
areas” or “misery belts.”97  These areas were those most vulnerable to Israeli air strikes and 
shelling—the Bekaa valley, Southern Lebanon, and the predominantly Shia suburbs in 
South Beirut known as al-dahhiya. Jihad al-Bina’s headquarters is located in the Haret 
Harik dahhiya and its satellite offices are located throughout these “doomed areas” which 
Hezbollah refers to as the forgotten or neglected areas98—referring to the state’s disregard 
for Lebanon’s Shia communities. 
4. Symbolism 
Jihad al-Bina’ appropriated symbols and slogans from its parent organizations to 
reinforce a theme of resistance while highlighting its development, welfare, and relief 
mission. The foundation’s logo is an open hand grasping wheat, symbolizing both method 
and goal of the organization’s efforts—resistance and prosperity through farming, building, 
and development toward a better life through physical effort and struggle (jihad). Their 
motto “Together we build, Together we resist,” and sometimes, “Together we resist, 
Together we build,” is often accompanied by the closed fist found on Hezbollah’s flag and 
serves as a reminder that their mission is resistance, and to support the parent organization. 
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The strand of wheat is also found on Hezbollah’s flag, signifying growth and social services 
provided by the organization.99  As Jihad al-Bina’ is one of these social services that 
specializes in agricultural projects, among others, it is appropriate that wheat is a central 
characteristic of Jihad al-Bina’s logo (see Figure 1).   
  
Figure 1. Jihad al-Bina’ logo100  
 
Figure 2. Hezbollah flag 
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Both Hezbollah and Jihad al-Bina’ borrowed the strand of wheat from their Iranian 
progenitors—the IRGC and Jehad-e Sazandegi, respectively (see Figures 2 and 3). 
   
Figure 3. IRGC logo and the seal of Iran’s Jehad-e Sazandegi 
The title of the Jihad al-Bina’s regular publication “All Together” pays homage to 
its Iranian progenitor.101  During a speech given by Ayatollah Khomeini on June 16, 1979, 
he established Jehad-e Sazandegi and encouraged all Iranians to join its ranks and efforts. 
To instill a sense of individual and collective purpose, Khomeini leveraged strong cultural 
symbols. He likened the “self-sacrifice” of joining the organization to the martyrdom of 
one of Twelver Shi’a Islam’s most revered figures, the grandson of the prophet 
Muhammad, Husayn, and his sacrifice at Karbala, Iraq. Also in his speech, Khomeini used 
the phrase “all together [toward construction]” which Jehad-e Sazandegi adopted as its 
official slogan and continues to be used on Iranian Ministry of Construction Jihad buildings 
and publications.102 
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5. Hierarchy and Structure 
Though there is some uncertainty regarding Hezbollah’s exact organizational 
structure, Jihad al-Bina’ was likely directly subordinate to the politburo at the time of its 
inauguration in 1988 to 1992 when Hezbollah entered Lebanese electoral politics (see 
Figure 4). The Politburo is not a decision-making apparatus but a supervisory one that 
coordinates and guides Jihad al-Bina’s activities. Jihad al-Bina’ is divided into eight 
committees which provide services to Hezbollah party members, new recruits, and party 
supporters. Services include financial aid, health services provision, housing, and utilities. 
Services provided by the committees will be discussed in further detail later in the chapter. 
Some committees, such as the Financial Aid Committee work closely with other Hezbollah 
social service groups, such as the Al-Shahid (Martyrs) Foundation. For example, financed 
directly by Iran, the Financial Committee spent over $90 million on dependents of killed 
or wounded fighters from 1982 to 1986. A Technical and Administrative Committee 
oversees the work of all committees to ensure operations are executed efficiently and 
benefit the most impoverished parts of Hezbollah’s constituency.103   
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Figure 4. Jihad al-Bina’ subordination to Hezbollah104 
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D. JIHAD AL-BINA’ DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION ACTIVITIES 1988 TO 
2008 
1. Initial Operations Repertoire during the Civil War 
After Jihad al-Bina’ was established in 1988, it focused its efforts on elevating the 
quality of life for Shiites in areas neglected by the state and Amal. To initiate and 
professionalize operations, it recruited engineers and social workers by offering attractive 
salaried positions, paying them almost double (about $1,500) over the going rate with a 
private company.105  As previously discussed, Amal focused its operations in areas that 
bore the brunt of Israeli incursions, primarily southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. 
Because of the fighting in these areas, Shiites fled en masse to the dahhiya which quickly 
became overwhelmed and overpopulated. One of the most visible evidences of neglect was 
the mounting garbage in Beirut. Between 1988 to 1992, Jihad al-Bina’ took it upon itself 
to collect refuse on a daily basis until the state’s Council for Development and 
Reconstruction received international aid and began managing or subcontracting sanitation 
and public works.106   
Jihad al-Bina’ also continued and expanded its basic repertoire of service provision 
its members conducted while serving in the Council of the South, and other Shiite 
humanitarian organizations. It also worked to improve living conditions in war-torn parts 
of the country to curb mass migration of Shiites from the Bekaa valley and southern 
Lebanon to the capital. The organization’s dug wells, built water tanks, laid water pipe 
networks, dug irrigation canals and sanitary networks, built electrical networks, and 
installed generators. It rebuilt homes and other buildings damaged or destroyed from civil 
war violence or conflict with Israel. It also pledged to increase literacy rates within 
Lebanon’s Shiite areas to help combat poverty. Jihad al-Bina’ set up schools, cultural 
centers, and training programs to help residents learn skills necessary to provide for 
themselves and their families.107 
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2. Post-civil War Service Provision as a Territoriality Expansion and 
Power Consolidation Mechanism  
Throughout the Lebanese civil war, and in the absence of state control, militias 
battled for control over sections of Beirut and were forced to take on social service roles 
previously held by the government. The competitors were primarily the Maronite Christian 
Lebanese Forces and its Phalange/Kataeb militias led by Bashir Gemayel; the Druze 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) led by Kamal Jumblatt; various Sunni groups; and the 
previously-discussed Shi’i group dynamics between the Amal Movement led by Musa al-
Sadr and Nabih Berri, and later its competitor Islamic Amal/Hezbollah formed by Husayn 
al-Musawi in collaboration with Iran. Violence amongst these groups led to massive 
population shifts and the formation of sectarian enclaves throughout Lebanon (see  
Figure 5) and in Beirut—it also led to a disruption of social services. Government jobs, 
including social provision workers—water and electric utilities, refuse removal, 
firefighters, etc.—were allocated by law according to sect and area. When Maronites fled 
western Beirut, for example, garbage collection jobs could not be filled according to the 
law. As factions took over sections of Beirut, they became responsible for service provision 
in these areas.108  The areas controlled by these groups were delineated by “green lines”—
natural foliage that grew due to violent, uninhabitable conditions along the territorial 
margins—and were protected by snipers. Hezbollah and Amal fought over Shia territories. 
Danawi describes the hostility with which the militia leaders governed these territories as 
a “Machiavellian policy of ‘better to be feared than loved.’”109  After the war, militia 
leaders became politicians and competed for popular support with a carrot-and-stick 
approach rather than through fear. Now, instead of competing for territory with Amal on 
the battlefield, Hezbollah now competed with Amal for influence. One of the main 
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mechanisms by which warlords vied for popular support was through social service 
organizations.110  
 
Figure 5. Hezbollah checkpoint in Beirut in 1988111 
Jihad al-Bina’s activities between 1988 and 1992 helped Hezbollah consolidate 
power over Amal and the state, and prepared the group for political participation. As 
violence subsided and reconstruction efforts increased following the civil war, people 
returned to the previously uninhabitable green line areas that demarcated Hezbollah from 
Amal territory. Where overgrown green lines once clearly defined territorial boundaries, 
Jihad al-Bina’ embarked on mosque construction and renovation projects to lay claim to 
public. Moreover, Jihad al-Bina’-constructed mosques were a key element to Hezbollah’s 
indoctrination via proselytization strategy to win over constituents from Amal.112   
Jihad al-Bina’s water tanks also served dual purposes: they provided potable water 
and served as markers for Hezbollah territory. Hezbollah territories were clearly marked 
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with Hezbollah flags, slogans from the revered Imam Husayn, pictures of Khomeini, and 
other pro-Iranian pictures and slogans.   
Amal territories similarly displayed stencils and flags containing its own logo, as 
well as Syrian leaders and pro-Syrian propaganda. During the civil war, the organization 
placed and filled more than 100 water tanks in the dahhiya suburbs of south Beirut which 
were targeted by Amal snipers from behind their own demarcation lines. Following the 
war, these tanks were utilized similarly to flags, posters, and emblems to clearly demarcate 
Hezbollah territories.113 
In the early 1990s, Jihad al-Bina’s assertiveness during political crisis enabled the 
group to establish a permanent foothold in social service and utility provision within the 
dahhiya. Jihad al-Bina’ provided emergency relief to the half-million people living in the 
dahhiya whose well-being was seemingly dismissed by the Aoun administration. The 
administration cut off water and electricity to the dahhiya due to continued fighting 
between Hezbollah and Amal. With financial assistance from Iran, Jihad al-Bina’ built 
4000-litre water reservoirs in each district of the dahhiya, and circulated water tanker 
trucks to fill them five times daily. Additionally, lorry trucks rotated from building to 
building to provide power needed to pump water (see Figures 6 and 7). Although the 
government partially restored services later that year, the source of 40-percent of the area’s 
water was lost due to war-related damages, and compromised after a number of UNICEF 
wells failed. Jihad al-Bina’ continued as the main provider of drinking water for most of 
dahhiya’s residents. In lieu of the state, it also continued repairing electricity, sewer, and 
water systems in the southern suburbs for the next two decades.114   
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Figure 6. Jihad al-Bina’ water trucks115 
 
Figure 7. Jihad al-Bina’ water tanks similar to those used to 
demarcate territory116 
Jihad al-Bina’s performance in these times of crisis brought normalcy to afflicted 
residents and elevated Hezbollah’s status in the eyes of its constituents and in contrast to 
the government and Amal’s perceived ambivalence. In truth, Amal didn’t have the 
resources to focus on the dahhiya. After the death of Mostafa Chamran in 1981, Amal lost 
its primary source of Iranian patronage. After Islamic Amal split from Amal in 1982, most 
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sources of Iranian funds earmarked for Amal nearly disappeared and the group was forced 
to focus its efforts within its stronghold of southern Lebanon. After abiding by the terms 
of the Taif agreement in 1989 and more closely integrating into the government, Amal 
became subject to the lackadaisical pace of Lebanese state operations and depended mostly 
on government distribution of funds to start projects.117 
Of the competing groups, Hezbollah led the transition from rule by fear to one of 
popularity by addressing the needs of members in “doomed areas”—the Dahhiya, the 
Bekaa valley, and southern Lebanon. In the late eighties and early nineties while still 
engaged in clashes with Amal, Jihad al-Bina’ asked residents to pledge allegiance to 
Hezbollah in exchange for goods, services, advice, money, and generally improving their 
quality of life. According to Danawi, these favors and support “reinforced Hezbollah’s 
popularity and established its territoriality” . . . “[and] expanded [Hezbollah’s] hegemony 
and popularity beyond its territory.”118  After Hezbollah decided to enter electoral politics 
in 1992, Jihad al-Bina’ modified its quid pro quo arrangement with constituents—it now 
asked recipients to cast ballots in favor of Hezbollah candidates or risk termination of Jihad 
al-Bina’-provided services and social alienation.119  Interestingly, at the al-Rasul al-’Azam 
hospital built by Jihad al-Bina’ in the dahhiya which services all residents—Shi’i or not—
there is a shuttling service run by Hezbollah volunteers that takes patients and staff to the 
voting polls on election days.120 
a. Home and Building Reconstruction 
Although Amal similarly transitioned and set up social service organizations, 
compared to Jihad al-Bina’ Amal’s capabilities in the years following the civil war were 
embryonic,121 particularly with regard to reconstruction efforts. For Hezbollah, Jihad al-
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Bina’ is the metaphorical maid that cleans up after the organization’s military wing makes 
a mess, i.e., initiates or engages in conflict which triggers an Israeli response. During the 
1990s, Jihad al-Bina’ reportedly repaired more than 6,000 houses damaged from fighting 
in southern Lebanon.122  In 1993, Jihad al-Bina’ reportedly rebuilt 4,700 homes destroyed 
by Israel.123  Within a month after Israel’s “Grapes of Wrath” campaign in 1996 after 
Hezbollah launched a number of Katyusha rockets into Israel, Jihad al-Bina’ rehabilitated 
2,800 structures damaged from Israeli strikes in 106 locations in the south.124  In 1998, 
continued Hezbollah fighting against the Israeli-backed Southern Lebanese Army 
prompted the Israeli Air Force to conduct mock raids over Beirut’s southern suburbs. The 
planes flew at high speed and low altitude, creating sonic booms and likely causing 
damages to windows in the area.125  Jihad al-Bina’ engineers began inspecting and 
repairing damaged homes as quickly as the day after the damage occurred.126  The group’s 
official numbers show that by 2002 it rehabilitated 9,640 homes in the “doomed areas.”127  
The organization prioritized fixing houses in the south so refugees who previously fled to 
Beirut suburbs could return and cast votes in its favor128—although this didn’t happen by 
1992.   
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b. Water and Electric Services 
Jihad al-Bina’ also established itself as the primary water and electrical services 
provider to millions in Shiite territories. Jihad al-Bina’ launched the Al-’Abbas drinking 
water project “with a generous initiative from the Islamic Republic of Iran” in 1988.129  In 
1989, the group built at least 100 water tanks, providing potable water to more than 500,000 
people in dahhiya. By 1996, Jihad al-Bina’ built fifty seven wells, four water reservoirs, 
hundreds of meters of distribution pipes, and placed at least four hundred potable water 
tanks in the three primary Shia-dense territories,130 including Amal’s territories. Jihad al-
Bina’ also built 23 power stations, and routed wires and stabilizers to extend electricity to 
regions which never before received it.131   
c. Religious Indoctrination and Education 
Jihad al-Bina’s early projects also reflect Hezbollah’s focus on reinforcing Islamic 
norms in the “doomed areas” via proselytization and indoctrination, as well as promoting 
Hezbollah’s distinct Shia character. Prior to 1982, there were only three theological schools 
in Shi’i areas;132 between 1988 and 2002, Jihad al-Bina’ built seven social, cultural, and 
education centers, and 29 religious centers (husayniyyat), and one sculpture of Ayatollah 
Khomeini.133  Between 1988 and 1996, Jihad al-Bina’ constructed, rebuilt, or renovated 
33 schools in the Bekaa valley, the dahhiya, and southern Lebanon.134  By 2008, the 
number of schools constructed grew to 66, and the renovation of mosques to 73135—most 
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of these projects in the south and the Bekaa Valley.136  Under the direction of Hezbollah, 
Jihad al-Bina’ also provided low-cost primary and secondary education which followed 
the national curriculum, and was supplemented with several hours of religious study each 
school day.137  To distinguish its efforts and identity from Amal, and to claim Baalbek as 
a Hezbollah haven, Jihad al-Bina’ placed giant portraits of Khomeini, Khamenei, and 
Husayn al-Musawi, as well as a large model of the Dome of the Rock at the entrance of the 
city. 
d. Agriculture in the Rural Areas 
The lion’s share of Jihad al-Bina’s attention during its early years was dedicated to 
developing the forgotten areas’ agricultural sector upon which 60% of the people—some 
80,000 families—relied on for their income and livelihood.138  Starting with a gift of 30 
tractors from Iran, Jihad al-Bina’ developed and continues to execute a sophisticated 
agricultural development program. Jihad al-Bina’ Agricultural Cooperatives often 
distributed gifts to Lebanese farmers on behalf of the Islamic republic. One such delivery 
in 2002 from the Iranian Agricultural Jihad Ministry included 500 pesticide sprayers, two 
tractors, a 4,000 liter water tanker, two water engines, a packaging machine, and 56 barrels 
of milk. Jihad al-Bina’ made the equipment and supplies available to more than 1,300 
farmers in the area.139 
Between 1988 and 1996, Jihad al-Bina’ built seven agricultural centers or 
cooperatives distributed throughout the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon  These centers 
provided farming supplies such as fertilizer, pesticides, and seeds at “reasonable prices,”140 
and training sessions in farming techniques and crop cultivation by qualified engineers at 
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no charge.141  After 1992, Jihad al-Bina’ launched agricultural extension services and 
established an Agricultural Committee when the government banned the cultivation of 
hemp and poppy seeds. These services were designed to help farmers replace the banned 
cash crops first with potatoes, and later it offered training sessions on how to grow tobacco 
and citrus.142  The Agricultural Committee also sent inspectors to consult for farmers facing 
crop disease, and offered courses on bee farming.143  The foundation also sent farmers to 
Iran for advanced six-month training programs,144 which included pilgrimages to holy sites 
and tours of model farms to learn advanced farming techniques.145  In 1996, Jihad al-Bina’ 
held 35 agricultural training sessions which attracted thousands of participants.146  Many 
of its training sessions were openly funded by the Islamic Republic of Iran who issued 
graduation certificates in the name of the state.147  In 1999, Jihad al-Bina’ opened the 
Seasons (Fusul) [Company] for Agricultural Projects and Services, and an Agricultural 
Credit Company in the northern Bekaa valley town of al-Nabi Othman.148  These 
organizations helped farmers by giving guidance, supplies, and loans—providing services 
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to around 7,000 additional families in the area.149  Jihad al-Bina’s Agricultural Committees 
consisted of engineers who traveled to farms to inspect the health of crops and consult for 
farmers.150  Its extension centers in the Bekaa Valley have on-site demonstration plots, 
greenhouses, a dairy farm, and pathology and soil testing laboratories.151   
Jihad al-Bina’s agricultural development included general infrastructure 
development in rural areas which improved quality of life and expanded Hezbollah’s 
visibility and influence. Between 1988 and 1995, it built a network of roads, 15 water 
canals, and 12 new irrigation canals in southern Lebanon, and two new veterinary centers 
in Nabatiya and Sohmur (Bekaa Valley) to help farmers.152  It dug water wells throughout 
the Bekaa Valley and the south, including one well in the village of Libaya which had no 
water source of its own for 20 years. In May 1990, the organization built modern agro-
technical center and a school in Hawsh Barada, and it started building a large polyclinic 
medical center in Hermel. In 1992, the organization provided free transportation from 
Baalbek and isolated villages, and set up numerous establishments that provided free food 
and services to the poor such as a restaurant, pharmacies, medical and dental clinics, and a 
chain of its own supermarkets.153  In 1992, Jihad al-Bina’ built a resort-like complex of 
bungalows in the town of Taybi, five kilometers from Baalbek, to house youth participating 
in Hezbollah cultural and recreational encampments and events sponsored by Hezbollah.154  
Jihad al-Bina’ also offered technical training programs in computer proficiency, electrical 
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work, tile, sanitation, bee keeping, fish breeding, animal husbandry, and carpentry to help 
farmers expand and to supplement their incomes.155   
3. Jihad al-Bina’ and Hezbollah’s Entry into Politics 
Through social service provision, reconstruction, education, and agricultural 
development, Hezbollah expanded influence and popularity beyond its territories, and 
increased membership for the party. Harik states that the motivation behind these actions 
is clearly political—the intent “is to keep the Shia on their land and induce those who left 
to return.”156  Lob provides a more nuanced characterization of Jihad al-Bina’s efforts in 
that they curbed migration from rural areas of the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon “to 
prevent depopulation” and to uphold “a critical mass of recruits and constituents . . . [and] 
gain popular support” upon which Hezbollah’s military wing could draw recruits, and to 
amass votes during elections.157  As validation, Hezbollah dominated Amal in its first entry 
into Lebanese parliamentary elections in 1992—it won eight seats to Amal’s four.158     
Hezbollah’s entry into politics also greatly affected Jihad al-Bina’. First, it forced 
Jihad al-Bina’ to institutionalize, to highlight its intrinsic Lebanese character, and to take 
on a veneer of officialdom. When Hezbollah made the decision to run candidates, it made 
the decision to work within the system of Lebanese politics. To support this transition, 
Jihad al-Bina’ trained its employees to abide by government laws, and according to Lob, 
“encouraged beneficiaries, as the new electorate” to vote.159  Where Jihad al-Bina’ 
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required allegiance from recipients of goods, funds, and services between 1988 and 1992, 
in the electoral period allegiance equated to voting in favor of Hezbollah candidates.   
Jihad al-Bina’ also helped Hezbollah to take on a more Lebanese identity void of 
Iranian patronage in the run up to elections. Shortly before the elections the Iranian 
members of Jehad-e Sazandegi that helped establish Jihad al-Bina’ offices and operations 
in Lebanon over the previous half decade returned to Iran.160  When addressing social work 
and reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, Hezbollah and Jihad al-Bina’ leadership often 
downplayed the organization’s Iranian heritage and patronage, and particularly its 
financing. While there is little doubt about the real benefits provided to Lebanon’s Shiite 
communities through Jihad al-Bina’s efforts, the Iranian origin of Hezbollah’s 
benevolence at times casts a shadow on the organization’s work and a sense of suspicion 
upon its motives.   
Second, Hezbollah’s entry into politics opened the door for collaboration with 
various Lebanese state agencies on multiple projects—even more greatly legitimizing 
Jihad al-Bina’ and its parent group within Lebanon. Despite the antagonistic rhetoric and 
relationship between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah, the state licensed and at times 
funded Hezbollah’s social welfare foundations—as will be demonstrated—which eased the 
organization’s entry into politics.161   
Emerging crises within Lebanon often exposed state ineptitude and provided space 
for Jihad al-Bina’ to highlight its capabilities in contrast to the state. Secretary Nasrallah 
often promises that “Jihad al-Bina’ will reconstruct whatever Israel destroyed in 
cooperation with government and non-government organizations.”162  Moreover, 
Hezbollah has various media platforms, such as Al-Manar television on which to showcase 
its multiple projects—often conducted at a greater speed and responsiveness than the state. 
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By 2000, Jihad al-Bina’ developed a good reputation for efficiency within Lebanon 
and internationally. United Nations representatives often attend opening ceremonies of 
new Jihad al-Bina’ initiatives,163 and praised the group for its responsiveness and 
capabilities. According to a representative from the U.N. Economic and Social 
Commission for West Asia (UNSC-WA), Jihad al-Bina’ “is one of the best-equipped 
social organizations” in the region.164  An example that highlights the organizations 
responsiveness occurred on January 22, 2003. At 9am, Israeli troops in the Shebaa farms 
area fired three 122mm artillery shells on the village of Birket al-Naqqar on the eastern 
outskirts of Kfar Shuba. Jihad al-Bina’ representatives responded within hours to inspect 
damages of approximately one dozen houses and began repairs.165 
4.  Funding 
a. Iran 
Iran is the primary source of funding for the Jihad al-Bina’ Development 
Foundation. However, this is difficult to confirm as Jihad al-Bina’ rarely releases official 
budget reports and Hezbollah’s leaders alter responses from admission, to obfuscation, to 
flat out denial regarding Iranian money. According to Danawi, without cash Jihad al-Bina’ 
“would be building and reconstructing castles in the sand.”  In 2002, Jihad al-Bina’ 
reportedly worked on an operating budget of $5 million per year.166  The cash is very real, 
but Danawi asserts that it is not at all clear where it comes from.167   
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However, some information—with discrepancies—regarding Jihad al-Bina’s 
budgets and expenses exist. For example, Jihad al-Bina’ cited discrepant sources of funds 
in two published prospectuses: one in Arabic published in 1992 and another in English 
from 1996. The Arabic publication cites the “Islamic Republic of Iran” as the primary 
donor to the organization’s budget, in addition to funds received from Khums, Islamic 
donations and charities. The English version, however, states that its budget is made up of 
donations from its members, charitable donations, and government aid.168  Either Iran 
stopped funding Jihad al-Bina’ after 1992 or this is an intentional omission. According to 
Danawi, it is likely that Hezbollah’s leadership was sensitive to the fact that its Arabic-
speaking constituents would be less averse to Iran as a source of funds than its English 
readers. 
Whether omitted, denied, or obfuscated, there are few that were unaware of Iran’s 
role in setting up and funding Jihad al-Bina’s operations—and Hezbollah’s leaders were 
sensitive to this. As previously presented in this thesis, Iran openly donated supplies, 
materials, support, and funds to establish Jihad al-Bina’ and sustained its construction and 
development efforts. In 1989 Al-Nahar Arab News reported that Iran’s annual allocation 
to Hezbollah was approximately $140 million.169  According to Taremi, the Iranian 
embassy in Damascus funneled Jihad al-Bina’ $220,000 to $440,000 per year between 
1988 and 2001.170  
Opponents of Hezbollah accused it of being a pawn of Iran, of undermining 
Lebanese sovereignty, or of creating and expanding a Shiite state-within-a-state by directly 
financing Jihad al-Bina’s reconstruction efforts and land acquisitions.171  Despite these 
accusations, Jihad al-Bina’ remains an officially licensed Lebanese charitable association 
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and Islamic welfare agency.172  As such, Jihad al-Bina’ can perform projects with foreign 
donations without violating laws, although it must deal with complexities of public 
perception. Through Jihad al-Bina’, Iran repaired “bridges, roads, mosques and schools . . 
. [and] repaired electrical, telecommunication, road, and water problems as well as 
compensating the peoples for the loss of their houses.”173  Following the 2006 war, wealthy 
Shi’a businessman, ‘Ali Tajedinne affiliated with Jihad al-Bina’ was accused of utilizing 
Iranian funds to buy lands from poor Druze and Christian landowners at up to four times 
the going rate as part of a Hezbollah-sponsored land-grab and resettlement program. Mr. 
Tajedinne and other Shia businessmen purchased at least 200 to 300 acres each in Christian 
and Druze villages of Chbeil and Al-Sreiri. They built dozens of apartment buildings, 
supermarkets, and started moving in Shi’i families. Druze Politician Walid Jumblatt also 
pointed to a four-lane highway constructed to connect Hezbollah stronghold Nabatiya in 
the south with the Bekaa valley as part of this conspiratorial effort. The road was lined with 
banners that proclaimed the source of the road’s funds: “510km of new roads paid for by 
the Iranian Organization for Sharing in the Building of Lebanon.”174   
Israel made it clear they knew of and disapproved Iran’s patronage when they struck 
a number of banks suspected of transferring Iranian funds to Hezbollah in 2006. On August 
11, French newspaper La Tribune reported that Jihad al-Bina’s interests were hit very hard 
following Israeli strikes on at least one dozen banks suspected of being used by Hezbollah 
“for transferring funds from abroad,” alluding to Iran. The goal of the strikes was to make 
it difficult for the organization to sustain social assistance services conducted by Jihad al-
Bina’, and to pay salaries of its employees. Israel also wanted to send a message to financial 
institutions that they should not work with Hezbollah. According to Israeli intelligence, 
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Hezbollah received $50 million a year during “normal times” and as much as $280 million 
in recent years.175   
Despite direct targeting efforts such as these, Jihad al-Bina’s resources were not 
obviously impacted. The organization reportedly enjoyed redundant streams of continuous 
revenue from multiple international sources. By the end of 2007, it was reported that Iran 
invested up to $381 million into Lebanon since the end of the 2006 war,176 the lion’s share 
of which was likely channeled to Hezbollah. It is nearly impossible to confirm amounts 
Hezbollah or Jihad al-Bina’ receives from Iran; Hezbollah leadership sporadically 
alternated from openly admitting to obfuscating Iran’s contributions. Their reluctance to 
divulge amounts received from Iran likely stems from not wanting to tie what might be 
perceived as radical or at least partisan goals with charitable works. 
b. The United States via Lebanon 
Interestingly, Jihad al-Bina’s greatest source of revenue through mid-2007 other 
than the Iranian government might possibly be the unwitting United States government. As 
an official social service organization, Jihad al-Bina’ received funds directly from the 
Lebanese government to assist in relief and reconstruction efforts following various 
conflicts. Following the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, Jihad al-Bina’ was the 
primary reconstruction management agency in the dahhiya and received $400 million from 
the Lebanese government to rebuild destroyed homes and buildings.177  Hezbollah 
members and sympathizers are members of municipal councils which have a hand in 
allocating U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID )funds178—since 2001, the 
lowest annual amount donated to Lebanon by USAID was $12 million in 2002, and the 
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highest was $194 million in 2008 to help with the war recovery. The USAID amounts 
marked for Lebanon in 2017 and 2018 are $116 and $106 million, respectively.179  Notably, 
six former members of Hezbollah’s Politburo of the early 1990s—when it provided 
guidance to the Health Committee that later became Jihad al-Bina’—were elected to 
Lebanon’s parliament in subsequent elections.180   
c. Other Sources 
Jihad al-Bina’ also enjoys financial access from international sources other than 
Iran and the unwitting United States. In 1992, Hezbollah sought out a medicine donation 
from Italy and since that time has been a regular recipient of international aid designated 
for Lebanon’s Shi’i community. Lastly, Hezbollah’s NGOs—including Jihad al-Bina’— 
borrowed 25 percent of all Lebanese NGO loans extended from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and international donors such as the UN Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM), the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the E.U. This totals 7,500 loans 
annually at a value of $4.5 million in 2001 alone.181   
Jihad al-Bina’ also receives some external aid through fundraising and local 
donations. For example, local villagers raised $18,000 of the $120,000 needed to add a 
clinic and dig a well for the husayniyya in Libaya and contributed $6,000 in labor. 
According to Jihad al-Bina’s director in 1992, Sultan As’ad, approximately 20 percent of 
Jihad al-Bina’s budget comes from religious donations (zakat) from Lebanon and 
abroad.182  Hezbollah also received individual and business donations, and revenue from 
its private investments. The organization continued finding housing for displaced persons, 
rented cars to replace those destroyed by Israel, and accelerated reconstruction operations 
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“with an efficiency that is rarely seen in Middle East administrations,”183 according to one 
journalist from Le Figaro.   
These revenue streams independent of the state allowed Jihad al-Bina’ to move 
forward on projects in a way competing groups could not. For example, although Israel 
primarily targeted Hezbollah buildings and institutions during its 2006 34-day campaign 
in Lebanon, the government—already with a reputation for tremendous neglect and 
indolence—became paralyzed. Government agencies or parties intertwined in the 
bureaucracy were slaves to the unimaginative and seemingly unconcerned pace of 
government operations. Almost a month after cessation of hostilities, while the government 
was still working with the UN Developmental Program (UNDP) on reconstruction 
strategies and procedures, Jihad al-Bina’ had already commenced its parallel 
reconstruction and recovery efforts. By September 6, 2006, Jihad al-Bina’ already 
established the extent of destruction and had developed a plan to begin reconstruction. 
Moreover, the organization already distributed $150 million to help people pay rent while 
the organization rebuilt their homes,184 even before receiving the $400 million later 
approved by the state. 
Moreover, Hezbollah’s prior political maneuvering allowed it to maintain its 
special status as a “resistance organization” as well as a legitimate political party. 
Therefore, it was able to retain its arms and independent funding streams, in addition to 
funds received through the state. This gave Hezbollah an advantage over competing 
sectarian groups. For example, when the Lebanese government passed laws in 1990 to 
disarm all militias, Druze, Maronite parties, as well as Amal lost significant funding cuts 
when their militias were disarmed. To boot, when the Lebanese Army began exercising 
authority in previous Amal enclaves, they lost revenue streams from previous independent 
taxation of the population. However, Hezbollah’s revenue stream was supplied primarily 
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by the Iranian government and religious groups. The available revenue gap between 
Hezbollah and Amal expanded exponentially from that time forward. Hezbollah was able 
to utilize its steadily swelling budgets to continue and expand projects and services.185 
E. THE 2006 WAR WITH ISRAEL AND WA’AD 
1. How it Began 
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah’s actions triggered an escalatory response from Israel 
and a devastating 34-day conflict. Hezbollah and Israel more or less abided by unofficial 
“rules of the game” developed in the 1990s during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon 
which lasted until May 2000. During Israel’s occupation of the south, Hezbollah fighters 
led the resistance against Israel and its proxy Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). Small 
exchanges often escalated into fierce conflicts, resulting in the slaughter of Lebanese 
civilians, garnering international attention, and ultimately, intervention. In 1996, both sides 
agreed to rules brokered by the United Nations—these rules specified that armored groups 
would not launch attacks against Israeli territory; that Israel would not bomb civilians or 
civilian targets; and that both sides would commit to avoid attacking civilians and 
launching attacks from within civilian areas. However, nothing in the agreement prevented 
the right to self-defense. For the most part, responses to aggression were proportionally in-
kind. A UN monitoring group made up of US, French, Lebanese, Syrian, and Israeli 
observers would oversee implementation of the agreement. This body also mediated 
between the two groups over prisoner exchanges and releases, return of corpses, and served 
as the forum where the groups could admit fault, submit a complaint or apology, and 
deescalate tensions.186  Adherence to the rules brought relative peace to the security zone 
established by Israel, and Israeli popular opinion built in favor of a full Israeli withdraw 
from the occupied territory in southern Lebanon in May 2000. Though occasional fighting 
broke out between Hezbollah and Israeli forces in the border areas, the six year period 
between Israel’s withdrawal and the start of the 2006 war was marked with relative quiet.187 
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Respect for the “rules of the game” waned on both sides in the time leading up to 
May 2006. In November 2005, Hezbollah attempted to kidnap several Israeli soldiers in 
the border village of Ghajar, which straddles the Israel-Lebanon border to secure the return 
of a few Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. In May 2006, Hezbollah fired on an Israeli 
border post and injured one Israeli soldier. According to the “rules,” an expected response 
would have been to shell a few Hezbollah positions and command centers. However, Israel 
shelled twenty Hezbollah positions, destroying a few. Hezbollah again escalated the back-
and-forth exchange by launching eight Katyusha rockets at the Israeli army northern HQ 
at Safad, damaging an antennae farm nearby. In June 2006, Israeli leadership received 
reports by respected analysts which revealed a Hezbollah plot to develop a “first strike” 
capability to launch a massive, preemptive rocket attack. Moreover, Israel intercepted 
communications between Nasrallah and a member of  HAMAS in which Nasrallah 
encouraged his counterpart to “hang tough” in negotiations with Israel over a prisoner 
exchange and in which he referred to Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister 
Peretz as weak. Finally, on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fighters ambushed an Israeli patrol 
inside the northern Israel border. The operation led to the death of five Israeli soldiers, the 
destruction of a new Merkava tank, and the capture of two soldiers.188  Hezbollah’s 
leadership knew the response would be harsh, but greatly underestimated the gravity of 
Israel’s response. 
2. Extent of Damage 
Hezbollah’s actions triggered a massive Israeli offensive intent on ridding the 
region of the “cancer” of Hezbollah, resulting in huge material and economic losses, as 
well as lives lost (see Figure 8). The Israeli strategy was to hold the Lebanese government 
responsible for not controlling Hezbollah, and to punish Hezbollah by inflicting violence 
on their strongholds.189  At the beginning of the conflict, Israel released approximately 
3,000 bombs, rockets, and artillery rounds per day; by the end of the war, it released 6,000 
                                                 
188 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story, 134–135. 
189 Howayda Al-Harithy, “The Politics of Identity Construction in Post-War Reconstruction,” in 
Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction: Case Studies from Lebanon in the Aftermath of the 2006 War 
(London - New York: Routledge, 2010), 73. 
64 
per day.190  During the 34-day conflict, approximately 500,000 people were evacuated from 
northern Israel, and almost 1 million from southern Lebanon.  43 Israeli and 1,109 
Lebanese civilians were killed.  118 Israeli and 28 Lebanese soldiers, and approximately 
200 Hezbollah fighters died in the fighting. Approximately 900 Lebanese factories were 
struck and 1,500 homes damaged or destroyed, resulting in the displacement of nearly 
15,000 families. In the south, 89,442 dwelling units were destroyed, as well as schools, 
hospitals, and other public and private structures.191  Material losses in Lebanon were 
estimated at $4 billion, undoing fifteen years of post-war reconstruction efforts.192  When 
including loss of wages, the Lebanese government estimated costs of war near $10 
billion.193  Moreover, the war devastated one of Lebanon’s greatest national sources of 
revenue, tourism. The war sabotaged the summer tourism season, representing a single year 
loss of approximately $2 billion in revenue, in addition to diminished tourism into future 
years while reconstruction efforts were underway—following the war, the effort was 
expected to take at least two years.194  The war was particularly damaging to rural 
livelihoods as well—orchards, agricultural crops were damaged or left unusable, and 
livestock killed. Unemployment estimates in southern Lebanon prior to the war were at 9–
11 percent; due to the war, that number rose to around 20 percent as a result of direct and 
indirect losses.195 
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Figure 8. Map of Israeli bombing of Lebanon July 12–August 13, 
2006196 
Nine months after the 2006 conflict—for which Hezbollah was largely blamed as 
the instigator—Hezbollah’s leaders launched reconstruction and relief efforts throughout 
Lebanon. However, Hezbollah emphasized its Wa’ad project (meaning pledge, in Arabic) 
in the dahhiya. In the dahhiya, the affected sectarian and political community were almost 
entirely Shi’i Hezbollah members. The damage included 1,232 buildings that housed 
                                                 




30,000 residential and 1,600 commercial units. Of those damaged, 951 were partially 
destroyed, the rest completely.197  The Lebanese government’s approved decision 146/
2006 issued on October 31, 2006 was to provide financial compensation to residents of 
destroyed domiciles, rather than to rebuild them. Each owner would receive payment of 80 
million Lebanese pounds ($53,333 USD) per house or apartment in two installments, with 
an extra 50 million Lebanese pounds ($33,333) for common areas.198 
3. Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad Project 
However, the project’s progression was at the mercy of a laggard seven-stage 
bureaucratic process. Hezbollah’s top priority was to expeditiously return people to their 
homes. Residents of destroyed or damaged dahhiya buildings were given the option to 
collect compensation from the government and rebuild their homes on their own, or to 
delegate Jihad al-Bina’ to collect compensation and take care of the rebuilding processes 
on their behalf. Jihad al-Bina’ also promised to pay for any costs not covered by the 
government allocation. An initial meeting was held with 5,000 residents to present these 
options, 70 percent accepted Jihad al-Bina’s services with more signing on as the work 
progressed. For this purpose, Jihad al-Bina’ set up the Wa’ad (promise in Arabic) 
Project.199 
F. THE 2007 U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST HEZBOLLAH’S JIHAD AL-BINA’ 
Before the Wa’ad project officially began in the spring, the United States Treasury 
designated its directing organization Jihad al-Bina’ for secondary on February 20, 2007.200  
In 2015, these sanctions became pursuant to the Hezbollah financial sanctions regulations 
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when the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act was passed.201  The reasons 
listed for the designation are that the organization receives direct funding from Iran and 
because it is overseen and run by Hezbollah. The release also points out that Jihad al-Bina’ 
used deceptive means to solicit funding from international development organizations, 
such as applying for funding under names of proxies to obfuscate the direct link to 
Hezbollah. The release also states that Hezbollah directs Jihad al-Bina’ for “its own 
construction needs as well as to attract popular support through the provision of civilian 
construction services.”202  Implied in this statement is that the United States recognizes the 
effect of Jihad al-Bina’s targeted reconstruction efforts in Lebanon—the consolidation of 
political power at the expense of the state.203  Given the antagonistic relationship between 
Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, and particularly with the Siniora government in 
2006 and 2007, there is reason to believe the Siniora administration supported and possibly 
requested that the United States sanction the organization.204  The sanctions froze any U.S. 
assets held by Jihad al-Bina’ and outlawed U.S. nationals or entities from dealing with the 
organization. Moreover, the intent of the sanctions was to “amplify [the effect] of primary 
sanctions [on Hezbollah, and] put pressure on third parties to stop their activities with . . . 
[Jihad al-Bina’] by threatening to cut off the third party’s access to the sanctioning 
country”205—the United States. It is unclear if and how many assets Jihad al-Bina’ held 
within the United States. According to Wa’ad director, Hassan Jeshi, the organization has 
no holdings in the United States.206  If true, the sanctions may not be much more than a 
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symbolic gesture or strategic messaging to third party observers. However, the details of 
Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad Project and the effect of sanctions will be discussed in chapters to 
follow. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Jihad al-Bina’ was an enabler for Hezbollah’s transition from militant group to 
socially-oriented political powerhouse in Lebanon. The organization assisted in this 
process by focusing on the forgotten Shia territories in the Bekaa Valley, southern 
Lebanon, and Beirut’s southern suburbs—the dahhiya. Jihad al-Bina’s activities included 
providing healthcare, housing, reconstruction and rehabilitation of housing, agricultural 
development, education, utilities including water and electrical services during peacetime 
and crisis, and promotion of religious norms. Unfettered access to funds from Iran and the 
international community via the Lebanese government financed the spectrum of Jihad al-
Bina’s social welfare and reconstruction programs. The cumulative effect of Jihad al-
Bina’s activities is that it maintained concentrations of Hezbollah-friendly populations 
upon which the organization could draw from for recruits and rely upon in elections. This 
popularity propelled Hezbollah onto the Lebanese political stage where it politically 
maneuvered to maintain autonomy at the expense of the government and its political rivals. 
It also garnered the attention of the United States who designated Jihad al-Bina’ in 
acknowledgement of its key role in supporting Hezbollah’s strategic objectives—to grow 
in power and influence in Lebanon and the region. The next chapter will examine Jihad al-
Bina’s activities in the post-sanction time period to assess sanction effectiveness. In sum, 
the next chapter will determine if the sanctions emplaced in 2007 and 2009 on the Wa’ad 
Project stifled their efforts and to what degree.  
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III.  JIHAD AL-BINA’ FROM 2007 TO 2018 
The United States designated Jihad al-Bina’ for secondary sanctions at a critical 
time for the organization. Following cessation of hostilities on August 14, 2006, regional 
and international observers marveled at Hezbollah’s professionalism and competence 
demonstrated in combat versus Israeli forces. This newfound notoriety helped divert public 
attention away from its miscalculations which tipped off the war and devastated Lebanon. 
Analysts struggled to explain how this seemingly militarily unsophisticated guerilla 
organization thwarted Israel’s technologically superior military from achieving its goal of 
wiping out Hezbollah from Lebanon. Hezbollah leadership reveled in the astonishment and 
the West’s reluctant acknowledgement of Hezbollah’s military significance. But in 
Lebanon, people surrounded by rubble were less enthusiastic about Hezbollah’s military 
prowess. 
In Lebanon, Hezbollah looked to Jihad al-Bina’ to help salvage its reputation 
following the massive destruction of the 34-day conflict with Israel. The war left at least 
1,109 Lebanese dead,—mostly civilians—approximately 4,400 injured, and an estimated 
1,000,000 displaced. In addition to the massive physical destruction which left the dahhiya 
in ruins, and thousands of residences (approximately 89,000) throughout southern 
Lebanon, the Bekaa valley, and elsewhere were completely destroyed—340 homes in 
Srifa; 215 homes in Siddiquine; 180 homes in Yatar; 160 in Zebqine; 750 more in ‘Aita al-
Cha’b; between 800 and 2,800 homes in Bint Jbeil’s old town207—considered the capital 
of Hezbollah’s resistance; and 140 homes in Taibe.208  The outrage against Israel was 
salient, but also expected—Hezbollah shouldered much of the blame for instigating the 
conflict. Fearing public backlash, Hezbollah leaders tasked Jihad al-Bina’ to expeditiously 
clean up the mess and pledged to make the destroyed area “more beautiful than it was.”  In 
addition to putting up a stiff military resistance, Hezbollah needed fast reconstruction 
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efforts to convey resilience. Given the scale of this endeavor, Jihad al-Bina’ set up the 
Wa’ad Project in the dahhiya, and began working to rebuild damaged Shia areas elsewhere 
in Lebanon. 
The United States government understood Jihad al-Bina’s importance to Hezbollah 
at this crucial moment. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the organization possessed 
the technical and administrative expertise to carry out large-scale projects, and a seemingly 
bottomless cash cow in Iran to fund its initiatives, as well as other redundant streams of 
revenue. Together, these potentially enabled Hezbollah to emerge from the 2006 crisis with 
reputation unscathed, and perhaps elevated. The United States decided this was the moment 
to designate the organization for its terrorist ties for two reasons: first, to go after its access 
to money necessary for workers, equipment, and supplies; and second, in attempt to 
preemptively dissuade international partners from working with or providing resources to 
the organization. 
A. U.S. SANCTIONS, HEZBOLLAH’S JIHAD AL-BINA’, AND IRAN 
1. A Brief History on Sanctions against Iran 
The history of U.S. sanctions against Iran goes back to the Islamic revolution. After 
Iranian students took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took Americans hostage, the 
United States banned imports from Iran and froze over $12 billion in U.S-based assets. In 
1984, the United States designated Iran a state-sponsor of terrorism. This designation 
imposed a long list of sanctions pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, 
section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 
Act; including, a ban on arms-related exports and sales; prohibitions on economic 
assistance; U.S. opposition to World Bank and other intergovernmental organization (IGO) 
loans; lifting of diplomatic immunity which opens the door for civil cases against the 
sponsor state; prohibition of U.S. citizens or corporations from engaging in financial 
transactions with the sponsor state; and limitations on visas and immigration, among 
others.209  In 1992, U.S. congress solidified its concerns on Iran’s nuclear, biological, and 
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chemical (NBC), and advanced conventional weapons development ambitions when it 
passed the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.210   
The United States’ efforts to muster international consensus to thwart Iran’s nuclear 
program and terror sponsorship came to a head in 1996. Because proliferation challenges 
Iran presented were similar to those of Iraq and Libya in 1990 and 1992, respectively, the 
United States wanted the UNSC to pass similar strong comprehensive sanction packages 
against Iran. UN sanctions passed against Libya ultimately convinced Muammar Ghaddafi 
to abandon Libya’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials and programs, allowing 
a team of U.S. and British experts to dismantle Libya’s WMD program and infrastructure 
by 2004. Moreover, Libya formally accepted responsibility for its sponsorship of terrorism 
and role in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, and paid $2.7 billion in 
compensation to families of victims. Strong UN sanctions against Iraq likewise convinced 
Saddam Hussein to abandon his WMD program, although this was not clear until after the 
2003 U.S. campaign in Iraq.211   
2. The UN Loses Gusto for Sanctions 
Though the UN sanctions were successful in a non-proliferation sense, the 
perception of hardships imposed on innocent Iraqis tainted the effort and turned Security 
Council members off to the idea of repeating a similar package in Iran. The sanctions cut 
off Iraq from international supplies—food and medicine—which undoubtedly caused 
tremendous suffering for innocent people. One Harvard study concluded that the sanctions 
imposed “suffering of tragic proportions,” particularly on Iraq’s children.212  After 1995, a 
number of studies cited that UN sanctions may have contributed to an increased rate of 
death among children, attributing approximately 500,000 child deaths to the sanctions. 
Most damning of these was the Iraq Child and Maternity Mortality Survey (ICMMS) 
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conducted by UNICEF. The survey found that children in central and southern Iraq were 
dying at a rate double that of the rate 10 years earlier. Results from subsequent studies 
based on the ICMMS data were even more troubling; one determined that the death rate 
per 1,000 births in Iraq rose from 56 between 1984 and 1989 to 131 between 1994 and 
1999 as a direct result of sanctions.213  It was later discovered in the early 2000s that these 
studies included inaccurate, irrelevant, “rigged” data within the ICMMS, and even falsified 
data manipulated by the Saddam Hussein regime.214  By the late 1990s, it did not matter if 
the data supporting the international community’s collective guilt over Iraq sanctions was 
proven invalid—Security Council members were unwilling to levy any sanctions against 
Iran for the next decade. 
In 1996, the United States attempted its own set of sanctions against Iran and called 
for the UNSC to follow suit, but they refused. The United States passed the Iran Sanctions 
Act which sought to deny Iran funds necessary to further its nuclear program by 
sanctioning any entity that invested more than $20 million a year in Iran’s oil or gas 
sector.215  By this time, US-Russia relations were souring, economies of European states 
were deeply intertwined with Iran’s, and European countries were heavily dependent upon 
Iran for energy needs. These new U.S. sanctions would require European countries to 
greatly curtail their dealings with Iran and go elsewhere to satisfy their energy needs. As 
described, the Iraq sanctions in the early 1990s—though successful—were perceived to 
have caused tremendous suffering among the innocent civilian populace and no one was 
eager to repeat this travesty elsewhere. For these reasons, the United States was never able 
to get the UNSC to back another set of comprehensive sanctions. The best the Clinton 
administration could do at the time was to sign a series of executive orders prohibiting the 
bilateral exchange of goods and services between the United States and Iran.216 
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3. The U.S. Goes it Alone: An Innovation in Sanctions 
The type of sanctions implemented against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 and Wa’ad in 
2009 were unique and had been recently developed by the U.S. Treasury to isolate and 
pressure Iran. Faced with the dichotomous task of stifling Iran’s nuclear program and the 
UNSC’s unwilling to pass strong sanctions, between 1996 and 2007 the United States used 
three innovative initiatives to place economic pressure on Iran. Two of these initiatives 
involved divesting state and local government pensions from companies who did business 
with Iran,217 and pressuring companies who supplied gasoline to Iran to halt gasoline 
sales.218  The third initiative—the type that was levied against Hezbollah and Jihad al-
Bina’ and Wa’ad starting in 2007—was what Kittrie refers to as “the Treasury 
Department’s new breed of financial sanctions,” orchestrated by America’s first 
Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Stuart Levey. The 
U.S. Treasury began deploying this new breed of sanctions in 2005. Kittrie describes the 
goal and intended effect of these new sanctions in that they “persuade[d] specific third-
country companies to stop doing business with the targeted rogue state (Iran), including by 
putting those third-country companies to a choice between the U.S. market and that of the 
rogue state.”  Of these three initiatives, the United States had the most success in gaining 
leverage over Iran’s decision-making process with regard to its nuclear program and 
terrorism financing through the Treasury Department’s financial sanctions.219 
Iran’s state-owned banks are highly integrated into the global financial system. 
They utilized deceptive practices to fund acquisition of items for its nuclear program and 
to fund Hezbollah. Deceptive practices utilized by Iranian banks include the use of front 
companies or intermediaries, and having financial institutions remove the name of Iranian 
banks when processing transactions to obscure Iran’s role in funding terrorist groups.220  
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Iran’s integration into the global financial system and use of deceptive practices allows it 
to covertly support its nuclear program and terrorism funding activities. 
Starting in 2005, the United States unleashed a multifaceted strategy of financial 
sanctions against Iran. As Kittrie states, this strategy included “direct outright to individual 
private financial institutions, aggressive use of financial authorities to pursue political 
goals, and effective development and harnessing of intelligence about global financial 
transactions.”221  Effectively, what this meant was that the United States had to convince 
companies and banks to stop doing business with Iran. When Levey pitched the idea of this 
new form of sanctions to then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, he argued that banks 
needed to be convinced that they were only as reputable as their clients’ practices, and that 
banks that served Iran risked their reputations as long as Iran financed terrorism and 
pursued nuclear and advanced missile programs. Banks also needed to understand the 
impact on their credibility if they complied with Iran’s less-than-transparent requests, such 
as when Iran asked banks to remove traces of Iran’s involvement in a transaction. Levey 
proposed that the United States press banks to stop working with Iran until they conformed 
to accepted international standards. The proposal was accepted by the State Department.222 
The United States’ efforts successfully garnered support from individual foreign 
governments and American and non-American companies to support Iran’s alienation from 
the global financial system. During the early years of his tenure, Stuart Levey embarked 
on more than 80 foreign visits to over five dozen banks where he presented U.S. 
intelligence on Iranian illicit activities. For example, Iran’s state-owned Saderat Bank with 
over 3,400 branches worldwide funneled approximately $50 million dollars to Hezbollah 
and Palestinian fighters through its branches in Lebanon. Prior to 2005, sanctions focused 
on leveraging the benefits associated with trade. The United States embargoed Iranian 
imports, placed restrictions on travel, and even sanctioned the IRGC. But Iran always found 
ways around these sanctions—China purchased massive amounts of Iranian oil, and Iran 
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found other partners with whom it could trade and other places to travel.223  Moreover, 
despite the financial clout of the United States, the U.S. Treasury was hesitant to “mess 
around with the international financial system,” as put by former Assistant Secretary of 
State for Non-Proliferation, Robert Einhorn.224   
The United States’ frustrations with the UN led it to innovate and utilize its 
financial muscle to halt Iran’s nuclear program and to defund Hezbollah. In 2006, the U.S. 
Treasury blacklisted Iran’s top banks including Saderat Bank, Bank Sepah, and Melli Bank. 
When Iran’s Export Development Bank took over Sepah Bank’s accounts, the U.S. 
Treasury blacklisted it as well. The European Union, Australia, and others soon followed 
suit. Big banks in the United Kingdom, the rest of the EU, Japan, and some Muslim 
countries such as Bahrain and Malaysia curbed their business dealings with Iranian 
companies. Most surprisingly, even Chinese banks cut off many business dealings with 
Iranian companies.225   
The success of innovative U.S. financial sanctions independent of the UN had a 
tremendous impact on Iran’s ability to utilize the international financial system. By 2008, 
more than 80 banks curtailed business dealings with Iran. Some banks who handled 
hundreds of millions of dollars in Iranian accounts cut them off completely. Iranian leaders 
fiercely denied involvement in any illicit activities and accused the United States of 
“financial terrorism,” and submitted formal complaints to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Moreover, Iran was dealing with its own financial crisis which started in 2005—
soaring inflation and prices—compounding the problems associated with the United 
States’ new sanction repertoire.226   
Between 2006 and 2010, the U.S. Treasury began upping pressure on Iran by 
sanctioning organizations other than banks inside Iran and abroad. The Treasury sanctioned 
Iran’s national shipping company and affiliates in at least ten countries for falsifying 
                                                 
223 Wright, “Stuart Levey’s War.” 
224 Kittrie, “New Sanctions for a New Century,” 800. 
225 Wright, “Stuart Levey’s War.” 
226 Wright. 
76 
documents and for transporting on behalf of sanctioned entities for their ties to WMD 
development. The Treasury also sanctioned insurance companies, science and technology 
research firms, and mining and machinery companies, among others.227 The Treasury’s 
sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ in early 2007 and Wa’ad in 2009 were part of a series of 
these new innovative sanctions against non-financial institutions that supported Iran via 
Hezbollah. 
4. The UN Comes Around 
Finally, after nearly a decade of no new sanctions, the UN could no longer ignore 
Iran’s advancing nuclear program. The UN finally responded to U.S. promptings in 2006 
when the UNSC passed resolution 1696 in July demanding that Iran suspend all enrichment 
and reprocessing activities or risk sanctions—Iranian leaders scoffed. On December 23rd, 
the UNSC unanimously passed resolution 1737, which mandated the same stipulations in 
UNSCR 1696 and demanded entry for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
experts to ensure compliance. UNSCR 1696 also implemented sanctions, albeit weaker and 
less comprehensive than those implemented in Iraq in the 1990s and earlier. The sanctions 
banned supplies of nuclear-related materials and technology and froze assets of individuals 
and assets related to Iran’s nuclear program.228  The UN Security Council upped the ante 
as Iran continued to ignore its demands by passing UNSCR 1747 on March 24, 2007 which 
imposed an arms embargo and expanded the freeze on Iranian assets to more individuals 
and entities. On March 3, 2008, the UNSC passed resolution 1803, extending the asset 
freeze, expanding prohibitions on trade of sensitive equipment and materials related to 
Iran’s program, called upon states to monitor more closely the activities of Iranian banks 
and to inspect all ships and aircraft suspected of transporting materials related to Iran’s 
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nuclear program. Lastly, UNSCR 1803 banned travel by certain sanctioned individuals and 
called upon governments to monitor the movement of key individuals as well.229 
5. Sanctioning the Iran-Lebanon Nexus 
2006 and 2007 was a watershed moment wherein multiple sets of sanctions were 
deployed against the Iran-Lebanon nexus to thwart Iran’s support of Hezbollah. 
Immediately following the war in September 2006, the U.S. Treasury designated two 
Hezbollah-controlled financial institutions, Bayt al-Mal (The House of Money) which 
operated as Hezbollah’s bank, creditor, and investment arm. It also designated the Yousser 
Company for Finance and Investment which secured loans and finance business deals for 
Hezbollah’s companies.230  As stated, the U.S. Treasury designated Jihad al-Bina’ in early 
2007 for its support to Hezbollah, and likely in anticipation of its role in helping Hezbollah 
salvage its reputation following the 2006 war. Under Executive Order (EO) 13224, the U.S. 
Treasury also designated the IRGC-QF in October 2007, for “provid[ing] material support 
to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.”231  IRGC-QF was also later 
sanctioned for providing $100-$200 million a year to Hezbollah and for rearming the group 
in violation of UNSCR 1701. Moreover, EO 13224 designated Iranian state-owned Saderat 
Bank, Melli Bank, Mellat Bank, and others “used by the Government of Iran to channel 
funds to terrorist organizations, including Hizballah.”232 
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a. Financial Institutions 
The U.S. Treasury targeted Iran’s national banks because they were a critical node 
between Iran and its external proxies. Most Iranian funding to Hezbollah comes through 
Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. During the 1990s, the IRGC’s activities and support to 
Hezbollah were financed through a branch of Bank Melli in Baalbek. One month prior to 
the 1994 bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) building in 
Argentina, the alleged mastermind and then Iranian Cultural Ambassador, Mohsen 
Rabbani received approximately $150 million transferred into his Deutsch Bank account 
which originated from Bank Melli. In September 2006, the U.S. Treasury revealed that 
Iran’s central bank utilized Bank Melli and Bank Saderat branches in Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Syria to fund Hezbollah, as well as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.233  Moreover, 
Bank Saderat was blackballed from the U.S. financial system in 2006 for transferring “tens 
of millions of dollars through branches in Europe to Lebanon’s Hezbollah,” according to 
Matthew Levitt.234   
b. Hezbollah’s Jihad al-Bina’ 
The United States sanctioned Jihad al-Bina’ in early 2007 and Wa’ad in 2009 as 
part of its overarching, comprehensive strategy to weaken Iran. Top-down sanctions over 
the previous decade targeted Iran’s sources of revenue to pressure the regime and influence 
its decision-making processes. Middle-man sanctions against Iran’s financial institutions 
and banks sought to deny transfer of Iranian funds to support institutions seen as critical to 
external operations—i.e. Hezbollah and other proxy groups. Designation of Jihad al-Bina’ 
was a bottom-up approach of stifling the support organizations’ efforts which were seen as 
critical to Hezbollah—and ultimately Iran’s—strategic purposes. By blackballing Jihad al-
Bina’, the U.S. Treasury theorized that it would deny the organization access to necessary 
funds and would therefore be unable to execute operations. If the organization could not 
execute operations, it would fail to repair the damage which resulted from the 2006 war 
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and extend the state of chaos and misery in the dahhiya. In theory, if the sanctions worked, 
Jihad al-Bina’ would be unable to execute operations. How long would it take for the 
sanctions to go into effect?  The following section examines Jihad al-Bina’s operations to 
determine if and how the sanctions and designations had the desired effect. 
B. POST-2006 WAR JIHAD AL-BINA’ RECONSTRUCTION 
1. The Wa’ad Project—Hezbollah’s Pledge in Beirut’s Southern Suburbs 
Haret Hreik—the location of Hezbollah’s headquarters—was the epicenter of 
Israel’s 34-day bombing campaign, and consequently the focal point for Jihad al-Bina’s 
initial post-war reconstruction efforts. Approximately one-third of Israel’s estimated 
12,000 air strikes targeted the dahhiya.235  And within the dahhiya, Haret Hreik bore the 
brunt of the offensive due to its strategic importance to Hezbollah.236  One Democracy 
Now! reporter described the physical state of Haret Hreik following the conflict to “the 
aftermath of September 11th, but . . . 100 times over.”237  Within the dahhiya, 1,200 
buildings were damaged and 282 were completely destroyed.238  However, even before the 
bombing campaign concluded, Jihad al-Bina’ already prepared survey forms and base 
maps to begin damage assessments and start recovery efforts. Hezbollah’s intent was not 
solely to reconstruct the physical damage in the dahhiya, but to reinforce a ‘Resistance 
Society’ at the Party’s core. Reconstruction in Hezbollah’s population centers was 
considered an act of defiance just as critical to the Resistance as direct fighting against 
Israeli soldiers, and just as necessary to the survival of the Party in the postwar aftermath.239 
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Jihad al-Bina’ also prioritized Haret Hreik because of its strategic importance as 
the Party’s headquarters. The headquarters building where many official functions were 
held, was completely destroyed. Secretary General Nasrallah often held important 
meetings, televised speeches, and hosted visiting dignitaries at Hezbollah’s offices here. 
Israeli strikes also destroyed numerous hospitals and schools in the surrounding areas. Prior 
to the strikes, Hezbollah’s security services and critical facilities were located underground 
in Haret Hreik. As part of the Party’s reconstruction, it decided to move all of its civilian 
institutions underground as had been done with its security service offices.240  Notably, he 
also downplayed rumors that the project constructed suspicious tunnels, passages, or 
shelters in the security quarter of Haret Hreik.241 
In stark contrast to state processes in Lebanon’s Shia areas, swift reconstruction 
was a defining feature of Jihad al-Bina’s contribution to the resistance. It would be more 
than two weeks after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 calling 
for an immediate cessation of hostilities that the Lebanese government appointed a firm to 
study the removal of debris, to survey damage, and discuss reconstruction in the dahhiya.242  
Hezbollah, however, needed work to start immediately for four reasons: first, to highlight 
the state’s ineptitude and/or ambivalence; second, to promote the Party’s resistance identity 
by demonstrating its resilience; third, to eliminate evidence of is miscalculation which 
tipped off the war; and fourth, to quickly alleviate suffering of its constituency.   
To support these goals, Jihad al-Bina’ went to work immediately. The two weeks 
between the cessation of hostilities on August 14th and when the government began 
acknowledging its intent to help rebuild in the dahhiya on August 31st were critical to Jihad 
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al-Bina’. The organization wasted no time in putting workers and volunteers to work. 
Hundreds of architects, engineers, and volunteers responded to Jihad al-Bina’s call to 
action and started work on August 12th, two days before the resolution went into effect. 
Jihad al-Bina’ also set up an executive committee to begin damage estimates, rent heavy 
machinery, and begin removing debris. Jihad al-Bina’ surveyed and subdivided the 
dahhiya into clusters in which buildings were classified as partially or heavily damaged, or 
completely demolished.243 Though the damage was monumental, Secretary General 
Nasrallah promised to repair or reconstruct every house damaged in the war.244 
In addition to initiating preliminary steps for reconstruction, Jihad al-Bina’ began 
relief efforts as well. It formed teams to help displaced people find a place to stay, it brought 
in water tanks so people had access to potable water supplies, and it transported and sprayed 
insecticides on salvageable critical produce. Jihad al-Bina’ also coordinated with 
international organizations to secure food and medicine supplies.245 
Jihad al-Bina’ was able to get a jump start on the state’s recovery efforts in great 
part because of its readily-available supplies of money. While the Fuoad Siniora 
administration was still mulling over reconstruction strategies with the UNDP, by 
September 6th Jihad al-Bina’ already distributed $150 million provided by Iran to enable 
people to pay for rent while their homes were being rebuilt.246  Each displaced family was 
moved from the public gardens or schools used as shelter during the war and was given 
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$12,000 to provide for rent and furniture for one year.247  During the same time frame, 
there was relatively little government presence in the dahhiya.   
2. Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad Takes the Lead in Reconstruction 
The government was initially slow to start reconstruction and recovery efforts in 
great part because it lacked what Jihad al-Bina’ possessed—money and a plan. On August 
31st, Prime Minister Siniora finally announced the establishment of a new committee tasked 
with planning reconstruction of the dahhiya. Three weeks after cessation of hostilities, 
Siniora was able to successfully secure nearly $1.2 billion in recovery aid donations at a 
Sweden donor’s conference held the first week of September. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and Qatar pledged an additional $800 million as a token of Arab solidarity.248  It 
would be an additional three weeks later when the newly established committee would 
meet to propose rebuilding strategies for the southern suburbs. 
The committee considered four proposals. First, to set up a public authority to plan 
and execute reconstruction. The authority would confiscate private lands and building 
properties, execute planning and reconstruction, and hand the properties back to owners 
following completion. This was rejected outright by politicians and municipal leaders 
because a similar project had been approved in the dahhiya before but never completed. 
The second proposal called for the establishment of a real estate company under which 
owners of various lots pool their ownership, plan and execute reconstruction according to 
their own volition, as had been done with a previous project in downtown Beirut. This was 
rejected because owners of original properties felt that the value of their ownership post-
project execution was much lower. The third proposal called “Re-Parcelization” or the 
Large Projects Law permitted the establishment of independent planning for any land over 
20,000 square meters. The pools could be set up by individuals, or individuals pooling 
together their parcels. This would be complicated as many of the buildings in the devastated 
areas were multi-level residential buildings, which would require lengthy and complicated 
                                                 
247 Alamuddin, “Wa’d: The Reconstruction Project of the Southern Suburb of Beirut,” 49. 
248 “Donors Make Huge Lebanon Pledge,” BBC News, September 1, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5303410.stm. 
83 
negotiations to satisfy multiple unequally-vested owners. Lastly, the committee proposed 
the option to leave reconstruction of buildings to individual owners while the government 
would rebuild infrastructure. Prime Minister Siniora approved this last option with a 
compensation plan under which individuals would receive the value of individual owned 
units within a building. Some ministers protested to this plan because the government still 
had not paid compensations approved for the displaced from the civil war which ended 15 
years prior. However, a minister from Hezbollah reminded the government that the costs 
associated with the 2006 war recovery would come from money donated by Arab countries 
and the international community, not the Lebanese government’s budget.   
Finally, on October 31st—six weeks after cessation of hostilities—the government 
approved a plan to compensate owners. Each owner would receive payment of 80 million 
Lebanese pounds ($53,333 USD) per house or apartment in two installments, with an extra 
50 million Lebanese pounds ($33,333) for common areas. But it would be up to owners to 
go through the painstaking bidding and contracting process to rebuild their domiciles.249  
Given the demand for construction contractors, the task would be daunting. With an 
approved plan in place, however, all that remained was to secure money to begin the 
process. Given the government’s past performance with post-war reconstruction and 
compensation, many were skeptical.   
Wa’ad was established as a non-profit management project—not an institution—to 
take the burden of the reconstruction processes off legal owners and to facilitate a speedy, 
minimally cumbersome process. Initially, Jihad al-Bina’ estimated that Israel inflicted 
about $370 million in damages on the dahhiya alone. The Wa’ad project employed 20,000 
technicians, engineers, and laborers which reflected an administrative cost of over $6 
million.250  Once owners delegated Jihad al-Bina’ as their surrogate representative, the 
organization fronted funds necessary to start the reconstruction process immediately rather 
than waiting on government funds. One resident of Beirut’s southern suburbs, Zaynab, 
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recounted her experience with Jihad al-Bina’s representatives in the days after the 
government plan was approved: 
[Hezbollah] officials contacted us and said they were planning to establish 
a company to rebuild the homes. They asked us to sign pledges that we 
would give them the money that we got from the Lebanese state and in 
exchange they would build us houses within one and a half years. I accepted 
this arrangement because it is difficult for the residents of an entire 
apartment building to agree on one rebuilding method. Additionally, 
[Hezbollah] usually fulfills its obligations.251 
Jihad al-Bina’ also deployed experts to carry out project bids and to supervise the 
building process. Perhaps most appealing for potential constituents was that if the 
government-designated amount for home reconstruction was not sufficient, Jihad al-Bina’ 
vowed to pay for excess costs. Hezbollah also offered to pay excess construction costs to 
those who opted not to designate Jihad al-Bina’. Initially, 70 percent of dahhiya’s residents 
opted to let Jihad al-Bina’ manage reconstruction affairs on their behalf, as stated in the 
previous chapter. This meant that from the outset, Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad project took on 
rebuilding 196 of the 264 buildings destroyed in the dahhiya.252  By July 2009, another 25 
percent of owners opted to turn over responsibility—and their government-allotted funds—
to Jihad al-Bina’.253 
The government likely permitted Jihad al-Bina’ to take lead on dahhiya 
reconstruction for five reasons. First, the Lebanese government had a history of 
incompetence. As previously stated, by the start of the 2006 war, the government still did 
not follow through on many of its post-war compensation and recovery commitments made 
after the end of the civil war 15 years prior.254  The state apparatuses responsible for 
reconstruction were neither capable, ready, nor ambitious to take on this new effort. 
Second, Hezbollah was undoubtedly the instigator of the war, and consequently, their areas 
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were hit the hardest. Effectively, the government’s message to Hezbollah was: you broke 
it, you fix it. Third, because the country was in ravages following the ceasefire, the anti-
Hezbollah portion of the government was likely keen to watch Hezbollah flail while 
undertaking the seemingly insurmountable task of reconstruction and die a slow public 
relations death. Fourth, Hezbollah made it clear that they were willing to lead 
reconstruction efforts including taking on whatever costs were not covered by the 
government. Effectively, Jihad al-Bina’ inadvertently placed a cap on the amount the 
government would disperse to its citizens. Moreover, the government stood ready to 
receive nearly $2 billion in international reconstruction donations. The reconstruction 
effort in the dahhiya alone was originally estimated by Jihad al-Bina’ at approximately 
$370 million,255 and later adjusted to $600 million.256  While Hezbollah’s pledge to quickly 
pay for and execute construction projects comforted its Shiite constituency, it also likely 
incentivized the government to withhold funds allocated for reconstruction projects in the 
areas covered by Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad project. Notably, by the time the Wa’ad project 
nearly completed work in the dahhiya, the government had only distributed 27 percent of 
promised reconstruction costs to citizens, showing no signs that it would follow through 
distributing the rest. This was likely because Wa’ad had already paid for the reconstruction 
and was waiting on the government to provide reimbursement.257  Lastly, even if the 
government was determined to take lead on reconstruction in the dahiyya, it lacked the 
organizational coherence and funds to beat Jihad al-Bina’ to the project. Ali al-Amin from 
Sada al-Balad news described the postwar environment in Lebanon as a new war over 
construction between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state. He added that no one “expect[s] 
Hizballah’s leadership to allow the government to manage the reconstruction, and for 
purely political reasons that have nothing to do with security or technical considerations. 
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It is simply not just a reconstruction process but an issue of political exploitation.”258  In a 
speech in early May 2007, Prime Minister Siniora reciprocated this sentiment when he 
openly criticized people for paying Hezbollah via Wa’ad, stating that residents in the 
southern dahiyya were somewhat responsible for the chaos that occurred in their area 
because of their support for Hezbollah. According to Ibrahim al-Amin, chairman of al-
Akhbar newspaper, Siniora criticized dahiyya residents for paying Wa’ad and enabling 
Hezbollah to “[steal] people’s money.”259  If Prime Minister Siniora held such disgust for 
Jihad al-Bina’ and Wa’ad, he likely would not have supported the organization taking lead 
on reconstruction unless the government was powerless to prevent this. 
3. U.S. Sanctions and the Isolation of Jihad al-Bina and Wa’ad 
Though the government was initially willing to delegate reconstruction authority to 
Jihad al-Bina’, U.S. influence caused Lebanese ministries to back pedal on cooperation 
with the organization. Jihad al-Bina’ and Wa’ad generally had cooperative relationships 
with municipality leaders and faced little obstacles in implementing projects in their areas. 
However, when it came to dealing with official government institutions that needed to 
approve release of rehabilitation funds, the government was extremely uncooperative.260   
Despite the government’s unwillingness to cooperate, Hezbollah’s need to quickly 
move on projects and its readily-available funds from Iran allowed it to innovate contracts 
with dahiyya residents. Jihad al-Bina’ fronted the funds and paid for excess costs as the 
legal representative of a damaged or destroyed domicile. Under this agreement, Jihad al-
Bina’s Wa’ad would legally collect funds from the government once released. However, 
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many within the government—still angry at Hezbollah for its impudence that led to the 
war—refused to cooperate with Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad. Moreover, they suspected that 
Hezbollah’s benevolence by offering to pay costs and represent owners was a front. For 
this reason, government institutions in charge of distributing designated funds refused to 
do turn them over to Jihad al-Bina’ or Wa’ad though they possessed power of attorney 
their contracts with constituents were legal.261  These powers of attorney permitted the 
organization to manage citizen reconstruction projects, contracting and supervision of the 
work, and follow-up with private and governmental entities for all legal, financial, 
technical, and administrative matters.262 When pressed on why Lebanon’s official 
institutions would not cooperate with the organization, Wa’ad director Hassan Jeshi 
chalked it up to “the general political decision,” or “political stupidity.”  He implied that 
hindering the distribution of funds to Wa’ad was the government’s futile attempt to delay 
reconstruction and drive a wedge between the people and the Resistance (Hezbollah).263   
The government had valid reasons to suspect Hezbollah’s benevolence. While 
advocating for building and residential unit owners meant accepting potential excess 
building costs, it might also gave Jihad al-Bina’ the opportunity to pocket excess funds if 
building costs fell below the amount given to owners from the government and 
subsequently signed over to Jihad al-Bina’. Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze PSP, 
confirmed these suspicions when he accused Jihad al-Bina’ of appropriating private lands 
and funds for its own allegedly nefarious purposes. He accused Jihad al-Bina’ of illegally 
asking the Lebanese Ministry of the Displaced for compensation for buildings Jihad al-
Bina’ claimed it owned in the dahhiya, Baalbek, and al-Hermel—effectively, Jumblatt 
accuses the organization of confiscating property that was not theirs. As of February 2007, 
the ministry would not turn funds over to Jihad al-Bina’ though its constituents already 
designated the organization—the ministry would only turn funds over directly to legal 
owners. Jumblatt expressed his belief that Jihad al-Bina’ pursued such a policy in attempt 
to force Lebanon’s Shia into a dependent relationship with Hezbollah in which they lose 
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their assets, become impoverished, and are forced to rely on the organization.264  Jumblatt 
furthered his accusations against Jihad al-Bina’ by characterizing it as part of an Iranian 
conspiracy. Jumblatt stated that Jihad al-Bina’s recent land acquisition was “part of a plan 
that seeks to change the Lebanese configuration” . . . “[into] a certain state that will be a 
pro-Iranian state at the expense of the Lebanese, and specifically at the expense of the 
Lebanese Arab Shiites.”265 
The post-2006 war reconstruction efforts in Lebanon also served as a forum of 
competition over resources between Hezbollah and the state. As stated, the Wa’ad project 
signed legal contracts and obtained power of attorney for many constituents who were 
entitled to compensation from the state. Most of the state-allocated funds came from 
international donors who pledged recovery assistance at Sweden. Some of the gulf nations 
willing to donate funds to Lebanon’s recovery overtly insisted their money be funneled to 
and utilized by state institutions,266 perhaps fearing U.S. accusations of defying its new 
unilateral sanctions against Hezbollah’s construction organizations. However, many of 
these international donors—Arab states and Islamic figures—had more faith in Jihad al-
Bina’ and Wa’ad than the state in safe-handling of funds and execution of projects. To 
simultaneously ensure their money went to effect reconstruction while avoiding the disdain 
of the United States, some Arab states and Islamic figures donated directly to Jihad al-
Bina’ anonymously.267  In some cases, Arab states opted to avoid the political fray and 
directly conduct reconstruction efforts independent of the Lebanese state and Hezbollah. 
For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) opted to carry out direct reconstruction 
work when it repaired schools and hospitals, and removed mines in southern Lebanon.268 
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4. Wa’ad’s Resistance Public Relations Campaign 
Hezbollah expertly capitalized on international media attention, and continued 
deploying its own media outlets to highlight the plight of its constituents, its philanthropic 
acts, and the government’s incompetence or apathy. Al-Manar displayed steady streams of 
funeral processions in southern towns and villages straddled by reports on Jihad al-Bina’s 
reconstruction efforts. Reports also focused on the government’s noticeable absence in the 
devastated areas and failure to initiate cleanup efforts well after hostilities ended. Its news 
reports also highlighted civil frustration with the government while praising Hezbollah and 
Jihad al-Bina’.269  As one resident of the dahhiya stated a few weeks after hostilities ended:   
The Lebanese state has not come here to ask us what we need after all of 
this destruction. They are quite non-existent on the scene. All of the work 
here is being done by the residents—by volunteers and by Hezbollah. We 
ask the government to come and look at us. So far, no one from the 
government has come here to see how they can help us in the immediate.270   
Shaykh Qodr Nordon from Hezbollah’s political council also commented on the 
government’s apparent ineptitude in the dahhiya following the war. Though he struggled 
to speak in English, the effort reflects his intent to capture the attention of a broad audience:   
We have about 7,000 families homeless today and winter will be after two 
months . . . and we have a bad state for our people here. We don’t like to 
replace government here, but if the government will not do anything we will 
start rebuilding after removing rubble which we have [been doing] [sic].271 
Nasrallah also called out the government’s seemingly purposeful inaction during a one year 
anniversary “Victory Party” after the end of the 2006 war. He stated that even after a full 
year following the allocation of over $1 billion in recovery funds, the government has not 
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released funds while Hezbollah doled out $380,900,000,272 implying that the government 
was in no rush to reconstruct damaged Shia areas. In speeches, he places the people at odds 
with the government by stating that the $1 billion is “the right of the people” and withheld 
by the government.273 
Jihad al-Bina’ also ran a successful public relations and advertisement campaign 
to support its recovery efforts—especially the Wa’ad project—and to salvage the Party’s 
reputation. Throughout 2006, Al-Manar television broadcast public announcements 
encouraging viewers whose homes were damaged or demolished as a result of “US-Zionist 
aggression against Lebanon in summer 2006” to document the damage and to keep records 
of maintenance and repair work bills so the organization could compensate them. Jihad al-
Bina’ also advertised phone numbers for anyone who was not included in the 
organization’s initial damage assessment process. They encouraged viewers to assist Jihad 
al-Bina’ by volunteering or donating a place for displaced people to stay. Al-Manar also 
broadcast advertisements for a call-in phone number and encouraged anyone willing to 
offer financial or in-kind donations to do so. Through its al-Manar advertisements, Jihad 
al-Bina’ also encouraged people to call in and register for compensation (see Figures 9, 10, 
and 11).274  Similar advertisements requesting donations continued through 2009. 
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Figure 9. Jihad al-Bina’ advertisement run on Al-Manar television in 
2006 asking for volunteers and donations with call-in phone numbers275 
 
Figure 10. Screen shot of Al-Manar report on launch of Wa’ad project 
in Beirut’s southern suburbs aired on May 17, 2007276 
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Figure 11. Al-Manar News screenshot of Jihad al-Bina’ banner hung 
on completed building in the dahhiya reads, “USA destroyed and Jihad al-
Bina’ built. Restoration Project. July 2006 Aggression.”277  
Jihad al-Bina’ also placed over 300 posters across the southern dahiyya in the days 
following cessation of hostilities to reassure residents and remind them of Hezbollah’s 
pledge.278 
Because Hezbollah’s credibility was at stake, Nasrallah was likely the greatest 
cheerleader and advertiser of Jihad al-Bina’s and Wa’ad’s postwar efforts. In his weekly 
addresses in the year after the end of the war, Nasrallah gave regular accountings of the 
organization’s efforts, expenditures, and likely hyperbolized effects. At the “Victory Party” 
held in August 2007, Nasrallah stated that in contrast to the government who kept hold of 
the people’s rightful compensation money, Hezbollah provided almost $381 million. 
Moreover, Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah did not distribute compensation; rather, the 
organization offers “help and assistance to treat painful wounds ... that a brother normally 
gives to his brother without any legal or official responsibilities ... according to the Sharia.”  
Nasrallah then summarized Jihad al-Bina’s and Wa’ad’s recovery efforts in the first year: 
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first, the organization saved 28,300 families from having to live on the streets by providing 
$135 million for “secure homes” and furniture. Second, Jihad al-Bina’ repaired 113,820 
housing units at a cost of $190.7 million  in all of the Shia territories with the exception of 
four towns for which Nasrallah thanked the state of Qatar who executed reconstruction 
projects there. Third, Hezbollah provided assistance to 12,500 economic and commercial 
establishments who suffered at a cost of $30 million. This included 3,300 cases of 
agricultural assistance to help overcome damage to crops and livestock valued at $5 
million; 2,300 cases of assistance to owners of vehicles for the benefit of the public—buses, 
taxis, excavators, etc.—at a cost of $4 million; and also $3 million to support afflicted 
villages enduring “harsh conditions.”  Jihad al-Bina’ also provided $700,000 to 
compensate 3,500 cases of afflicted fishermen. Nasrallah also reported that after one year 
of reconstruction, Hezbollah’s Wa’ad had paid approximately $14 million toward 
reconstruction thus far. Lastly, Nasrallah recommitted to paying one more year of rent for 
those still waiting to be able to return to their homes, promising that no one would be 
homeless.279 
5. Results of the Wa’ad Project 
By most accounts, the Wa’ad project was a tremendous success. The project’s 
success was contingent upon the organization’s ability to return people to their homes as 
quickly as possible. In September 2007, only four months after the Wa’ad project was 
launched, the first building was handed over to residents. By January 2008, Jihad al-Bina’ 
already renovated 174 of 210 demolished or damaged buildings in the southern dahiyya 
and was working on an additional ten more in the city of Tyre.280  In January 2009 the U.S. 
Treasury decided to also designate Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad project under EO 13224 for 
utilizing “deceptive tactics to support [Hezbollah’s] military and terrorist apparatus.”281  
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The U.S. Treasury asserted that Wa’ad attempted to mask its affiliation with Hezbollah and 
helped Jihad al-Bina’ circumvent sanctions placed in 2007.282  However, by the time the 
U.S. Treasury placed sanctions on Wa’ad, it was in the finishing stages of its project. By 
July 2009 only ten of the 102 projects from the initial design phase were not yet 
completed.283  As 2009 ended, more buildings than initially planned were added to Wa’ad’s 
portfolio. By October 2010, Wa’ad completed 143 buildings, including 3,019 apartment 
units. By 2011 all work was declared complete and buildings were handed back to owners. 
In all, Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad project completed 268 buildings in the dahiyya, including 
4,000 residential apartments and 1,700 commercial establishments.284  
While most buildings were completed by 2009 as promised, the project remained 
engaged because the government failed to follow through on its commitments to rebuild 
the infrastructure and roads around the newly rebuilt facilities. For example, in 2008 the 
government failed to rehabilitate two squares in the dahiyya. In response to government 
neglect, Jihad al-Bina’ organized numerous sit-in protests to bring attention to the 
government’s absence and unfulfilled promises and decided to rehabilitate the square 
gardens and plant saplings.285  Regarding building reconstruction, Wa’ad guaranteed its 
work to owners, promising to return to fix any flaws found within one year of turning the 
buildings back to their rightful owners. In a closing ceremony held in the dahhiya in 2012, 
Nasrallah “sealed” the project when he stated that “the divine promise [made by 
Hezbollah]” was finally fulfilled six years after the “divine victory” over the Israeli enemy. 
He highlighted the project’s purpose and victory by pointing out that it enabled people to 
“remain invincible in their land and homes, to prove to themselves and the world [that] 
they are not afraid to prove their loyalty to their country.”286 
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The project was also a success in that it helped the organization save face and 
credibility at a critical moment. Jihad al-Bina’s quick and efficient work distracted many 
from Hezbollah’s obvious miscalculation that tipped off the war. Even while Israel was in 
the middle of its July-August campaign against Lebanon, many politicians were calling for 
Hezbollah’s disarmament. Accusations of Hezbollah acting as an Iranian pawn grew 
louder, particularly when the disaster of the 2006 war was framed as the result of an 
external power’s interests by senior Lebanese politicians.287  Despite fierce opposition and 
the devastation which resulted from Hezbollah’s actions, Jihad al-Bina’s projects helped 
Hezbollah grow in popularity. A 2008 poll conducted in Lebanon found that following the 
2006 crisis, only 9% expressed sympathy with the majority governing coalition while 30% 
sympathized with the opposition led by Hezbollah.288  The survey also showed that 
amongst Lebanon’s Shia population, 68% had a more positive attitude towards Hezbollah 
following the war while only 2% conveyed a more negative one.289 
6. Southern Lebanon 
Southern Lebanon was the most severely targeted area by Israel during the 2006 
war.290  Moreover, it was the battlefield where ground-fighting between Israeli and 
Hezbollah forces took place. However, reconstruction efforts were initially hindered 
because of the state’s stretched resources. Thankfully, numerous international donor-states 
took lead in reconstruction efforts in the south. 
Jihad al-Bina’ was not the primary orchestrator of reconstruction efforts in southern 
Lebanon as it was in Haret Hreik. Rather, the reconstruction of the south was directly 
sponsored by various Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, 
Jordan, and Bahrain.291  However, Jihad al-Bina’ was active wherever it could improve 
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livelihoods of its southern Lebanese constituents. For example, once aggression in the 
south stopped, Jihad al-Bina’ began removing rubble immediately and building sand roads 
as alternative routes to bridges destroyed by Israeli air strikes in the south. It also distributed 
donations and formed teams from over 3,000 volunteer specialists from various sects and 
Arab states.292 
While Jihad al-Bina’ did not lead reconstruction in the south, Hezbollah’s 
volunteer coordinators and Jihad al-Bina’ workers led the initial recovery and relief efforts. 
The first stage included distribution of financial aid to help people acquire housing, and 
necessary goods and food. The second stage included an effort to clear debris and rubble 
in cooperation with local municipalities. These volunteer coordinators’ efforts were critical 
because while the destruction in southern Lebanon was proportionally just as severe as in 
the dahhiya, the lion’s share of bulldozers were dedicated to Lebanon’s urban areas to clear 
debris. In southern Lebanon, most debris was cleared manually and pushed to the sides of 
the road to form fences and property markers.293 
As was the case in the dahhiya, Jihad al-Bina’ deployed volunteers, as well as 
professional architects and engineers immediately after hostilities ended to initiate relief 
and reconstruction efforts (Figure 12). Jihad al-Bina’ inspectors went from house to house 
and inspected each private domicile and prepared a damage assessment for each unit.   
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Figure 12. The yellow uniformed Jihad al-Bina’ inspector conducts 
initial postwar damage assessments in the border town of ‘Aita al-Cha’b in 
southern Lebanon 2006294 
Once turned in, the local Jihad al-Bina’ representative determined how much 
compensation would be necessary for the resident to rebuild their home or repair the 
damage. If houses needed to be rebuilt, Jihad al-Bina’ reassured residents that they would 
take on all aspects of the reconstruction process.295  As was done in the southern dahiyya, 
Jihad al-Bina’ promised residents to pay for temporary housing for one year.296 
(1) Tactical Tunnels and Underground Facilities 
Tactical tunnels and underground facilities (UGF) built by Jihad al-Bina’ in 
southern Lebanon were crucial to Hezbollah’s successes during the 2006 war. It is unclear 
when Hezbollah’s tactical tunnels and UGFs were built—or rebuilt—in southern Lebanon, 
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but they were likely constructed by Jihad al-Bina’ throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.297  
According to UNIFIL observers in southern Lebanon, they “never saw them build 
anything,” referring to Hezbollah’s construction arm.298  Israeli analysts also failed to 
detect Hezbollah UGF construction as it was likely conducted under the guise of Jihad al-
Bina’s road and infrastructure work.299  This was certainly by design but also astounding 
as the group reportedly has over 1,000 UGFs in southern Lebanon.300  In 2015, As-Safir 
Newspaper broadcast a Hezbollah tour of tactical tunnels utilized during the 2006 war, as 
well as additional secret tunnels built more recently in preparation for an eventual future 
conflict with Israel. The report noted that “construction was said to be continuing around 
the clock, using primitive means rather than advanced machinery in order to avoid 
detection by Israeli surveillance.”301  Jihad al-Bina’ builders likely received training and 
guidance from its Iranian counterparts, as well as UGF construction experts from North 
Korea under the auspices of a front company, the Korea Mining Development 
Corporation.302 
These UGFs were utilized by Hezbollah as a form of tactical denial and deception 
(D&D) to avoid Israeli detection and targeting. In addition to tunnels, Jihad al-Bina’ also 
constructed other UGFs which would have been difficult to detect because of their 
locations although they were within just a few kilometers of the Israeli border.303  
                                                 
297 “Lebanon’s Hizballah Reportedly Preparing Attacks on Israel,” Intelligence Online, sec. July 22, 
2010, accessed November 19, 2018, 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display
/EUP20100721177004#index=14&searchKey=30986546&rpp=10. 
298 “Iran Week: Hezbollah’s Environmental Warriors,” Tablet Magazine, June 27, 2017, 
http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/238801/hezbollahs-environmental-warriors. 
299 “Lebanese Hezbollah: A Profile,” Federal Research Division (Washington, D.C.: Library of 
Congress, April 2012), 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/2650
8343/CTTSO-FRD-Hezbollah_Final_Report_Apr%202012-r.pdf, 124. 
300 Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanese Hezbollah Offers a Glimpse of Its Firepower,” Atlantic Council, 
accessed November 21, 2018, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/lebanese-hezbollah-
offers-a-glimpse-of-its-firepower. 
301 Itamar Sharon, “Hezbollah Shows Off ‘Advanced Tunnel Network” on Israeli Border,” The Times 
of Israel, May 23, 2015, https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-flaunts-advanced-tunnel-network-on-
israeli-border/. 
302 “Lebanese Hezbollah: A Profile,” 108. 
303 “Lebanese Hezbollah: A Profile,” 47. 
99 
Underground bunkers, storage rooms, barracks, and booby traps were connected by an 
elaborate network of tunnels among the forested areas and hillsides of the south.304  
Moreover, the organization constructed concealed underground storage for rocket 
launchers whose openings could quickly open to launch a surprise attack, and in-mountain 
drive in shelters from which vehicle-mounted multiple-rocket launchers (MRL) could 
emerge.305  According to Israeli Brigadier General Yossi Kuperwasser, Hezbollah fighters 
effectively used tactical tunnels to their advantage. They would quickly emerge to launch 
a man-portable anti-tank missile only to disappear again. The General described addressed 
Hezbollah’s tunnels when he stated, “We know what they have and how they work, but we 
don’t know where are the tunnels are. So they can achieve tactical surprise.”306  Jihad al-
Bina’ reportedly continued constructing UGFs and tactical tunnel networks for Hezbollah 
through at least 2012.307   
b. Bint Jbeil 
In addition to Hezbollah’s Beirut suburbs, reconstruction in Bint Jbeil was a top 
priority for Hezbollah, but Jihad al-Bina’s actions would not reflect this. The remote 
southeastern Lebanese town was of little strategic or military importance Hezbollah, but it 
was targeted by Israel as part of its collective punishment strategy and for its cultural and 
historic value to Hezbollah.308  Municipal leaders, private home and building owners, and 
external donors—primarily Qatar—wanted to begin reconstruction efforts immediately, 
but disagreed on a reconstruction plan. Initially, Jihad al-Bina’ conducted a damage 
assessment in parallel with one commissioned by the government-approved engineering 
firm Khatib & Alami and managed by the Council of the South. Jihad al-Bina’s survey 
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would serve as the basis for initial compensations to be handed out to displaced residents 
to secure housing. The Council of the South’s survey would serve as the basis for rebuilding 
financed by the government of Qatar who pledged $300 million for postwar reconstruction 
in Khiam, ‘Aita al-Cha’b, Bint Jbeil, and ‘Ainata.309  Jihad al-Bina’ handed over a 
reconstruction plan and strategy to municipality leadership who were Hezbollah members 
and left the managerial and execution responsibilities in their hands.310   
Municipal leaders attempted to implement a plan which improved public spaces 
and roadways, but at the expense of landowner rights. Moreover, the municipality was 
eager to turn Bint Jbeil into a new modern landscape in stark contrast to the ancient town 
destroyed by Israel. Effectively, the plan appropriated property and gave the municipality 
freedom to shape Bint Jbeil in a way of its choosing and to compensate owners based on 
its own calculations.311  This plan entailed bulldozing large swaths of Bint Jbeil’s old town, 
including traces of the town’s architectural and cultural heritage. The Hezbollah 
representative in southern Lebanon at the time, Shaikh Nabil Qaouq later described the 
municipality’s plan as a “completion of Israel’s unfinished work [by] erasing the memory 
of the town.”  Such action would run counter to Hezbollah’s system of heritage 
conservation which stands in resistance against Israel.312 
The municipality’s reconstruction plan was opposed by a coalition of landowners, 
the Council of the South headed by Nabih Berri, and members of the reconstruction unit 
from the American University of Beirut. Each of these had different interests to oppose the 
plan but little power to put a stop to it. The government had little interest in reconstruction 
plan details and was primarily concerned with the distribution of approved compensation 
to those who lost their residences. But the government would not even manage the 
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distribution of compensation; for that, it empowered the Council of the South.313  To halt 
the plan, the coalition needed the support of Hezbollah. 
When the coalition’s protests fell on deaf ears, Hezbollah intervened on behalf of 
landowners and other vested parties against municipal leaders from its own party. 
Hezbollah’s representative in the south ensured the municipality’s plan was abandoned and 
that owners’ property rights would be upheld. Moreover, Hezbollah’s intervention resulted 
in the formation of a cooperative planning committee to oversee the approved 
reconstruction plan implementation.314  The Hezbollah executive officer in charge of 
reconstruction consulted with trusted urban planners, including Hassan Jeshi, the Director 
of Wa’ad, and Muhammad Haidar, a Hezbollah Member of Parliament (MP). Both were 
involved in the historic preservation of the city of Saida and supported the vision of the 
coalition to conduct reconstruction in way that preserves the historic culture of Bint 
Jbeil.315 
7. Northern Lebanon 
Very little information on Jihad al-Bina’s postwar reconstruction projects north of 
Beirut could be located. However, while decrying the U.S. designation of Jihad al-Bina’ 
as a terrorist organization, Director General of Jihad al-Bina’ in 2008, Qasim al-Aliq stated 
that the developmental organization initiated reconstruction in “all areas” affected by 
Israeli aggression and Lebanese government neglect. These areas included “the north, the 
Bekaa, the south, and Beirut.”  In this interview, al-Aliq stated that Jihad al-Bina’ 
constructed 600 houses in the north and Kasrawan,316 located approximately 20 kilometers 
north of Beirut. 
                                                 
313 Debs, “Reconstruction of Bint Jbeil and Social Representatinos of the Urban Space,” 103–106. 
314 Debs. 
315 Al-Harithy, “The Politics of Identity Construction in Post-War Reconstruction,” 92. 
316 “Interview with Jihad Al-Bina’ General Director Qasim Al-Aliq.” 
102 
C. THE 2008 LEBANESE CONFLICT AND HEZBOLLAH’S FORCED 
INTEGRATION 
In 2008, Jihad al-Bina’ found itself at the center of an internal Lebanese crisis 
between Hezbollah and the state. In early 2008, the Lebanese Ministry of Information, 
Ghazi al-Aridi revealed the existence of an independent fiber-optic telecommunications 
network set up by Jihad al-Bina’ utilized by Hezbollah for monitoring state 
communications and activities. According to al-Aridi, the network was discovered in April 
2008 at a Jihad al-Bina’ roadway construction site just north of the Litani river. For 
kilometers along the road, Jihad al-Bina’ placed posters of its ongoing and recently-
completed projects—27 educational establishments, 25 medical centers, 170 kilometers of 
secondary roads, 510 kilometers of main roads, and 75 kilometers of road enhancements. 
Every few meters, Jihad al-Bina’ touted its accomplishments on lamp posts collocated with 
Iranian flags. When the Ministry discovered Hezbollah’s communication network 
extended to Jihad al-Bina’s project site in that area, the government declared it illegal and 
demanded it be shut down.317 
Lebanese communications experts also asserted that the network enabled 
Hezbollah to tap Lebanese, US, and Israeli communications throughout the country.318  
According to Lebanon’s Telecommunications Minister, Marwan Hanadeh, the network 
began in the suburbs of Beirut, circled the airport and extended approximately 25 
kilometers south to Sidon and then to Naqoura, the location of UNIFIL headquarters near 
the Israeli border. The network then ran east along the border and turned north toward 
Nabatiya, Hezbollah’s capital in southern Lebanon. The network then extended to Jezzine 
through the Bekaa valley with lines extending to Palestinian bases, pro-Syrian Palestinian 
camps, and farther north to al-Hermel, then northwest to the Christian areas around Mount 
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Lebanon. The minister also stated that additional excavations were under way, allegedly to 
extend the network toward Syria. He stated that the network was built with help from 
Iranian engineers and “from the Iranian organization supporting the reconstruction of 
Lebanon and Jihad al-Bina,’”319 likely referring to Jehad-e Sazandegi.   
The government also accused Jihad al-Bina’ of setting up and operating a camera 
system for Hezbollah utilized to monitor traffic to and from Beirut’s international airport 
and flights on one of its runways. Members of the Lebanese army on patrol around the 
airport discovered the cameras and monitoring equipment affixed to shipping containers 
owned by Jihad al-Bina’ (Figure 13). Walid Jumblatt called for removing the cameras and 
for banning Iranian airlines from landing in Beirut because they likely smuggle in weapons 
and cash into the country, circumventing sanctions.320 
  
Figure 13. Al-Manar TV news broadcast screen shots of Jihad al-
Bina’ containers with cameras overlooking Rafiq al-Hariri International 
Airport in Beirut321 
Ultimately the government decided to move to dismantle Hezbollah’s 
communication system. The system violated UNSCR 1701 which precipitated the 2006 
war’s conclusion, but also reiterated previous resolutions’ call to disarm all non-
governmental militias in Lebanon, primarily Hezbollah. Minister Al-Aridi called 
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Hezbollah’s telecommunication system “an illegal and illegitimate action [which] poses a 
threat to the sovereignty of the country.”  He also stated that the government would hand 
over all documents to the Arab league which would prove Iran’s hand behind the network 
and meddling in Lebanon’s affairs.322  Once the government discovered the cameras at 
Jihad al-Bina’s airport site, it fired the airport head of security who was a close associate 
of Hezbollah.323 
Hezbollah would not tolerate the dismantling of its telecommunications network 
nor the dismissal of the airport security chief. Nasrallah called the government’s decision 
to move against Hezbollah an act of war and stated that the network was as vital to the 
resistance as the AK-47, the centerpiece of Hezbollah’s and its Iranian progenitor’s 
symbols.324  Hezbollah’s military leader at the time, Naim Qassim vehemently opposed the 
state’s position when he stated that the communications system was “tantamount to [the 
Party’s] arms, and those who are taking aim at the telecommunications network are 
targeting our weapons—they are calling on us not to fight Israel.”325  When the government 
announced its intent to shut down the telecommunications network, fighting broke out 
between pro-Hezbollah and opposition fighters against pro-government fighters. 
Hezbollah captured portions of western Beirut and shut down the airport. The conflict 
resulted in at least 62 deaths on both sides, but ultimately Hezbollah prevailed. The 
government capitulated to Hezbollah’s demands, leaving the telecommunications network 
intact and reinstating the dismissed airport chief of security. Moreover, the government 
was forced to bend to Hezbollah’s political demands, including granting Hezbollah veto 
power over any cabinet decisions.326 
Hezbollah emerged from the 2008 crisis with military ambition unhampered, more 
politically powerful than before, and poised to more closely integrate with the legitimate 
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government apparatus. In stark contrast to the post-2006 war environment, the taboo of 
cooperating with Jihad al-Bina efforts started to dwindle with Hezbollah’s putsch against 
the government. The 2008 conflict revealed the Lebanese government’s military impotence 
compared to Hezbollah, and the government all but abandoned its UN charge to prevent 
Hezbollah from rearming. Though some government personalities were indignant—chief 
among them Walid Jumblatt—the government was forced to abdicate. From this time 
forward, Jihad al-Bina’ faced less government as well as UN resistance and enjoyed more 
formal acknowledgement and cooperation. 
D. POSTWAR NORMALIZATION 
While reconstruction absorbed most of Jihad al-Bina’s time, attention, and funds 
after the war, the organization also sustained and returned to many of its steady-state 
developmental and social welfare operations. Moreover, it attempted to portray its 
Lebanese character by promoting projects for the benefit of all Lebanese. In 2007, the 
organization launched its “Good Tree” project was part of an environmental initiative to 
reforest green areas burned in the 2006 war and combat desertification by planting trees.327  
As part of this project, Jihad al-Bina’ set a goal of planting 5 million trees within five 
years.328  According to a Hezbollah official, Jihad al-Bina’ imported approximately “one 
million nursery plants from Syria and distributed them to all societies that requested them,” 
regardless of political or sectarian affiliation.329  By October 2007 the organization 
distributed 1.7 million trees throughout Lebanon to combat desertification, worked with 
farmers to promote organic farming, and set up seasonal farmers markets to disconnect 
farmers from distributors. The organization also set up the “Farmer’s Relief Project” which 
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included awareness courses to help farmers overcome “fear of adopting [unfamiliar] 
activity such as the cultivation of alternative crops,” according Adil al-Haj Hassan, Jihad 
al-Bina’s media officer in 2008. In October 2010, Hasan Nasrallah with the Lebanese 
Minister of Agriculture and a Hezbollah member of parliament (MP) planted the 1 
millionth tree that year near his residence in the Haret Hreik (Figure 14). Together, 
Hezbollah and the Lebanese government publicly commemorated the simultaneous 
benchmark accomplishments of Jihad al-Bina’s reconstruction and developmental 
efforts.330   
 
Figure 14. Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, 
Lebanese Minister of Agriculture Dr. Hussein Hajj Hassan, and MP Ali 
Ammar plant the 1 millionth tree of 2010 near Nasrallah’s residence in Haret 
Hreik under Jihad al-Bina’s “Good Tree” project331 
The relief project also included goat breeding assistance, and medicine distribution for 
livestock and bees. Jihad al-Bina’ tried to demonstrate national rather than sectarian 
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solidarity by promoting its Farmer’s Relief and Good Tree projects “on behalf of the 
country’s oppressed.”  To this end, Jihad al-Bina’ expanded agricultural and craft seminars 
in Rumaysh, Al-Arqub, and Jubayl which did not have Shia majorities.332   
E. JIHAD AL-BINA’ 2011 TO 2018  
1. Sunni Extremist Backlash to Hezbollah’s Pro-Assad Activities in Syria 
Hezbollah faced serious political and military backlash at home after intervening in 
the Syrian civil war to uphold the Assad regime. The Syrian civil war marked the first time 
the organization openly fought in an offensive outside Lebanese borders. Moreover, this 
time the organization’s actions defied its pro-Lebanese, cross-sectarian rhetoric. Rather 
than fighting against Zionist-crusader aggression, it was now targeting fellow Arabs and 
Muslims—specifically, Sunni Muslims—on behalf of a brutal Shia (Allawi) dictator.   
Hezbollah’s cost-benefit analysis led it to operate along sectarian lines in Syria. 
However, it is unclear if Hezbollah’s leaders understood the extent or magnitude of the 
costs it would come to bear. First, Hezbollah’s intervention severely damaged the Pro-
Lebanese cross-sectarian identity it fervently strives to maintain. To reinforce its image as 
the strong vanguard of Lebanon’s territorial integrity, Hezbollah worked with multiple 
Sunni and Christian militant and political groups over the years, in and outside Lebanon. 
As described in the previous chapter, Hezbollah simultaneously attempted to maintain a 
broad-based protector image and project a strategic message and identity of resistance on 
behalf of all Lebanese citizens, not just Shia Muslims. Hezbollah’s sectarian actions to 
uphold President Bashar al-Assad undermine its pan-Islamic, pro-Lebanese (non-sectarian) 
messaging and identity.   
Second, Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria sparked a Sunni extremist backlash that 
would be felt in Hezbollah’s strongholds in Lebanon. Although the organization’s covert 
activities in Syria go back to the 2011 uprisings, the organization openly fought on behalf 
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of Assad in May 2013 at Qusayr333—the extremist response was immediate. Beginning in 
August 2013, Hezbollah’s actions in Syria faced retaliation through a series of attacks and 
bombings against its Lebanese territories. The following is a list of alleged attacks against 
Hezbollah’s strongholds in Lebanon between 2013 and 2014:334 
• August 15, 2013—Ruwais Bombing—27 killed, 336 wounded—claimed 
by “external operations” arm of Battalions of Aisha Um al-Mu’mineen 
• November 19, 2013—Iranian Embassy bombing in Bir Hassan—23 
killed—claimed by Abdullah ‘Azzam Brigades (Al-Qa’ida affiliated) 
• January 2, 2014—Haret Hreik bombing—6 killed, 66 wounded—
unknown assailants 
• January 21, 2014—Second Haret Hreik bombing—4 killed, 46 
wounded—claimed by Jubhat al-Nusra 
• February 19, 2014—Twin blasts in south Beirut near Iranian cultural 
center—5 killed—claimed by Abdullah ‘Azzam Brigades 
• September 20, 2014—Hezbollah Checkpoint bombing in Khreibeh—at 
least 3 killed 
a. Damage Control: A Two-Part Strategy 
Hezbollah implemented a two-pronged strategy to downplay the obvious sectarian 
nature of its participation in the Syrian conflict and to sway public perception away from 
the consequences of its actions. The first was a well-articulated public relations campaign 
that framed Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian civil war as the natural next step in 
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Hezbollah’s never-ending campaign against U.S. aggression. To this end, Hezbollah’s 
leaders utilized contrasting narratives intended for different audiences.   
To the Lebanese population as a whole, Hezbollah’s narratives focused on Syria’s 
role in the resistance against Israel, and the necessity for Hezbollah to engage to protect 
Lebanese towns and territory. From its inception, Hezbollah’s security strategy inside and 
outside of Lebanon was driven by anti-Western, anti-Israeli ideology. This ideology drove 
Hezbollah to work with various Sunni militant groups such as the PLO, the PIJ, and 
HAMAS. In most domestic and security policy respects, Hezbollah equates anti-American 
with pro-Lebanese, or at least pro-Hezbollah ideals for Lebanon. For Hezbollah’s leaders, 
the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon upholds morally superior ideals which are antithetical 
to Western influence, imperialism, and oppression which corrupted and subjugated Iranian 
Muslims until the Islamic revolution, and continues to oppress Palestinians and Muslims 
worldwide. Hezbollah leadership believes that the United States is constantly scheming to 
topple its power structures, including its link to Iran via Syria. Moreover, the West wants 
to attack Islam. By supporting the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah undermines the United 
States’ plans to weaken the resistance organization, and portrays itself as the defender of 
Lebanese sovereignty.   
To Lebanon’s Shia community the narrative carried strong sectarian overtones. For 
example, Nasrallah pulled on Shia emotional heartstrings by stating that the organization 
was obliged to intervene to protect sacred Shia symbols and sites in Syria. The most 
important of these was the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab bint ‘Ali in Damascus—one of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s granddaughters and sister to the revered hero-martyr of Shiism, 
Imam Husayn. He also instilled a sense of urgency for potential recruits when he stated 
that Sunni extremist groups announced their intent to destroy the shrine once reached.335  
Framed in this manner, Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian civil war was not just a 
sound security strategy, it held religious prudence and exigence. Underlining Hezbollah’s 
unabashed sectarian motivations in Syria, many Hezbollah fighters reportedly dawned 
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headbands with “O Husayn” in printed script.336  In the Shia areas of Southern Lebanon, 
the Bekaa valley, and Shia suburbs of Beirut, Hezbollah regularly and publicly displays 
pictures of its martyrs killed in Syria and honors their deaths as fulfillment of sacred 
“jihadist duties.”337  The contradiction is lost on no one, but Hezbollah leadership works 
hard to obfuscate it. 
The second part of this strategy focused on eliminating signs of suffering. As it had 
done over the previous three decades, Jihad al-Bina’ responded immediately to begin 
reconstruction efforts to areas damaged by Sunni extremism. For example, within 24 hours 
after the explosion in the Ruwais neighborhood, Jihad al-Bina’ architects began to assess 
damage and immediately started clearing debris. The assessment team determined that 13 
buildings needed reconstruction and reinforcement, all of which was projected to be 
concluded within two months. Moreover, Jihad al-Bina’ determined that 193 cars were 
damaged in the explosion.338  However, it is unclear but likely that the organization took 
all costs and reimbursements upon itself. It is also likely the organization performed similar 
reconstruction and recovery activities following the other bombings, though no associated 
publications could be located to confirm this.  
2. Current Operations 
The Jihad al-Bina’ Developmental Foundation’s contemporary repertoire of social 
welfare and development projects rings true to its historical roots. Jihad al-Bina is first and 
foremost Hezbollah’s construction wing. Jihad al-Bina’ conducts construction both for 
Hezbollah and to support Hezbollah’s objectives. As previously demonstrated, the most 
publicized of Jihad al-Bina’s construction endeavors are post-conflict recovery projects 
such as Wa’ad. Contrarily, Hezbollah does its best to keep Jihad al-Bina’s involvement in 
its tunnel construction projects out of the public eye for security reasons. Apart from 
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construction, current website displays the organization’s operational interests and areas of 
focus: the environment, agriculture, vocational training, and its various cooperatives. The 
organization views itself as the holy vanguard of Lebanon’s environmental resources which 
are constantly under threat from abroad, and which are at risk due to “the absence of 
integrated local environmental rights management and protection.”339   
Although Jihad al-Bina’ is still capable of operating independent of the state as it 
did through post-2006 war reconstruction, it now also publicly integrates with and at times 
prods state efforts. The organization has been involved in drafting environmental laws, 
regulations, and systems. It also promotes and initiates multiple environmental programs, 
such as the Good Tree project, the ‘Abbas Water project, and the Lands Market (farmers 
market) project. Lastly, Jihad al-Bina’ pursues an ongoing public relations campaign to 
further polish its veneer officialdom whenever possible. For this purpose, Jihad al-Bina’ 
annually organizes scores of graduation ceremonies, ribbon cuttings, anniversary 
celebrations, and official announcements with government officials as often as possible.  
a. Construction 
Although little information on Hezbollah’s tunnels is available, Jihad al-Bina’s 
tactical tunnel construction also expanded with Hezbollah’s operations into Syria. In 
preparation for ongoing conflicts along Syria’s eastern border, Jihad al-Bina’ constructed 
a sophisticated tunnel network in the Qusayr area of Syria similar to that used during the 
2006 war with Israel. The tunnel network was equipped with an unspecified protection 
system, air conditioning, lighting, communications equipment, and sleeping quarters. The 
tunnels extend from Syria “deep into Lebanese territory” to secure safe routes for 
Hezbollah’s fighters.340   
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The organization continues to focus on agricultural development in Lebanon’s Shia 
territories to improve the livelihood and maintain a base of constituents. From its three 
agricultural centers—the Shahid Al-Sayyed ‘Abbas al-Mousawi Center for Agricultural 
Development in Baalbek founded in 1999; the Al-Jawad Extension Center for Agricultural 
Development in Al-Hermel, also founded in 1999; and the Abu Dharr al-Ghifari Center in 
Derdghaiya in southern Lebanon, founded in 2004—Jihad al-Bina’ conducts agricultural 
tours, demonstrations, and inspections on farms and livestock. It also conducts numerous 
seminars and classes to educate thousands of farmers and breeders, and administers 
thousands of vaccines (see Table 2). The centers also rally agricultural workers, 
beneficiaries, and activists to demonstrate for or in opposition of political interests. Jihad 
al-Bina’ also regularly publishes “Green Bulletins” with tips on how to cultivate various 
types of plants and produce.341 
Table 2. Average number annual of all Jihad al-Bina’ agriculture center 




Jihad al-Bina’ also continues the al-’Abbas water project in the dahhiya whose 
beginnings coincide with the organization’s in 1988. The object of the project is to ensure 
hundreds of thousands of residents can access clean potable water whether or not the city’s 
public water systems are functioning. Through at least 2015, Jihad al-Bina’s six lorry 
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tankers transferred water to 135 tanks and 30 drinking set up in “all areas of the suburb” 
for free. It also carried out maintenance, cleaning, laboratory inspections, and sterilization 
on all of the tanks.343  The effects of the al-’Abbas project were felt most during and 
following conflicts when reliable sources of public water could not be counted on. 
Jihad al-Bina’ also utilizes its water campaign to reinforce its Shia sectarian 
identity. Starting in 2014, the organization launched the “Labayk” water campaign. 
Foundation volunteers pasted Jihad al-Bina’ logos with “Labayk ya Husayn” printed on 
thousands of bottles of water to be handed out to the thousands of funeral procession 
marchers during the commemoration of Ashura held in the dahhiya (Figure 15). The 
organization announced it would carry on the tradition into future years.344   
 
Figure 15. Jihad al-Bina’ volunteers affix logos and Shia slogans to 
bottles of water to be distributed to Ashura commemoration mourners345 
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d. The Good Tree Project 
Starting in 1992, Jihad al-Bina’ undertook an anti-desertification campaign for a 
duality of purposes. First, Jihad al-Bina’ wanted to reforest much of the vegetation burned 
and lost from multiple conflicts and lack of appropriate government support and irrigation 
in agricultural areas in southern Lebanon. Second, as Hezbollah entered electoral politics, 
Jihad al-Bina’ helped the organization soften its image by initiating public good projects. 
In 2007, the initiative was formalized as the “Good Tree” project which distributed nearly 
9.5 million trees by 2015.   
In more recent years, Hezbollah has increasingly publicized and relied upon Jihad 
al-Bina’s good-works campaigns such as the Good Tree project to counter additional 
rounds of U.S. sanctions. The Good Tree project is one of Jihad al-Bina’s most successful 
public awareness and participatory campaigns.346  Each year the organization holds a 
highly-publicized opening ceremony with the Ministry of Agriculture to launch the project 
and advertise its annual goals. It is also able to muster large numbers of volunteers—school 
teachers and children, girls and women’s organizations, the Imam Mahdi Scouts (similar 
to Boy Scouts), local religious leaders, and community members—to distribute and plant 
trees throughout southern Lebanon and the Bekaa valley. Jihad al-Bina’ increasingly 
publicized civil and particularly younger generation involvement following a new round 
of sanctions targeting Hezbollah in 2015 (Figures 16 and 17). The aim of this new emphasis 
was to characterize the United States’ sanctions as evil, as they took aim at pure good will, 
charitable acts, and innocent segments of society. The Good Tree project continues 
executing scores of public awareness campaigns through today.347 
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Figure 16. Imam Mahdi Scouts hand out saplings to drivers on the 
streets of Baalbek in 2018348 
 
Figure 17. A local religious figure plants a tree with school children 
wearing Jihad al-Bina’s volunteer garb in a school in 2016349 
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e. Jihad al-Bina’ Cooperatives  
The objective of Jihad al-Bina’s various cooperatives is to achieve greater 
legitimacy and influence through inter-organizational outreach and integration—cross-
sectarian, governmental, and intergovernmental. According to Jihad al-Bina’, the efforts 
of its cooperatives were beneficial to society in various ways: first, they develop regional 
awareness and concern for the livelihoods of fellow countrymen who support society; 
second, they allow citizens to develop their abilities and become self-reliant; third, new 
investment opportunities are created by promoting local agriculture and industry; fourth, 
cooperative programs reduce unemployment; lastly, their training programs enhance the 
quality of local products, thereby improving quality of life for the consumer and producer. 
Under this construct, the developmental foundation is also able to influence policies 
affecting various parts of government and society. That is not to say that all of the 
foundation’s efforts have a dual nefarious purpose; rather, it demonstrates the extent and 
mechanisms by which Jihad al-Bina can support Hezbollah’s political objectives. From 
2011 at least onward, Jihad al-Bina’ cooperatives conducted numerous coordination 
seminars with government ministries, municipality directorates, counterpart organizations 
in other political parties, and intergovernmental organizations (IGO). As previously 
discussed, Jihad al-Bina’ has already drafted environmental policy legislation. Jihad al-
Bina’ also holds regular cooperative workshops where it informs and trains other 
cooperatives. For example, in 2017 it held a “Workshop of Cooperatives” with the Ministry 
of Agriculture and the Amal Movement’s agricultural cooperative to discuss joint projects 
and funding in Baalbek and al-Hermel.  21 regional cooperatives attended the workshop 
who learned about sterilization methods and the importance of preserving food products. 
To incentivize participation, Jihad al-Bina’ handed out 21 steel tanks to cooperatives that 
attended.350  In 2015, Jihad al-Bina’ set up a meeting with the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the Mount Lebanon Cultivation Authority at the Ouzai Fishing Port. The meeting, which 
was attended by numerous fishers and fishing cooperatives, dealt with the “licensing of 
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transport vehicles dealing with fish and fishing equipment.”  The goal of the meeting was 
to finalize a policy recommendation to the Ministry of Agriculture.351  Because Jihad al-
Bina’ is almost universally seen as a technically and administratively competent 
organization, its training sessions for other cooperatives are held often and attended by 
numerous cooperatives and project managers.352  To promote a sense of unity amongst the 
various cooperatives, Jihad al-Bina’s agricultural cooperative and the Amal movement 
host an annual luncheon with guests that include municipal and government leaders, as 
well as UN leaders on the banks of the Litani river.353 
After the 2008 crisis and signing of the Doha agreement, Jihad al-Bina’ is also 
gaining credibility in the international community. Although cooperating with the 
organization in the wake of U.S. sanctions placed in 2007 and 2009 was taboo, the stink of 
working with the organization seems to be wearing off. As previously demonstrated, the 
organization exhibited world-class technical and administrative expertise by executing the 
lion’s share of postwar recovery and reconstruction in the most damaged territories in 
Lebanon. The UNDP has showed support for Jihad al-Bina’ by participating in numerous 
collaborative workshops aimed at developing Lebanese municipalities.354 
(1) Vocational Training 
Jihad al-Bina’ conducts numerous vocational training courses with a similar 
outreach goal as that of its cooperatives, but with a difference. Jihad al-Bina’s vocational 
training programs reinforce its patronage system with its Shia constituents. They also 
accomplish cross-sectarian outreach by providing a non-threatening forum where any 
willing participant may receive training. Jihad al-Bina’ regularly holds training workshops 
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for thousands of participants covering various topics. For example, one workshop held for 
various women’s organizations focused on how to make decorations with fruit and 
vegetables. While slightly chauvinistic in its characterization, Jihad al-Bina’ and the 
Municipality of al-Bekaa also held “simplified workshops in cooperation with women’s 
organizations” to help them develop artistic skills and experience in leather, wood, and 
wool burning, as well as in making sweets and pastries and crochet.355  Projects like these 
were part of Jihad al-Bina’s overarching vocational training and rehabilitation program 
which also set up artisan markets—and farmer’s markets—where the women could try to  
eventually sell the crafts with skills developed thanks to Jihad al-Bina’. Jihad al-Bina’ also 
held multi-session training workshops for managers and workers of cooperatives that 
focused on raising cattle in the Baalbek-Hermel region, covering topics such as cooperative 
financing, management, and livestock diseases.356   Among other workshops and 
vocational trainings held between 2011 and 2018 by Jihad al-Bina’ were courses for 
workers in the food industry, plastic shaping, labor development, decorating, chocolate 
casting, computer programming and maintenance, and on the modern applications of smart 
phones.357 
(2) Jihad al-Bina’ Markets 
Jihad al-Bina’ cooperatives also set up a number of fixed and mobile markets to 
reinforce a “culture of local consumption” and to improve the economic and social status 
of its constituents. Through its various cooperatives and cooperative networks, Jihad al-
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Bina’ heavily promoted numerous direct-to-consumer art, craft, and farmer’s markets so 
local producers could stop relying on distributors and to create a bond to their fellow 
countrymen. In 2002, Jihad al-Bina’ first opened a local artisan and farmer’s market and 
exhibition in the western Bekaa town of Mashgara entitled “Bounties of the Land” where 
local producers and artisans could sell their products. Its success prompted Jihad al-Bina’ 
to continue the exhibition annually in Mashgara and expand elsewhere. Hoping to replicate 
its success, Jihad al-Bina expanded the construct to Bint Jbeil in 2010.358  In 2014, the 
organization expanded the project with a slightly altered focus on women. In cooperation 
with the Ministry of Industry and Hezbollah’s women’s organization, Jihad al-Bina’ 
opened the five-day “Bounties of My Nation” agricultural and handicraft exhibition in the 
Khalde area south of Beirut.359  At these exhibitions, agricultural cooperatives tried to help 
small farmers by providing an opportunity to sell their products locally, and to improve 
product marketing by adjusting to consumer demand.360 
F. HIZBALLAH INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL PREVENTION ACTS 
(HIFPA) 
To put additional pressure on Iran and to isolate Hezbollah, the U.S. Congress 
passed the HIFPA on December 16, 2015, and renewed with additional stipulations in July 
2017. The purpose of the new policy was to “prevent Hizballah’s global logistics and 
financial network from operating in order to curtail funding of its domestic and 
international activities . . . [and] to block that organization’s ability to fund its global terror 
activities.”361  The 2017 version allows the president to impose secondary sanctions on any 
person he determines provides “significant support” to Hezbollah entities, of which Jihad 
al-Bina’ is specifically named. The amended version includes a language which narrows 
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those the sanctions could affect follow concerns expressed by the Lebanese banking sector 
that the 2015 version could exclude large portions of Lebanon’s Shia population from its 
banking system.362   
This new round of sanctions was very likely imposed on Hezbollah because despite 
sanctions passed in 2006 to prevent Hezbollah from funding Jihad al-Bina’s reconstruction 
efforts, reconstruction progressed virtually unhindered. Despite U.S. sanctions designed to 
prevent international financing dedicated to recovery efforts from reaching Hezbollah, 
Hezbollah financed reconstruction. Jihad al-Bina’s efforts overshadowed the government 
and boosted the Party’s image domestically and internationally. The United States and its 
European allies plan to rally support for their political allies in Lebanon by attracting 
international investments and bolstering the LAF to counter Hezbollah’s power. To this 
end, the Paris Economic Conference for Development (CEDRE) was held in April 2018. 
This meeting generated $11.8 billion in significant loans and pledges from the World Bank, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the 
Islamic Development Bank, as well as from state governments including Saudi Arabia, 
France, Qatar, and the United States.363  The HIFPA in combination with international 
financing is designed to enable to Lebanese state to wrestle loyalty away from Hezbollah 
by financing its own infrastructure and economic development; to bolster its image as Jihad 
al-Bina’s recovery and developmental efforts have done for Hezbollah; and to isolate 
Hezbollah from its financial lifelines so that the government might standout in contrast. 
However, it will not be possible to measure the effects of this latest round of sanctions 
without getting a detailed look into Hezbollah’s coffers, or analyzing its activities through 
the coming years. What is clear, however, is that previous attempts to cut off Jihad al-
Bina’ from funding lifelines through at least 2015 were unsuccessful. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
Jihad al-Bina’ markedly increased the scope and scale of its operations between 
2007 and 2018. Despite U.S. sanctions targeting Jihad al-Bina’ and Wa’ad in 2007 and 
2009, respectively, the organizations expertly executed reconstruction of destroyed areas 
following the 2006 war in the southern dahhiya. Moreover, these organizations helped 
manage reconstruction and recovery efforts elsewhere independently and in collaboration 
with state and international entities. While completing postwar reconstruction, Jihad al-
Bina’ also expanded social welfare and development activities through its numerous 
cooperatives in the Bekaa valley and southern Lebanon, including the ‘Abbas water 
project, the Good Tree project, and the Lands market and other artisan and cultural events. 
Funded directly by Iran, Jihad al-Bina’ built and rebuilt roads and waterways, and other 
infrastructure projects neglected by the state. Lastly, Jihad al-Bina’ conducted numerous 
military-related construction projects throughout southern Lebanon, north of the Litani 
river, and along the Syrian border including UGF bunker and tunnel construction, as well 
as Hezbollah’s dedicated telecommunication system. 
Jihad al-Bina’ did not apparently face difficulty funding its reconstruction activities 
following the 2006 war, nor its developmental and social welfare projects through 2015 
when the HIFPA was passed. Following 2007–2009 U.S. sanctions, the Lebanese 
government only turned over a small portion of the funds designated to citizens represented 
by Jihad al-Bina’ and Wa’ad for reconstruction. Additionally, foreign persons and 
governments anonymously donated to Jihad al-Bina’ to simultaneously support 
reconstruction while defying U.S. efforts to thwart Hezbollah. Lastly, although it is unclear 
if the U.S. Treasury’s designation of Iranian banks utilized to transfer money to Hezbollah 
were effective, Hezbollah undoubtedly received millions in support directly from Iran. 
Even if sanctions against banks took effect, there is evidence to support that Iran flew in 
cash directly as alleged by Walid Jumblatt and the large amounts of cash-on-hand 
distributed by Jihad al-Bina’ to its constituents.   
Because Jihad al-Bina was able to fund and continue operations in the face of 
sanctions, it helped Hezbollah dodge negative public perception from its actions that kicked 
off the 2006 war and even bolstered Hezbollah’s reputation. Hezbollah ran an extremely 
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successful public awareness campaign to promote its reconstruction activities—in contrast 
to the government’s incompetence—through various media outlets, but primarily through 
Al-Manar. Moreover, because U.S. sanctions targeted Jihad al-Bina’s seemingly 
philanthropic efforts following Israel’s blatant targeting of civilian locales, Hezbollah 
emerged as the champion of the oppressed. Defiance and resistance characterized its 
speeches, its efforts, and its identity. As demonstrated, Hezbollah’s popularity grew 




This thesis sought to determine if U.S. sanctions imposed against Jihad al-Bina’ in 
2007 and its Wa’ad project in 2009 had their desired effect. Specifically, this thesis 
attempted to determine: first, if and how U.S. sanctions affected Jihad al-Bina’s ability to 
carry out its work, primarily in the post-2006 war aftermath, but also through the present 
time; and second, if the sanctions obstructed Jihad al-Bina’ from supporting Hezbollah’s 
strategic objectives. To answer these questions, two hypothesis were initially presented: 
(1) U.S sanctions placed against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 and thereafter did not curb the 
organization’s activities. Jihad al-Bina’ effectively circumvented the effects of sanctions 
with the help of foreign funding, by channeling funding from other non-sanctioned entities, 
and by setting up new organizations with parallel functions; and (2) U.S. sanctions helped 
to reinforce Hezbollah’s resistance identity and spurred Hezbollah’s consolidation of 
influence and power in Lebanon’s Shia communities. Because Jihad al-Bina’ provides 
critical services to Lebanon’s Shia territories, the U.S. narrative of Hezbollah’s terrorist 
classification did not resonate. Moreover, U.S. sanctions likely played into the anti-
American, anti-Israeli resistance narrative Hezbollah maintains and helped Hezbollah gain 
sympathy and support away from Amal, which is more closely integrated into what is 
perceived by the Shia community as a weak state apparatus that does not have their interests 
in mind. 
This chapter summarizes the research presented in this thesis, compares Jihad al-
Bina’s activities in two case studies pre- and post-US sanctions in 2007 and 2009, tests the 
latter study against the two hypotheses, and presents the final argument. This thesis argues 
that U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 and against Wa’ad in 2009 failed to cut 
off either group from funding necessary to accomplish activities in the postwar aftermath. 
It also argues that the sanctions were ineffective at stifling Jihad al-Bina’ from advancing 
Hezbollah’s power consolidation and growing popularity through 2015. Jihad al-Bina’ 
effectively circumvented U.S. sanctions through deliberate measures, such as soliciting 
donations from domestic and foreign individuals and organizations. It also funneled 
significant funding from the Lebanese government through its constituents that designated 
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the group as their legal representative for reconstruction. Jihad al-Bina’ also received 
funding directly from foreign governments, primarily Iran, but also from other foreign 
governments who wished to support Lebanon’s recovery through Jihad al-Bina’ 
anonymously. The unexpected enabler for Jihad al-Bina’s anonymous foreign funding was 
the Lebanese government which was perceived as largely corrupt and incompetent. The 
Lebanese government was notoriously sluggish, in part due to its confessional government 
system whose decisions often came to a deadlock. This environment led to multiple 
unfunded or incomplete post-civil war reconstruction projects even as the 2006 war kicked 
off more than fifteen years later. This demonstrates that even though foreign donors 
understood the importance of avoiding U.S. ire by giving money to or working with Jihad 
al-Bina’, they placed a premium on furthering postwar recovery, even if that required 
working with the newly designated terrorist subsidiary. Ultimately, in the choice between 
an ineffective legitimate government and an effective blackballed organization, the 
government lost out. For U.S. sanctions to have been effective, more viable alternative 
options for collaboration should have been available to foreign donors. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
Chapter I presented the research question and a body of authoritative literature on 
Hezbollah’s social service organization history. It also presented a limited but rich body of 
research that focused on Jihad al-Bina’ from its founding in 1988 through the late 2000s. 
The literature review revealed two gaps in the body of research on Jihad al-Bina’: first, 
none of the research explored whether U.S. sanctions targeting the organization had their 
intended effect; and second, no scholarly research documented the organization’s activities 
in great detail after 2010. With this need for research identified, the research question was 
posed: what effect did U.S. sanctions emplaced on Jihad al-Bina’ in 2007 and 2009 have 
on the organization’s ability to execute projects and support Hezbollah’s strategic 
objectives?  To answer this question, this thesis examine Jihad al-Bina’s collective works 
from its inception through 2018. 
Chapter II presented the first case study on Jihad al-Bina’ from 1988 through 2006. 
The chapter started with a discussion on Iran’s revolutionary ideology which was based on 
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fierce anti-Western imperialism and Zionism. This ideology fueled the Islamic revolution 
of 1979 and helped the Khomeinist clergy consolidate power in Iran. It then laid out Iran’s 
“revolution exportation” policy initiated as a result of the Iran-Iraq war but which found 
the most success in Lebanon where Hezbollah formed. Under this policy, Iran seeded and 
nurtured copies of Iranian military, political, and social service institutions within 
Hezbollah, such as Jihad al-Bina’. Additionally, this chapter presented information on 
Jihad al-Bina’s objectives, structure, and funding.   
After a discussion on the founding of Jihad al-Bina’, the chapter primarily focused 
on the developmental foundation’s social service activities in Lebanon’s Shia territories 
which suffered from multiple conflicts and government neglect. These activities included 
public service provision, education, welfare distribution, and construction through 2006. 
This chapter demonstrated that Jihad al-Bina’s activities clearly helped Hezbollah 
consolidate power over the state and from Amal after the organization entered electoral 
politics. The chapter concluded by discussing the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the extent of 
the damage, the creation of the Wa’ad project, and U.S. justifications for sanctioning Jihad 
al-Bina’ in 2007.   
Chapter III presented the Wa’ad project’s postwar reconstruction and Jihad al-
Bina’s social welfare and development activities from 2007 through 2018. The chapter 
opened with an overview on sanctions against Iran. Misperceptions associated with UN 
sanctions against Iraq following the first Gulf War drained the international community’s 
will to impose similar sanctions against Iran to curtail its nuclear program. In response, the 
United States innovated an independent system of sanctions which pressured international 
banks to stop doing business with Iran. Although the UN eventually implemented sanctions 
against Iran, the United States continued and expanded its unilateral sanctions against 
Iranian and Hezbollah institutions such as those imposed on Jihad al-Bina’.   
Even in the face of U.S. sanctions, Jihad al-Bina’s Wa’ad project was a tremendous 
success. U.S. sanctions imposed difficulties on Jihad al-Bina’ and Wa’ad, but did not stifle 
project pace nor completion. The bulk of the recovery projects were completed in the 
promised two year time frame and full project completion was achieved by 2012. Although 
Jihad al-Bina’ and Wa’ad were legal construction and real estate entities outlined in the 
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Lebanese postwar recovery plan, U.S. sanctions stigmatized association with Hezbollah’s 
subsidiaries, resulting in denial of government funds. However, Hezbollah still received 
funds necessary to cover costs of projects from Iran, private donors and organizations, as 
well as some money through Lebanon’s reluctant government.  
Beyond postwar recovery, Jihad al-Bina’ expanded operations between 2009 and 
2018. Jihad al-Bina’ returned its focus to social welfare and development activities through 
its numerous cooperatives in the Bekaa valley and southern Lebanon. These projects 
included the ‘Abbas water project, the Good Tree project, and the Lands market and other 
artisan and cultural events. Jihad al-Bina’ also built and rebuilt roads and water systems, 
and other infrastructure projects neglected by the state. Lastly, Jihad al-Bina’ conducted 
numerous military-related construction projects throughout southern Lebanon, north of the 
Litani river, and along the Syrian border including UGF bunker and tunnel construction, 
as well as Hezbollah’s dedicated telecommunication system. 
B. FINDINGS 
This thesis examined Jihad al-Bina’s activities pre and post 2007 and 2009 U.S. 
sanctions. From 1988 through 2006, Jihad al-Bina’ helped Hezbollah consolidate power 
and territory by providing much-needed services to its Shia constituency in the southern 
suburbs of Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley. Jihad al-Bina’ excelled at 
provisioning services such as providing potable water, collecting garbage, repairing and 
extending new electric systems, and building schools, mosques, hospitals, commercial and 
residential buildings. The organization also invested heavily in agricultural development 
programs including vocational training to raise the standard of living in Shia areas, and to 
help rural residents become self-sufficient. Perhaps most significantly, Jihad al-Bina’ 
expertly and swiftly rebuilt homes in Shia territories following damage sustained in the 
Lebanese civil war, and from multiple conflicts with Israel including the occupation of 
Lebanon, the 1993 bombing campaign, and the 1996 the Grapes of Wrath campaign. These 
reconstruction projects allowed people who fled war torn areas to return to their homes, 
bolstered popular support and affinity for Hezbollah, and promoted a grassroots base upon 
whom Hezbollah could draw for political support and military recruits. Following the end 
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of the civil war and again after Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Jihad al-Bina’ 
helped Hezbollah assert control over its territories.   
This thesis finds that Jihad al-Bina’s service provision contributed to Hezbollah’s 
consolidation of power at the expense of Amal through 1992. Following the split in the 
early 1980s, Hezbollah’s relationship with Amal was mostly antagonistic and at times 
violent through 1990. In large part due to its access to Iran’s finances, Jihad al-Bina’ 
outpaced Amal’s developmental activities and social service provision which nudged 
popular and political support toward Hezbollah in the 1992 general elections. Hezbollah’s 
entry into politics also forced Jihad al-Bina’ to downplay its Iranian connection and 
professionalize. Political legitimization and professionalization facilitated Jihad al-Bina’s 
integration with state organizations. 
However, this thesis also finds that Jihad al-Bina’s service provisions lack 
explanatory power for Hezbollah’s performance in subsequent elections compared to 
Amal. There is likely greater explanatory power for Amal’s resurgence in subsequent 
elections related to Syria’s influence. Amal overtook Hezbollah in the 1996 general 
elections, winning eight seats to Hezbollah’s seven. As discussed in chapter II, relations 
between Amal and Hezbollah normalized after the civil war. Syrian troops occupied 
Lebanon for the next 15 years, and the Syrian government had great influence in Lebanese 
politics and elections. While this thesis did not close examine Syria’s influence into 
Lebanese politics, it finds that factors other than service provision accounted for a slight 
dip in Hezbollah’s electoral performance. Between 1992 and 2005, Jihad al-Bina’s 
expanded post-conflict reconstruction and social service provision. While this did not 
translate into increased electoral performance in 1996, it undoubtedly won Hezbollah 
public support which helped the organization reinforce its resistance identity. Moreover, 
the organization further expanded its independent operations in Shia territories, 
strengthening its patronage networks. Lastly, Jihad al-Bina’ built up the professional and 
administrative capacity during these years which far outpaced the state. This capacity was 
a key factor for post-2006 war reconstruction. 
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This thesis finds that the 2007 and 2009 U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ and 
its Wa’ad project were ineffective in the short and long term. The United States understood 
the role of Jihad al-Bina’ in supporting Hezbollah’s strategic objectives, including 
fostering a loyal base of constituents upon whom the Party could rely on for political 
support and military recruits. The United States overtly stated that its goal behind 
sanctioning Jihad al-Bina’ was ultimately to cut off support for Hezbollah’s terrorist 
activities. The timing of these sanctions—in between cessation of hostilities and the start 
of postwar reconstruction—indicates that the near-term goal was to deny Jihad al-Bina’ all 
sources of funding necessary to conduct reconstruction. These sources included Iranian 
funding, donations from private donors, and money pledged by the international 
community for postwar reconstruction.   
The 2007 and 2009 U.S. sanctions failed to hinder Jihad al-Bina’s postwar 
reconstruction. In order to front the funds necessary to execute projects from 2006 to 2012 
under the Wa’ad program, Jihad al-Bina’ needed access to nearly $1 billion. Although the 
Lebanese government reimbursed the organization a fraction of what it was owed, Jihad 
al-Bina’ was able to pay out readily-available money to constituents and contractors for 
reconstruction projects even while the government refused to turn over money. While some 
constituents complained that what Jihad al-Bina’ turned over was not enough, this had 
nothing to do with the organization’s lack of funds, rather the skyrocketing prices of 
housing and goods in the postwar aftermath. No sources could be located which 
complained of Jihad al-Bina’ failing to make payments for projects performed. 
Additionally, while U.S. sanctions prevented individuals and organizations from 
contributing to Jihad al-Bina’ overtly, it did not deny anonymous donations. Some 
countries who might otherwise have collaborated with Jihad al-Bina’, such as Qatar and 
the UAE decided to directly fund reconstruction projects likely as a result of U.S. sanctions. 
This thesis also finds that a weak, incompetent, and unsympathetic Lebanese central 
government enabled Jihad al-Bina’ to circumvent the sanctions’ financial ramifications, 
and led to the failure of U.S. sanctions’ intent to defame and alienate the organization. By 
the time the 2006 war kicked off, the Lebanese government still had not fulfilled, nor did 
it appear intent on fulfilling post-civil war recovery commitments. When it finally 
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approved its post-2006 war recovery plan, the government made it clear that it had no 
intention to perform reconstruction; rather, it decided to hand money and responsibility to 
citizens take care of the arduous task of reconstruction themselves. Moreover, the 
government appeared more concerned with blaming Hezbollah for the war than it did 
helping its citizens recover. This provided a monumental opportunity for Jihad al-Bina’. 
Had the Lebanese state moved with a similar sense of urgency as Jihad al-Bina’ in 
performing damage assessments, requesting bids, and executing contracts, the public’s 
attention might have focused more on Hezbollah’s faults than its postwar recovery 
accomplishments. However, even if the government showed concern, its lack of ready-
funding and administrative capacity would have encumbered its efforts. Ultimately, the 
government’s inability to execute postwar recovery left it with few options besides 
releasing funds to Jihad al-Bina’, although slowly and much less than what it owed to the 
organization. 
In the long term, 2007 and 2009 sanctions also failed to curtail Jihad al-Bina’s 
token social service provision, developmental projects, and dedicated construction 
projects. Following postwar reconstruction, Jihad al-Bina’ continued and expanded 
existing agricultural development and vocational training throughout southern Lebanon 
and the Bekaa valley. Jihad al-Bina’ also further integrated with governmental 
organizations and IGO’s for Lebanese development through its numerous cooperatives. It 
also helped Hezbollah prepare for the next conflict by constructing dedicated military-
related UGFs and facilities.   
US sanctions targeting Jihad al-Bina’ likely prompted the organization to 
emphasize its philanthropic character, particularly as the United States implemented the 
HIFPA and renewed sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ in 2015 and 2017. Increasingly since 
2010, Jihad al-Bina’ professionalized its website and began publicizing its communal 
integration, particularly with school-aged children through the Good Tree program. 
Moreover, the organization expanded the ‘Abbas water project and Lands markets to 
improve lives and livelihoods in rural areas. 
However, is not quite as clear if 2007 and 2009 sanctions hindered Jihad al-Bina’s 
ability to execute major projects to the scale of the Wa’ad project in the long term. The 
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renewal and expansion U.S. sanctions in 2015 and again in 2017 provides some evidence 
that the United States is trying to block all avenues to financing upon which Jihad al-Bina’ 
and Hezbollah relied upon to circumvent sanctions in 2007 and 2009. It will not be possible 
to evaluate the effectiveness of these new sanctions until Lebanon is again ravaged by war. 
Jihad al-Bina also supported Hezbollah’s strategic objectives by spurring its 
popularity, despite instigating the war and resultant devastation. Because Jihad al-Bina’ 
was able to fund and continue operations in the face of sanctions, it helped Hezbollah dodge 
negative public perception from its actions that kicked off the 2006 war and even bolstered 
Hezbollah’s reputation. Hezbollah ran an effective public relations campaign to promote 
its reconstruction activities. Moreover, amongst Lebanon’s citizenry U.S. sanctions had the 
opposite of their intended effects. Sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ were cited as proof of 
the organization’s resistance identity and moral superiority. The United States backed 
Israel which devastated Lebanon. Hezbollah stood toe-to-toe with Israel militarily and 
eliminated signs of its aggression philanthropically. Both crucial capabilities helped 
Hezbollah rise in prominence and popularity through 2018. 
C. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
This thesis argues that 2007 and 2009 sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ were 
ineffective. The first hypothesis contended that U.S sanctions placed against Jihad al-Bina’ 
in 2007 and thereafter did not curb the organization’s activities. It also argued that Jihad 
al-Bina’ effectively circumvented the effects of sanctions with the help of foreign funding, 
by channeling funding from other non-sanctioned entities, and by setting up new 
organizations with parallel functions. Further, this thesis argues that U.S. sanctions that 
target Jihad al-Bina’ will be ineffective unless the following conditions are met. First, U.S. 
sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ must be proactive, not reactive. The U.S. accused Jihad 
al-Bina’ of setting up Wa’ad to solicit funding and circumvent sanctions. However, the 
Wa’ad project was announced in 2006 prior to sanctions against Jihad al-Bina’ and 
operating for two years before 2009 sanctions were implemented. Had the 2007 sanctions 
included Wa’ad, they might have had a greater impact on the project. Second, sanctions 
cannot be effective while Hezbollah maintains access to foreign funding. Third, unless the 
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US-friendly portions of the Lebanese government possess the political will, administrative 
capacity, and funding to perform timely, meaningful developmental projects during 
peacetime, and immediate, competent postwar recovery, sanctions will be perceived to be 
counterproductive to Lebanon’s interests, not just Hezbollah’s. This thesis advances the 
first hypothesis to advance the primary argument. 
The second hypothesis argued that U.S. sanctions had the opposite of their intended 
effect to Hezbollah’s resistance identity, and that they bolstered rather than damaged 
Hezbollah’s reputation. Hezbollah’s reputation should have suffered a massive hit for 
bringing great destruction to Lebanon in 2006. Instead, it emerged from the crisis as the 
model of anti-Israeli, anti-American resistance and responsible administration. When the 
United States labeled Jihad al-Bina’ a terrorist group, Lebanese citizens scoffed. Jihad al-
Bina’ was the most visible and hard-working recovery organization in areas most 
devastated by Israel. This classification reinforced in the minds of many Lebanese citizens 
the antithetical nature of U.S. policy to the well-being of those who suffered in the war. 
The second hypothesis also argued that U.S. sanctions against Jihad al-Bina helped 
Hezbollah win sympathy away from Amal. The thesis found that Hezbollah’s leadership 
was primarily focused on contrasting its own actions against the Lebanese state, and 
highlighting the evil behind coordinated Israeli actions and U.S. policy. Hezbollah leaders 
did not denounce or try to win over Amal constituents. By the time the 2006 war kicked 
off, Hezbollah and Amal’s political interests were fairly aligned and both groups formed 
the backbone of the March 8 Alliance, the pro-Syrian bloc of Lebanese politics. Moreover, 
in the postwar aftermath, Amal and Hezbollah’s new Loyalty to the Resistance Party lead 
the government opposition movement together, and split seats nearly evenly in the 2009 
and 2018 elections. Therefore, this thesis advances the first half of the second hypothesis 
to advance the principle argument, but finds no evidence to support that U.S. sanctions 
helped Hezbollah wrestle loyalty away from Amal. 
D. IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
Did the U.S. designation of Jihad al-Bina’ as a terrorist organization prevent the 
organization from executing projects and supporting Hezbollah?  The research presented 
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in this thesis suggests that U.S. sanctions did not have their intended effect and were 
counterproductive. Jihad al-Bina’ successfully executed postwar reconstruction and 
expanded developmental activity with greater governmental and intergovernmental 
cooperation through 2018. Moreover, its activities in contrast to the state bolstered 
Hezbollah’s popularity. Lastly, Jihad al-Bina’ adapted the nature of its projects and its 
image so that future U.S. sanctions against the organization will further polarize its 
constituency against the United States making it more difficult for the US-friendly portions 
of the Lebanese government to check Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon. 
While conducting research for this thesis, numerous underexplored topics for 
potential research became apparent. As it did in Lebanon during the civil war, the IRGC is 
cloning Iranian institutions in the midst of the chaos in Syria, Yemeni, and Iraq. For 
example, Jehad-e Sazandegi is currently active in Syria, assisting the Assad regime rebuild 
following eight years of civil war. Before his death in Syria in 2015, IRGC Commander 
Major General Hossein Hamedani stated, “Construction Basij (Basij-e Sazandegi) has been 
established in Syria.”364  The model of Iran’s revolutionary exportation is being copied in 
these areas; specifically, the cloning of Iran’s revolutionary institutions which helped the 
Khomeinists consolidate power in Iran. This thesis recommends a focused research effort 
to discover how and which institutions Iran is exporting. 
As discussed in this thesis, the United States implemented the HIFPA in 2015 
which were renewed in 2018. U.S. Congress is currently putting together a new set of anti-
Hezbollah sanctions in coordination with its reimplementation of sanctions against Iran. 
These sanctions specifically call out Jihad al-Bina’ in attempt to further curtail its current 
and future operations. Observers of the United States’ anti-Iran policies should focus on 
the Lebanese government’s ability to manage future postwar reconstruction and recovery 
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in this environment of new and more comprehensive anti-Iran and anti-Hezbollah 
sanctions. Future research should seek to answer if the Lebanese government is prepared, 
willing, and competent to take on the roles previously shirked and championed by Jihad 
al-Bina’ following the 2006 war with Israel. 
  
134 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
135 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
“A Ceremony Honoring 320 Mothers of Martyrs and Conclusion of a Crochet Course in 
Yunin.” Jihad, April 1, 2017. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=14388&cid=774#.W--McOhKiM9. 
“A Series of Simplified Workshops in Cooperation with Women’s Organizations.” Jihad 
Al-Bina’ Official website, March 11, 2016. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=14166&cid=544#.W_XFWuhKiM8. 
Abbas, Thair. “Lebanon: Hizballah’s Wa’d Director on Plans, Problems to Rebuild 




———. “Report on Plans to Rebuild Hizballah-Controlled Southern Suburb in Beirut.” 
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. August 24, 2007. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/
server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20070824825002#index=11&searchKey=30158129&rpp=500. 
Abrahamian, Ervand. “The Islamic Left.” In Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern 
Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left, 268–79. London - New York: 
Routledge, 2004. 
“AFP: Hizbullah Spends Millions to Rebuild Beirut Stronghold.” Paris AFP (North 
American Service), March 23, 2009. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/
gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
EUP20090323522001#index=10&searchKey=30286397&rpp=500. 
“Agricultural and Handicraft Cooperatives Participated in ‘Bounties of My Nation’ 
Exhibition in Khalde.” Jih, October 20, 2014. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=13654&cid=504#.W_XD5OhKiM8. 
“Agriculture Profile.” Jihad al-Bina’ Official website. Accessed November 21, 2018. 
https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=9&cid=574#.W_S4WOhKiM8. 
Alagha, Joseph. Hizbullah’s Identity Construction. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2011. 
———. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and 
Political Program. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006. 
136 




Al-Amin, Ibrahim. “The International Tribunal and the Current Lebanese Situation.” Talk 




Alamuddin, Hana. “Wa’d: The Reconstruction Project of the Southern Suburb of Beirut.” 
In Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction: Case Studies from Lebanon in the 
Aftermath of the 2006 War, 46–70. London - New York: Routledge, 2010. 
Al-Hariri, Yasir. “Wa’d Company Chairman on Progress of Reconstruction in Southern 
Suburb.” Al-Diyar Online, August 2, 2010. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/
server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20100808610002#index=19&searchKey=30986546&rpp=10. 
Al-Harithy, Howayda. “The Politics of Identity Construction in Post-War 
Reconstruction.” In Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction: Case Studies from 
Lebanon in the Aftermath of the 2006 War, 71–99. London - New York: 
Routledge, 2010. 
“Almost Two Years After War, Displaced Residents of Beirut’s Southern Suburbs 
Return.” The Daily Star. April 30, 2008. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/
server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20080430966002#index=12&searchKey=30216768&rpp=500. 
Al-Qubaysi, Fatin. “Report on Hizballah’s Jihad Al-Bina’ Foundation’s Services to 
Citizens.” Al-Safir. June 17, 2008. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/
gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20080618351001#index=33&searchKey=30224729&rpp=500. 
“An Overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations Involving Sanctions against Iran.” Office of 
Foreign Asset Control. Accessed November 10, 2018. https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.txt. 
Avenue, Human Rights Watch | 350 Fifth, 34th Floor | New York, and NY 10118-3299 
USA | t 1.212.290.4700. “Why They Died | Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during 
the 2006 War.” Human Rights Watch, September 5, 2007. https://www.hrw.org/
report/2007/09/05/why-they-died/civilian-casualties-lebanon-during-2006-war. 
137 
Awakirah, Khadir. “Al-Sanyurah Reported Asked U.S. to Target Hizballah Institutions.” 
Sham Press, February 23, 2007. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/
gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20070224644001#index=49&searchKey=30158129&rpp=500. 
“Ayatollah Montazeri Notes Political Nature of Islam.” Tehran Domestic Service, 
September 28, 1979. 






“BBC News | Middle East | Israeli Planes Create Sonic Boom Confusion over Lebanon.” 
Accessed October 25, 2018. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/231406.stm. 
Betts, Robert Brenton. “Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism.” Middle East 
Policy; Washington 12, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 160–62. 
Bissat, L.E. “The Role of Civil Society in Rural Community Development: Two Case 
Studies from Lebanon.” UN House, Beirut: Joint ESCWA-World Bank Capacity 
Building Workshop on Rural Development in the Middle East, June 3, 2002. 
Blanford, Nicholas. “Cuts to U.S. Aid Will Affect Support to Lebanese Army.” The Arab 
Weekly, September 25, 2017. https://thearabweekly.com/cuts-us-aid-will-affect-
support-lebanese-army. 
———. “Lebanese Hezbollah Offers a Glimpse of Its Firepower.” Atlantic Council. 
Accessed November 21, 2018. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-
atlanticist/lebanese-hezbollah-offers-a-glimpse-of-its-firepower. 
“‘Bounties of the Land’ in Bint Jbeil and Mashgara.” Jihad al-Bina’ Official website, 
September 2010. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=424&cid=504#.W_XZDfZFytV. 
Byman, Daniel, and Bilal Y. Saab. “Hezbollah in a Time of Transition.” Brookings 
Institution Center for Middle East Policy, November 2014. 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Hezbollah-in-a-Time-of-
Transition.pdf. 
Chehabi, H. E. “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade.” In Distant Relations: 
Iran and Lebanon in Teh Last 500 Years, 201–30. Oxford: I.B. Tauris, 2006. 
Chehabi, H.E. “Iran and Lebanon after Khomeini.” In Distant Relations: Iran and 
Lebanon in the Last 500 Years. London - New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006. 
138 
“The Conclusion of a Sweets and Pastries Course in Al-Rum.” Jihad Al-Bina’ Official 
website, October 28, 2017. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=14461&cid=544#.W_XAJ-hKiM_. 
 “Cooperative Sector and Local Consumption Culture.” Jihad al-Bina’ Official website, 
September 11, 2009. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=197&cid=504#.W_XP4ehKiM8. 
Cordesman, Anthony H, and Abraham Wagner. The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: 
The Iran-Iraq War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. 
“Cultivation of 1500 Forest and Fruit Trees in Jihad al-Bina’ Aforrestation Campaign.” 
Jihad al-Bina’ Official website. March 31, 2016. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=14176&cid=744#.W_m4COhKiM8. 
Dagher, Ramez. “The War Files (Part XII)—Amal, Hezbollah, Syria: Yes, They Were At 
War.” Moulahazat (blog), April 12, 2015. https://moulahazat.com/2015/04/12/
the-war-files-part-xii-amal-hezbollah-syria-the-clashes-that-preceded-the-
alliance/. 
Danawi, Dima. Hizbullah’s Pulse. First. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2002. 
Debs, Habib. “Reconstruction of Bint Jbeil and Social Representatinos of the Urban 
Space.” In Lessons in Postwar Reconstruction: Case Studies from Lebanon in the 
Aftermath of the 2006 War, 100–132. New York: Routledge, 2010. 
“Distribution of Trees in the City of Baalbek.” Jihad al-Bina’ Official website. April 2, 
2018. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=14497&cid=744#.W_mzr-
hKiM8. 
“Donors Make Huge Lebanon Pledge.” BBC News, September 1, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5303410.stm. 
Dyson, Tim, and Valeria Cetorelli. “Changing Views on Child Mortality and Economic 
Sanctions in Iraq: A History of Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics.” BMJ Global 
Health 2, no. 2 (July 1, 2017). https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000311. 
“Elie Hobeika’s Assassination: Covering Up the Secrets of Sabra and Shatilla.” Accessed 
October 9, 2018. http://www.jcpa.org/art/brief1-17.htm. 
Erlanger, Steven, and Richard A. Oppel Jr. “A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel 
with Its Training, Tactics, and Weapons.” New York Times. August 7, 2006. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07hezbollah.html. 
“Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities 
and Support for Terrorism.” Accessed November 13, 2018. 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp644.aspx. 
139 
Gates, Robert M. “2008 U.S. National Defense Strategy.” Washington, D.C.: Department 
of Defense, June 2008. http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/
2008_NDS.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-124535-363. 
Ghanim, Marcelle. “Lebanon: Junblatt Interviewed on Attitudes to Hizballah, Syria, U.S. 
Visit, Tribunal.” Interview. Kalam Al-Nass. Beirut: LBC Europe Satellite 
Television, February 22, 2007. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/
gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20070226611001#index=45&searchKey=30158129&rpp=500. 
“Graduation Ceremony for Training Courses Held in Hermel.” Jihad Al-Bina’ Official 
website, November 28, 2017. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=14475&cid=544#.W_XAG-hKiM_. 
Halabi, Nour. “The Contingency of Meaning to the Party of God: Carnivalesque Humor 
in Revolutionary Times.” International Journal of Communication, no. 11 (2017): 
4032–45. 
Hamzeh, Ahmad. In the Path of Hizbullah. First. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 2004. 
———. “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary 
Accommodation.” Third World Quarterly 14, no. 2 (January 1993): 321–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599308420327. 
Harb, Ali. “‘A Regional Power’: How Fighting Assad’s War Transformed Hezbollah.” 
Middle East Eye, October 9, 2017. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/regional-
power-how-syria-civil-war-changed-hezbollah-lebanon-israel-1187885930. 
Harb, Mona, and Mona Fawaz. “Influencing the Politics of Reconstruction in Haret 
Hreik.” In Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction: Case Studies from Lebanon in the 
Aftermath of the 2006 War, 21–45. London - New York: Routledge, 2010. 
Harel, Amos, and Gili Cohen. “Hezbollah: Not a Terror Group but a Midsized Army.” 
Haaretz, December 7, 2016. https://www.haaretz.com/st/c/prod/eng/2016/07/
lebanon2/. 
Harik, Judith. “The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias.” In Papers on 
Lebanon, 1–54. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1994. 
https://lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/6ea83fe14.-The-Public-
and-Social-Services-of-the-Lebanese-Militias.-Judith-Harik-1994.pdf. 
Harik, Judith P. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. London - New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2005. 
140 
———. “Hezbollah’s Public and Social Services and Iran.” In Distant Relations: Iran 
and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, 259–86. London: I.B. Tauris and St. Martin’s 
Press, 2006. 
Hermez, Sami. Review of Review of Hezbollah: A Short History, by Augustus Richard 
Norton. International Journal of Middle East Studies 41, no. 1 (2009): 148–49. 
“Hezbollah Mobilizes for Decisive Qalamoun Battle | News , Lebanon News | THE 
DAILY STAR.” Accessed May 23, 2018. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/
Lebanon-News/2015/Mar-25/292077-hezbollah-mobilizes-for-decisive-
qalamoun-battle.ashx. 
“Hezbollah, the Lebanese Sectarian State, and Sectarianism.” Middle East Institute. 
Accessed June 12, 2018. https://www.mei.edu/content/map/hezbollah-lebanese-
sectarian-state-and-sectarianism. 
Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–102, USC 
1701 50 (2015). https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/hifpa.pdf. 




“Hizbullah Official on Surveillance Cameras, Communications Network.” Al-Sharq Al-
Awsat. May 7, 2008. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20080507825001#index=19&searchKey=30216768&rpp=500. 
“The Hizballah Program – An Open Letter,” August 21, 2006. https://web.archive.org/
web/20060821215729/http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm. 
 “Hizbullah Spends Millions to Rebuild Southern Suburbs.” The Daily Star. March 24, 
2009. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/GMP20090324966009. 
“Hizbullah, State, Arab Donors Help in Reconstruction of South.” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 
July 16, 2007. http://www.asharqalawsat.com/; https://www.opensource.gov/
portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20070716825005#index=18&searchKey=30158129&rpp=500. 









Humud, Carl E. “Lebanon.” Congressional Service Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Congress, June 19, 2018. https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1075866/
download. 
“Interview with Jihad Al-Bina’ General Director Qasim Al-Aliq.” Al-Manar News TV. 
Beirut: Al-Manar TV, June 14, 2008. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/
server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20080614644001#index=32&searchKey=30224729&rpp=500. 
“Interview with Lebanese Experts on Hezbollah’s Telecommunications Network.” Inside 
Story. Beirut: Al-Jazeera English, May 7, 2008. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=SW8JFfr_E68. 
“Iran Week: Hezbollah’s Environmental Warriors.” Tablet Magazine, June 27, 2017. 
http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/238801/hezbollahs-
environmental-warriors. 




“Jihad Al Binaa - Lebanon - Al Mashriq.” Accessed August 28, 2018. 
http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/jihad-el-binna/. 
“Jihad al-Bina’: A Pillar of Victory and Liberation in Development and Giving,” April 
24, 2018. https://alahednews.com.lb/163562/222. 
“Jihad Al-Bina’ Cooperatives Archive.” Jihad Al-Bina’ Official website, 2018. 
https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/catessays.php?cid=504&pid=464. 
“Jihad al-Bina’: Directorate of the South Participates in  ‘Nabatiya Municipality 
Deevelopment’ held at Parliament.” Al-Wadi News. January 23, 2018. 
http://wadipress.com/?p=1353889. 
“Jihad al-Bina’: Good Tree Project Archive.” Jihad al-Bina’ Official website. Accessed 
March 30, 2018. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/catessays.php?cid=744&page=1. 
“Jihad Al-Bina’ Green Bulletins.” Jihad Al-Bina’ Official website. Accessed November 
1, 2018. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/catessays.php?cid=937&pid=444. 
142 
Jishi, Hasan. Wa’d Project Manager: Southern Suburb Reconstruction Going According 




Joint Chiefs Of Staff Washington Dc. “The National Military Strategy of the United 
States of America 2015: The United States Military’s Contribution to National 
Security:” Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, June 1, 2015. 
https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA619156. 
“Joint Cooperatives Workshop Held in Baalbek.” Jihad al-Bina’ Official website, 
February 3, 2017. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=14356&cid=504#.W_W7tvZFytV. 
“Jumblatt, Ja’ja Cooperate with Israel to Kill Hizballah Figure, Gen Awn.” Al-Manar 
News TV. Beirut: Al-Manar TV, May 5, 2008. https://www.opensource.gov/
portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20080505640004. 
Karam, Patricia. Opening Remarks: Reconstruction in Lebanon, § U.S. Institute of Peace 
(2006). https://www.c-span.org/video/?194097-1/reconstruction-lebanon. 
Kittrie, Orde F. “New Sanctions for a New Century: Treasury’s Innovative Use of 
Financial Sanctions.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 
Spring, no. 789 (2009): 789–822. 
Kobeissy, Siraj. “‘The Most Beautiful Promise’ Is Fulfilled, People Return Home with 
Dignity.” Al-Moqawama.Org. May 12, 2012. http://www.waad.org.lb/
pressinformation.asp?id=150&catid=28. 
Kosterlitz, Julie. “Squeezing Iran.” National Journal 39, no. 35 (September 1, 2007): 22–
29. 
“‘Labayk’ Water Project.” Jihad Al-Bina’ Official website. 2014. 
https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=13785&cid=734#.W_W1GvZFytV. 
“Lebanese Hezbollah: A Profile.” Federal Research Division. Washington, D.C.: Library 
of Congress, April 2012. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/26508343/CTTSO-FRD-
Hezbollah_Final_Report_Apr%202012-r.pdf. 
“Lebanon: Advertising for Promise Project to Reconstruct Southern Suburbs Starts.” 




“Lebanon’s Hizballah Reportedly Preparing Attacks on Israel.” Intelligence Online, sec. 
July 22, 2010. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/
server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
EUP20100721177004#index=14&searchKey=30986546&rpp=10. 
Levinson, Charles. “Hizbollah Buys Frontier Land to Attack Israel.” The Telegraph. 
August 12, 2007. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1560119/
Hizbollah-buys-frontier-land-to-attack-Israel.html. 
Levitt, Matthew. Attacking Hezbollah’s Financial Network: Policy Options, § Committee 
on Foreig Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (2017). https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/FA/FA00/20170608/106094/HHRG-115-FA00-Wstate-LevittM-
20170608.pdf. 
———. “Hiding Terrorist Activity.” Blog. Middle East Strategy at Harvard (blog), 
January 6, 2009. https://blogs.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/hiding-terrorist-activity/. 
———. “Making Iran Feel the Pain.” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2007. 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/
docview/308702259?accountid=12702. 
Levitt, Matthew, and Michael Jacobson. “The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and 
Freezing Terrorist Finances.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, no. 
Policy Focus #89 (November 2008). http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/
Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus89.pdf. 
Lob, Eric. “An Institutional History of the Iranian Construction Jihad: From Inception to 
Institutionalization (1979-2011).” Dissertation, Princeton, 2013. 
———. “Construction Jihad: State-Building and Development in Iran and Lebanon’s 
Shi’i Territories.” Third World Quarterly, May 3, 2018. 
Lynch, Thomas F. “Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God.” Prism : 
A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations; Washington 5, no. 1 (2014): 
132–35. 
Mackey, Sandra. The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation. New York: 
Dutton, 1996. 
Makhzoumi, Jala. “Marginal Landscapes, Marginalized Rural Communities: Sustainable 
Post-War Recovery in Southern Lebanon.” In Lessons in Post-War 
Reconstruction: Case Studies from Lebanon in the Aftermath of the 2006 War. 
London - New York: Routledge, 2010. 




Margulies, Peter. “Terrorist Sanctions: The Clash in U.S. and EU Approaches.” Lawfare, 
February 17, 2016, 3. 
Mattis, Jim. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.” U.S. Department of 
Defese, 2018. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-
Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
“Middle East Crisis: Facts and Figures,” August 31, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/5257128.stm. 
Milani, Mohsen. The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic 
Republic. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. 
“The Ministry of Agriculture and Jihad al-Bina’ Organize a Meeeting at the Port of Ouzai 
on Sea Fishing.” Lebanon Files. June 4, 2015. http://www.lebanonfiles.com/news/
893106. 
Moehr, Ole. “Secondary Sanctions: A First Glance.” Atlantic Council. Accessed 
September 21, 2018. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/ole-
moehr-3. 
Mustafa, Amin. “Hizballah’s Wa’d Director on Reconstruction Efforts, Qatari Funding.” 
Al-Watan Online. April 20, 2009. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/
gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20090422054003#index=12&searchKey=30286397&rpp=500. 
“Nasrallah on ‘Victory’ Anniversary, Warns of ‘Big Surprise’ If Attacked.” Al-Manar 
News TV. Beirut: Al-Manar TV, August 14, 2007. https://www.opensource.gov/
portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20070814632002#index=13&searchKey=30158129&rpp=500. 
“Nasrallah to Deliver Speech on Latest Developments.” Al-Manar News TV. Beirut: Al-
Manar TV, October 9, 2010. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/
gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20101008700008#index=27&searchKey=30986546&rpp=10. 
“Nasrallah Warns Israel of ‘Big Surprise.’” Al-Manar News TV. Beirut: Al-Manar TV, 
August 14, 2007. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
FEA20070815279912#index=12&searchKey=30158129&rpp=500. 
Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short Story. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2007. 
“The Official website of Jihad Al Bina Foundation.” Accessed October 22, 2018. 
https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/catessays.php?cid=694&pid=199. 
145 
 “Olive Cooperatives: Modern Application of Smart Phones.” Al-Manar News TV. Beirut: 
Al-Manar TV, September 17, 2015. http://mail.almanar.com.lb/programs/
pdetails.php?did=1074181&pid=3647&eid=162732&wid=4420. 
Ostovar, Afshon. Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guard. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
“The Presidential Election: A Race between the Parliamentary Quorum and the Quorum 




Qansou, Ghassan. “Jihad Al-Bina’ Courses in Hermel and the Northern Bekaa.” Al 
Hermel Blog (blog), February 20, 2011. http://alhermel.blogspot.com/2011/02/
blog-post_20.html. 
Qassem, Naim. Hizbullah: A Story from Within. Third. London: Saqi Books, 2012. 
Qutish, Mohamed. “Agricultural Cooperative - Annual Luncheon Held in Nur Astraha on 
the Banks of the Litani River.” Ya Sawr. May 7, 2017. http://yasour.org/2016/
list.php?go=fullnews&newsid=105653. 
Ranstorp, Magnus. Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. 
New York: MacMillan Press, 1997. 
“Reconstruction of Lebanon’s Economy.” Democracy Now, August 2, 2007. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szyA8-VER1g. 
Redd, Benjamin. “New Vote Law Leaves Lebanese Perplexed.” The Daily Star. May 5, 
2018. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Mar-07/440551-
new-vote-law-leaves-lebanese-perplexed.ashx. 
“Restoration of Damage Caused by Ruwais Explosion.” Jihad Al-Bina’ Official website. 
Accessed November 21, 2018. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=7744&cid=714#.W_WDXOhKiM8. 
“Results of the 2018 Lebanese General Elections وزارة الداخلیة والبلدیات | التفاصیل.” Lebanese 
Ministry of the Interior, May 8, 2018. http://www.interior.gov.lb/
AdsDetails.aspx?ida=281. 
Royce, Edward R. [R-CA-39]. Hizballah International Financial Prevention Act of 2015, 
Pub. L. No. 114–102 (2015). https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/
house-bill/2297. 
146 
Samore, Gary. “Sanctions Against Iran: A Guide to Targets, Terms, and Timetables.” 
Addendum to Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal. Cambridge: Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, June 2015. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/files/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf. 
“Sanctions List Search.” Office of Foreign Asset Control, February 20, 2007. 
https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=1565. 
Scolari, Rolla. “Lebanese Minister Details Hizballah’s Telecommunications Network.” Il 
Foglio. May 18, 2008. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
EUP20080520029007#index=27&searchKey=30224729&rpp=500. 
“SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS FOR END TO HOSTILITIES BETWEEN 
HIZBOLLAH, ISRAEL, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1701 
(2006) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” Accessed November 13, 2018. 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm. 
“Security Council Resolution 1803 - UNSCR.” Accessed November 13, 2018. 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1803. 
Sen, Ashish Kumar. “A Brief History of Sanctions on Iran.” Atlantic Council. Accessed 
November 8, 2018. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-brief-
history-of-sanctions-on-iran. 
Shaery-Eisenlohr, Roschanack. Shi’ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making 
of National Identitiees. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
Shapira, Shim’on. “The Nexus between Iranian National Banks and International 
Terrorist Financing.” The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, December 19, 
2007. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/GMP20080218739007. 
Sharon, Itamar. “Hezbollah Shows Off ‘Advanced Tunnel Network” on Israeli Border.” 
The Times of Israel, May 23, 2015. https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-
flaunts-advanced-tunnel-network-on-israeli-border/. 
Sly, Liz. “Iraqis Think the U.S. Is in Cahoots with the Islamic State, and It Is Hurting the 





Sobelman, Daniel. “New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal 
from Lebanon.” Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv 
University, January 2004. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/3837556/
GMP20040227000055001.pdf. 
“State Sponsor of Terrorism.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 1, 2018. 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. 
Sullivan, Marisa. “Hezbollah in Syria.” Middle East Security Report. Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for the Study of War, 2014. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/
default/files/Hezbollah_Sullivan_FINAL.pdf. 
“Syria: Sources Say Hizballah Establishes New Headquarters, Deploys Elements in 




Taremi, Kamran. “At the Service of Hizbollah: The Iranian Ministry of Construction 
Jihad in Lebanon, 1988–2003.” Politics, Religion & Ideology 16, no. 2–3 (April 3, 
2015): 248–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2015.1080164. 
Telhami, Shibley. “2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll.” Survey of the Anwar Sadat 
Chair for Peace and Development. University of Maryland, 2008. 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/
0414_middle_east_telhami.pdf. 
“The Ten-Year Performance Record of the Construction Jihad from 1979 until 1989.” 
Publications and Press Office, 1991. 
Tramballi, Ugo. “Lebanon: Italy ‘Country of Preference’ for Reconstruction, 
Commencing with Army.” Milan II Sole-24 Ore. September 6, 2006. 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/EUP20060906058005. 
“Treasury Designates Hizballah’s Construction Arm.” Accessed May 24, 2018. 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp271.aspx. 
“Treasury Targets Hizballah Construction Company.” Accessed May 8, 2018. 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1341.aspx. 
“Treasury Targets Hizballah Construction Company.” Accessed July 26, 2018. 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1341.aspx. 
UNSCR 1737 (2006). https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1737-%282006%29. 
148 
“U.S. Foreign Aid by Country.” Accessed September 22, 2018. 
https://explorer.usaid.gov//cd. 
“US Goes after Hizbullah’s Waad Rebuilding Effort.” The Daily Star. January 11, 2009. 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/GMP20090111966010. 
“Walid Junblatt Holds News Conference, Discusses Situation in Lebanon.” News 




“Washington’s Weird Way of Trying to Make Friends in Lebanon.” The Daily Star. 
February 22, 2007, sec. Editorial. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Editorial/
2007/Feb-22/113295-washingtons-weird-way-of-trying-to-make-friends-in-
lebanon.ashx. 
“Water Projects Brief.” Jihad Al-Bina’ Official website. Accessed November 1, 2018. 
https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=4934&cid=734#.W_WjL-hKiM8. 
“Workshop on Project Management in Hermel.” Jihad al-Bina’ Official website, May 3, 
2014. https://jihadbinaa.org.lb/
essaydetails.php?eid=11764&cid=504#.W_XD7ehKiM8. 
Worth, Robert F., and Nada Bakri. “Deal for Lebanese Factions Leaves Hezbollah 
Stronger.” The New York Times, May 22, 2008, sec. Middle East. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/22/world/middleeast/22lebanon.html. 
Wright, Robin. “Stuart Levey’s War.” New York Times, October 31, 2008. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/magazine/02IRAN-t.html. 
Zaatari, Mohammed. “AUB Project Aims to Instill Sense of Appreciation for 
Biodiversity.” The Daily Star. January 19, 2010. https://www.opensource.gov/
portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/
GMP20100119966040#index=3&searchKey=30986546&rpp=10. 
Zaraqit, Maha. “Jihad al-Bina’: Restoration of 940 Buildings and Planting 1.7 Million 
Trees.” Al-Akhbar. June 25, 2008. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/
gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_0_43/content/Display/9332595/V-
GMP20080626611001001.htm. 
Agence France Presse, April 2, 1997. www.farsinet.com/news/apr97b.html. 
 
   
  
149 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
